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FROM THE EDITORS 
Carlos Alberto Sánchez 
SAN JOSE STATE UNIVERSITY 
Lori Gallegos de Castillo 
TEXAS STATE UNIVERSITY 
For this issue of the newsletter, we have brought together 
a variety of essays that showcase the true diversity of 
philosophical projects occupying our Hispanic/Latinx 
philosophical community. We’ve divided this issue into 
three sections: the first, a special cluster edited by 
Stephanie Rivera Berruz, is comprised of papers delivered 
at the Latinx Philosophy Conference at Marquette University 
in May of this year; the second section is comprised of four 
articles dealing with issues of race and embodiment, Latinx 
thought, exile, and Latin American Marxism; and, finally, the 
third section includes an excerpt from a forthcoming book 
by Susana Nuccetelli and a book review of Linda Martín 
Alcoff’s Rape and Resistance. 
We begin this issue with a Special Cluster of essays that 
came out of a 2019 conference jointly hosted by the Fourth 
Latinx Philosophy Conference and the Society for Mexican 
American Philosophy at Marquette University. Stephanie 
Rivera Berruz, one of the conference organizers, introduces 
this exciting collection of papers. 
In the following section, Omar Rivera offers a critique of José
Carlos Mariátegui’s aesthetics, namely, that its representative
investments in indigeneity can essentialize Andean
peoples and cultures in order to support Mariátegui’s own
revolutionary program. Then, reading Mariátegui against
himself, Rivera approaches Mariátegui’s Seven Essays by
drawing from a notion of racial embodiment taken from
W.E.B. DuBois, Frantz Fanon, and Linda Martín Alcoff. This
counter-reading reveals a dynamic and contextual approach
to racial embodiment, one that complicates Mariátegui’s
adherence to a racist representative aesthetics of liberation. 
In that same section, the essay by Alejandro Vallega seeks 
to dismantle the traditional, reductionist treatment of 
Latino/a/x identities as a mere racial identity. He calls on 
us to engage the diversity of Latino/a/x lineages, histories, 
and experiences which, he argues, ontologically ground a 
rich and distinctive Latino/a/x thought and consciousness. 
Specifically, building on the work of Aníbal Quijano, Vallega 
shows how the temporality of Latin American experience 
unsettles the single history of progress established by the 
coloniality of power and knowledge. 
Sergio Lomeli Gamboa’s “Jose Revueltas’ Marxism: A 
Struggle Against Orthodoxy” is an excellent introduction 
into the thought of this brilliant Mexican thinker. Known 
mostly for his fictional writing, Revueltas is also one of 
Marx’s most original readers and a fierce critic of “Orthodox 
Marxism.” Gamboa’s reading here seeks not only to locate 
Revueltas in the center of Mexico’s philosophical landscape 
of the last century, but also at the center of Mexico’s cultural 
and political life. This care for the Mexican circumstance is 
symptomatic of Mexican philosophy as a whole, and the 
essay presented here is exemplary in its execution. To 
close off this section, Arturo Aguirre’s short piece aims to 
think about the concept of “exile” as an operative concept 
capable of being deployed for the analysis of the modern 
dispossessed. Beginning with an “archeology” of the 
concept in Plato’s Laws, Aguirre ends by suggesting that 
the concept of exile is intimately violent. 
In the third section, we are pleased to offer our readers 
an excerpt from Susana Nuccetelli’s forthcoming book 
on Latin American philosophy. In this intriguing essay, 
she considers some of Karl Marx’s criticisms of Simón 
Bolívar. In particular, she focuses on the nature of Bolívar’s 
sympathies for authoritarian government. 
Finally, we close our newsletter with Juan Colomina­
Alminana’s review of Linda Martín Alcoff’s Rape and 
Resistance, which centers on historical, institutional factors 
that allow and condone sexual violence and assault. 
Colomina-Alminana focuses his commentary on Alcoff’s 
discussion of how to transform the unjust conditions that 
currently frame survivors’ speech and the handling of that 
speech by others. 
CALL FOR SUBMISSIONS 
The APA Newsletter on Hispanic/Latino Issues in Philosophy 
is accepting contributions for the SPRING 2020 issue. Our 
readers are encouraged to submit original work on any topic 
related to Hispanic/Latino thought, broadly construed. We 
publish original, scholarly treatments, as well as reflections, 
book reviews, and interviews. Please prepare articles for 
anonymous review. 
All submissions should be accompanied by a short 
biographical summary of the author. Electronic submissions 
are preferred. All submissions should be limited to 5,000 
words (twenty double-spaced pages) and must follow 
the APA guidelines for gender-neutral language and The 
Chicago Manual of Style formatting. All articles submitted 
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to the newsletter undergo anonymous review by members 
of the Committee on Hispanics. 
BOOK REVIEWS
Book reviews in any area of Hispanic/Latino philosophy, 
broadly construed, are welcome. Submissions should 
be accompanied by a short biographical summary of the 
author. Book reviews may be short (500 words) or long 
(1,500 words). Electronic submissions are preferred. 
DEADLINES
Deadline for spring issue is November 15. Authors should 
expect a decision by January 15. Deadline for the fall issue 
is April 15. Authors should expect a decision by June 15. 
Please send all articles, book reviews, queries, comments, 
or suggestions electronically to the editor, Carlos 
Alberto Sánchez, at carlos.sanchez@sjsu.edu, or by post: 
Department of Philosophy, San Jose State University, One 
Washington Sq., San Jose, CA 95192-0096. 
FORMATTING GUIDELINES
The APA Newsletters adhere to The Chicago Manual of
Style. Use as little formatting as possible. Details like page
numbers, headers, footers, and columns will be added
later. Use tabs instead of multiple spaces for indenting. Use
italics instead of underlining. Use an “em dash” (—) instead
of a double hyphen (--). Use endnotes instead of footnotes.
Examples of proper endnote style: John Rawls, A Theory of
Justice (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1971), 90. See
Sally Haslanger, “Gender and Race: (What) Are They? (What)
Do We Want Them to Be?” Noûs 34 (2000): 31–55. 
SPECIAL CLUSTER 
Latinx Philosophy Conference 
Stephanie Rivera Berruz 
MARQUETTE UNIVERSITY
In the spring (May 2–4, 2019), the Fourth Latinx Philosophy 
Conference partnered with the APA Society for Mexican 
American Philosophy (SMAP) for one full-length conference 
at Marquette University. The conference celebrated 
philosophical work by Latinx and Latin American 
philosophers on issues particularly relevant to Latinx 
and Latin American communities. The event was the first 
of its kind and successfully brought together scholars 
working on a broad range of topics and from a wide 
variety of philosophical and interdisciplinary traditions. 
The program featured the work of over a dozen scholars 
at different stages of their academic careers and was 
keynoted by Jacqueline Martínez (Arizona State University) 
and José Medina (Northwestern University). Historically, 
the conference has intended to bring scholars together 
who otherwise would not have had an opportunity to 
intersect. In this vein, the special cluster featured in this 
issue showcases the possibilities of such intersection. 
The authors here further remind readers that our current 
political climate, particularly as it pertains to immigration, 
is material, lived, and with great consequence. 
Allison Wolf’s essay “Dying in Detention as an Example of 
Oppression” argues for the importance of a structural lens 
of oppression in order to better understand the reasons 
why Raul Morales, Moises Tino, Roxsana Hernández, and 
Raquel Calderon died while in US detention. Alan Chavoya’s 
essay, “A Negative Path Toward Anti-Immigration Policy,” 
maintains that current US non-racist immigration policy 
does little more than contribute to the myth of a post-racial 
social order while at the same time perpetuating mass 
amounts of racial injustice. As a result, Chavoya defends 
the possibilities of anti-racist immigration policy by using 
a negative conception of justice as the starting point. 
Considering issues of injustice and immigration on an 
international scale, “Immigration and International Justice” 
by Jorge M. Valadez explores the moral dimensions of the 
territorial rights of states as a mechanism for developing 
immigration policies that can address injustices globally. 
Juxtaposed, Wolf, Chavoya, and Valadez importantly 
remind us of the ways in which the intersection between 
immigration and criminalization are structurally embedded 
into our social fabrics, and they demand more careful and 
nuanced social and political analysis. Eric Bayruns Garcia 
and Damián Bravo Zamora shift attention toward the 
epistemic dimensions of our social fabric. In “Are Our Racial 
Concepts Necessarily Essentialist Due to Our Cognitive 
Nature?” Bayruns Garcia explores the epistemic content 
framed by the social constructionism of race as argued by 
Mallon and Kelley. He maintains that their position does not 
hold by drawing on historical references to racial concepts 
as well as the lived experiences of race in Dominican NY-
based communities. Bravo Zamora demands “Epistemic 
Humility Now!” as he develops an account of epistemic 
humility that can appreciate a multiplicity of worldviews 
without collapsing into relativism. 
In sum, the essays in this special cluster showcase the 
importance of spaces/events like the Latinx Philosophy 
Conference as well as the Society for Mexican American 
Philosophy. The topics taken up here demonstrate the 
need for the development of ideas that track the lived 
experiences of our communities. It is my sincere hope 
that projects like these will continue to pave the way for 
a burgeoning field of work rooted in demands for social 
justice. 
Dying in Detention as an Example of 
Oppression 
Allison Wolf
SIMPSON COLLEGE 
INTRODUCTION 
On December 8, 2018, seven-year-old Jakelin Caal Maquin 
died in US custody. Shortly thereafter, on Christmas Day, 
eight-year-old Felipe Alonzo-Gomez died from the flu, also 
while in US custody.1 Given the widespread news coverage, 
many may have heard about the tragic deaths of these 
children. But let me introduce you to a few more. 
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First, Raul Ernesto Morales-Ramos: 
On April 6, 2015, Raul Ernesto Morales-Ramos, a 
44-year-old citizen of El Salvador, died at Palmdale 
Regional Medical Center in Palmdale, California 
of organ failure, with signs of widespread cancer. 
He had entered immigration custody four years 
earlier in March 2011. An ICE investigation into the 
death of Morales-Ramos found that the medical 
care he received at both facilities failed to meet 
applicable standards of care in numerous ways. 
Two independent medical experts, analyzing ICE’s 
investigation for Human Rights Watch, agreed 
that he likely suffered from symptoms of cancer 
starting in 2013, but that the symptoms essentially 
went unaddressed for two years, until a month 
before he died. . . . Throughout this time, Morales-
Ramos repeatedly begged for care. In February 
2015, he submitted a grievance in which he wrote, 
“To who receives this. I am letting you know that I 
am very sick and they don’t want to care for me. 
The nurse only gave me ibuprofen and that only 
alleviates me for a few hours. Let me know if you 
can help me.”2 
Then, there is Roxsana Hernández: 
Roxsana Hernández, a 33-year-old trans woman 
seeking asylum in the US from Honduras, 
reportedly died from HIV-related complications 
following an alleged five-day detention in what’s 
known by immigrant rights groups as the “ice 
box”—Ice [sic] detention facilities notorious for 
their freezing temperatures.3 
During her first week in the United States, Roxy’s 
body and spirit quickly deteriorated. . . . Soon after 
asking for asylum, Hernandez was initially held 
at a detention center by US Customs and Border 
Protection. She was cold, lacked adequate food 
or medical care, and was held in a [freezing] cell 
[known as an ice box] with the lights turned on 24 
hours a day. A week later, ICE says she arrived at the 
transgender unit in the Cibola County Correctional 
Center in Milan, New Mexico––a privately run 
federal prison for men that contracts with ICE. But 
by the next day, she was taken to a local hospital 
with symptoms of pneumonia, dehydration and 
“complications associated with HIV,” ICE says. 
Hours later, she was transferred to a hospital in 
Albuquerque where “she remained in the intensive 
care unit until her passing,” the agency said.4 
An autopsy report showed that she was also 
beaten in custody.5 
The third person is Moises Tino-Lopez: 
Moises Tino-Lopez, 23, had two seizures within 
nine days, each observed by staff and reported to 
the nurses on duty in the Hall County Correctional 
Center in Nebraska. He was not evaluated by 
a physician or sent to the hospital after the first 
seizure. During his second seizure, staff moved him 
to a mattress in a new cell, but he was not evaluated 
by a medical practitioner. About four hours after 
that seizure, he was found to be unresponsive, 
with his lips turning blue. He was sent to the 
hospital but never regained consciousness and 
died on September 19, 2016.6 
And, finally, Raquel Calderon de Hildago: 
A 36-year-old Guatemalan woman, Raquel 
Calderon de Hildago, died Sunday at Banner Casa 
Grande Medical Center, according to Immigration 
and Customs Enforcement officials at the Eloy 
Detention Center in Arizona. She was taken to the 
hospital after medical staff at the Eloy Detention 
Center called paramedics following a series of 
seizures, ICE officials said in a news release. The 
woman continued to experience seizures in the 
ambulance on the way to the hospital, ICE officials 
said.7 She was the 15th person to die at that facility. 
According to an autopsy report, however, Calderon 
de Hildago died of blood clots “throughout all the 
lobes of the right lung,” the result of a leg injury. 
Reportedly, Calderon de Hildago had difficulty 
walking at the time she was apprehended by the 
Border Patrol. The blood clots, which traveled 
from her leg to her lung, would have triggered the 
seizures, Dr. Gregory Hess, Pima County’s chief 
medical examiner, said in an interview.8 
In 2013, women prisoners in Eloy Detention 
Center went on hunger strike to protest life 
threatening conditions there.9 Calderon de Hildago 
died November 27, 2016. 
Sadly, these six cases (the four just highlighted and the two 
children) are not anomalies. In 2019, three more children 
died in US Customs and Border custody, the most recent 
being a sixteen-year-old Guatemalan teenager, Carlos 
Hernandez Vasquez, who crossed the border in Texas.10 
Just six days earlier, a Guatemalan toddler also died in US 
custody.11 In 2018, at least twelve adults and three children 
died in US detention facilities.12 In 2017, twelve people 
died in US detention facilities and at least ten women 
filed complaints against ICE for causing them to miscarry 
due to their treatment in custody. In fact, Human Rights 
Watch reports that between 2010 and 2018, seventy-four 
people have died in US detention facilities.13 Worse, over 
half of these deaths were both preventable and caused 
by inadequate medical care offered by Immigration and 
Customs Enforcement facilities.14 
The purpose of this essay is not to argue that these deaths 
are wrong––I take that as obvious. Instead, I want to focus 
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on why they are wrong. More specifically, I argue against 
mainstream philosophers of immigration that the principal 
wrong in these circumstances is the rampant existence of 
human rights violations (though I concede that is clearly 
the case). I will suggest that the major wrong underlying 
this pattern of deplorable conditions in detention that lead 
to immigrants’ deaths are best understood as the result 
of oppression. But first, I need to tell you a bit about US 
detention policy and the rights of detainees. 
A BRIEF OVERVIEW OF US DETENTION POLICY 
Migrants who are detained are not criminals; they have 
not committed a criminal act and or broken criminal law. 
So why do we detain them? Two reasons: “(1) to ensure 
individuals appear for immigration court proceedings” 
and (2) to “comply with removal orders.”15 Now, because 
detained migrants have not broken criminal laws, they 
are not supposed to be housed in jails or with criminals. 
They are entitled to be housed in good conditions, with 
the ability, for example, to exercise, move freely within the 
facility, eat well, be safe, and have good health care.
Despite the fact that, for many of us, detaining migrants for 
these purposes seems relatively commonplace, the idea of 
detaining large numbers of immigrants in the United States 
while they await their immigration hearing or deportation 
is relatively new. For most of the twentieth century, the 
Border Patrol and Immigration and Naturalization Services 
(INS) did not focus on detention or deportation. Their job 
was to regulate migration, not to punish it.16 And so Border 
Patrol and INS were not focused on criminal prosecutions 
of immigration violations at all and, as sociologist Patrisia 
Macías-Rojas explains, “Training manuals of the time 
instructed agents to avoid illegal detention” on the grounds 
that it violates the Constitution.17 Instead, if someone was 
caught crossing the border without papers, they were 
simply sent home. So what changed? 
Macías-Rojas traces what she refers to as the “punitive 
turn” in immigrant detention to the 1980s and 1990s. In 
1986, the Immigration Reform and Control Act introduced 
a criminal alien program designed to deport convicted 
felons.18 In 1988, the Anti-Drug Abuse Act created provisions 
for deporting noncitizens who committed aggravated 
felonies.19 In 1996, however, the game changed when the 
Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility 
Act (IIRICA) was introduced to target criminal aliens as 
a major enforcement priority and expanded the list of 
aggravated felonies for which one could be deported to 
include petty theft, minor drug offenses, and DUIs.20 It 
also required mandatory detention of noncitizens who had 
completed their prison sentences.21 Notice that increased 
deportation and detention was never about immigration 
per se; it was about drugs and crime. 
And it stayed that way until September 2001 when the 
USA PATRIOT Act authorized indefinite detention of those 
suspected of being terrorists in the wake of the September 
11, 2001, attacks. At that point, immigration matters, 
generally, and deportation and detention, in particular, 
were reframed as national security concerns. This led to the 
reorganizing of governmental operations and agencies to 
better emphasize this new focus. In 2003, the Immigration 
and Naturalization Service was disbanded and Immigration 
and Customs Enforcement (ICE) was created to deal with 
internal enforcement via deportation and detention. By 
2004, the Department of Human Services (DHS) started 
prosecuting those who entered the country without 
permission in order to minimize the practice of paroling 
eligible, mostly Central American, migrants from detention 
(i.e., catch and release), a policy that existed precisely 
because detention centers did not have enough beds.22 
In order to support detention Congress gave increasing 
funds to maintain detention beds. In 2009, Congress 
mandated that at least 33,400 detention beds be available. 
Recently, the Trump Administration has ordered that those 
who are caught entering the country without permission 
be charged with a criminal violation for the first time in 
recent history. The result is that we need more beds but 
do not have them. In response, in its most recent budget, 
the Trump Administration pushed to expand the number 
of beds to more than 51,000.23 Currently, the United States 
detains the highest number of migrants in the world, close 
to 450,000, most of whom are male and from Mexico and 
Central America.24 We still do not have enough beds to 
detain all noncitizens, so “ICE officers order detention on a 
discretionary basis.”25 
In detention, migrants (even if they commit a crime) have 
a right to health care. Moreover, most of those who are 
detained at the border are asylum seekers, following US 
and international law by crossing the US border and then 
petitioning for asylum. As such, they too have the right to 
a certain level of care, including medical care. The Inter-
American Council on Human Rights of the Organization of 
American States (of which the United States is a part), for 
example, states that: 
In border areas, it is the duty of state authorities 
to provide immediate assistance to migrants and 
asylum-seekers, and that this assistance must 
specifically include medical assistance, adequate 
food and water, clothing, blankets, personal 
hygiene supplies, and opportunity to rest. As part 
of operations to intercept migrants and control 
migration at international borders, it is the duty of 
state authorities to prioritize medical and health 
screenings for migrants and asylum-seekers. This 
implies that competent medical personnel must 
be present in places where migrants and asylum-
seekers are intercepted or detained in order to 
examine them and refer them for further medical 
attention, including mental health referrals, when 
appropriate.26 
Similarly, the United Nations argues that immigrants–– 
refugees, asylum seekers, or otherwise––have a right 
to health care. Article 12 of the International Covenant 
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, for example, 
maintains that: 
States that are a party to the Covenant have 
an obligation to ensure the provision of: equal 
and timely access to basic preventive, curative, 
rehabilitative health services and health education; 
regular screening programmes; appropriate 
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treatment of prevalent diseases, illnesses, injuries 
and disabilities, preferably at community level; 
essential drugs; and appropriate mental health 
treatment and care. They also have an obligation 
to prevent, treat and control epidemic, endemic, 
occupational and other diseases. Under article 
12.2 (d), they must create “conditions which would 
assure to all medical service and medical attention 
in the event of sickness.”27 
Even the United States government recognizes its 
obligations to provide health care to immigrants in 
detention, as evidenced by the fact that ICE maintains the 
ICE Health Service Corps (IHSC) to provide “direct care to 
approximately 13,500 detainees housed at 21 designated 
facilities throughout the Nation to include medical, dental, 
and mental health care, and public health services as well as 
medical case management and oversight for an additional 
15,000 detainees housed at approximately 119 non-IHSC 
staffed detention facilities across the country.” And IHSC 
oversees the financial authorization and payment for off-
site specialty and emergency care services for detainees 
in ICE custody.28 
Despite this, medical care and services for migrants is 
woefully inadequate. First, the numbers show this is the 
case—ICE’s own numbers show that they are equipped to 
provide care to 28,000 detainees, but there are hundreds 
of thousands in the system. Unsurprisingly, then, the 
American Civil Liberties Union reports: “ICE puts thousands 
of people’s health and lives at risk by failing to provide 
adequate medical care to the people it detains for weeks, 
months, and even years.”29 As we saw in the cases 
described earlier, responses are delayed or inadequate, 
emergency responses botched and slow, and the quality 
of care is poor. As a result, migrants are suffering (and 
increasingly dying). 
WHY IS THIS WRONG? OPPRESSION 
There are many reasons that people would morally condemn 
the treatment of detainees in the United States as well as 
the increasing numbers of people getting sick and dying 
in US custody. Within the literature on immigration justice, 
the most common condemnation is framed as a violation 
of immigrants’ basic human rights. I think this intuition 
is correct for all sorts of reasons: This treatment violates 
Article 3 of the Universal Declaration for Human Rights, 
which states that “everyone has the right to life, liberty, and 
security of person,” as well as Article 9, which states that 
“no one shall be subjected to arbitrary arrest, detention, or 
exile.”30 Some, such as philosopher Joseph Carens, argue 
that detentions, arrests, and most types of border control 
also violate Article 13, which guarantees the right of all to 
exit their country.31 Still, I think that viewing these injustices 
as human rights violations is not our best bet for a couple of 
reasons: (1) Because the human rights framework focuses 
on individual acts and incidents, which means it is hard to 
detect structural and systemic issues; and (2) because the 
human rights framework takes the target and perpetrator 
of the wrong to be individuals and not social groups or 
nations. As a result, the human rights approach to thinking 
about immigration justice and injustice will not actually 
reveal what I take to be the core immigration injustice in 
these cases, namely, that the treatment of detainees and 
their resulting deaths are the result of oppression.
Let me state my position more clearly. I argue that 
immigration injustice should be defined as occurring 
when any immigration policy, practice, norm, or system 
perpetuates, reflects, or maintains oppression. US 
detention policies, practices, and systems perpetuate 
oppression in various ways. Therefore, they are unjust, and 
the core reason is their role in oppression, not the fact that 
they violate human rights (though they clearly do that too). 
But what is “oppression”? To help explain, I employ feminist 
philosopher Marilyn Frye’s famous metaphor of a bird cage. 
Imagine a birdcage. When we pay attention to the birdcage, 
we notice that the cage only functions when multiple wires 
are arranged in specific ways, namely, to “restrain, restrict, 
or prevent the [bird’s] motion or mobility.”32 In other words, 
the cage does not consist in random, unrelated wires just 
thrown together. To the contrary, the cage is formed by the 
specific way that wires are put together in relation to the 
others. Further, to be arranged in this specific way is neither 
random, accidental, or haphazard. The cage is designed to 
trap the bird and prevent it from escaping. 
Oppression is similar. Under oppression, social and 
institutional norms, policies, practices, and structures work 
together to reduce, immobilize, and mold the oppressed 
specifically to restrict and impede their options. The cage 
does not simply work to trap the bird. Rather, it works 
to trap the bird in particular ways––namely, by creating 
double-binds. A double-bind exists when the oppressed’s 
“options are reduced to a very few and all of them expose 
one to penalty, censure, or deprivation.”33 No matter what 
they do, the oppressed are vulnerable to facing negative 
consequences. A common example of a double-bind is 
young women’s sexual expression. If young women have 
sex, they are whores, but if they abstain, they are prudes, 
teases, and frigid. Regardless of their choice, they are 
vulnerable to censure. The experience of oppression is 
being caught up in a system that is designed to trap you in 
double-binds. 
Frye’s birdcage metaphor raises a key question: Who or 
what does the bird represent? In the immigration context, 
the answer is almost always social groups, nations, 
nation-states, transnational communities (like Indigenous 
groups). So when someone finds herself in a “cage” and 
asks, “Why am I in this cage?” (i.e., Why am I caught in 
this double-bind?), the answer will not be that individual’s 
actions. Instead, the answer will be “You are in the cage 
because you are a member of a certain social group, 
nation, state, community, etc.” For example, in the US 
there is a practice of racial profiling Black and Latino men 
(and other men of color). Under these circumstances, 
there is nothing an individual Black or Latino man can do 
to avoid the police pulling him over––driving too fast will 
be cause, since one is speeding; driving too slow will be 
cause, since it is suspicious; driving the speed limit will be 
cause, since nobody drives the speed limit unless they are 
hiding something. In these cases, the man is not stopped 
because of his actions (all of which many white people do 
on a regular basis, including myself––much to my mother’s 
chagrin). He is stopped because he is Black or Latino. In 
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this way, one is oppressed because of their membership in 
a social group, nationality, citizenship, or community.
Of course, individuals are members of multiple groups, 
communities, and even nations. Many individuals can be 
both victims and perpetrators of oppression. Take me as an 
example. As a Jewish woman in Iowa, I am a victim of sexism, 
Anti-Semitism, and their intersections in a shockingly large 
number of ways. But, in Los Angeles, where I am primarily 
perceived as white (especially in the middle of these frigid 
winters that take all of the glorious color out of my skin), I 
also participate in and benefit from racism and classism. 
Both are true because of my belonging to multiple social 
groups. 
To be clear, to say that these networks of systems and 
barriers are set up to restrict and immobilize the oppressed 
does not mean that oppression is conscious, calculating, 
or necessarily done by evil people with malice. In fact, 
while we cannot deny that this can occur, more often than 
not, oppression is carried out by well-meaning people 
upholding norms or enacting policies that are deeply 
problematic. The problem lies in the structures and norms 
being upheld in the policy, not the individual character 
flaws of those who create or enforce it. To put it more 
concretely, the problem is not that US Customs and Border 
Patrol officials are intentionally cruel as they deport people 
to Mexico and Central America, but rather the policies that 
they are enforcing, for example, requiring them to detain 
all irregular migrants, reflect and promote oppressive 
norms. Oppression is located in the structures, values, and 
practices, not in individuals. 
A consequence of this conceptualization is that detecting 
oppression requires utilizing a macroscopic analysis––one 
must see how everything is connected (history, politics, 
laws, social norms, etc.) to determine whether a particular 
instance is a random, unfortunate event, or part of a larger 
system of oppression. Again, we can return to Frye’s 
metaphor of the birdcage. If one examines why a birdcage 
encloses the bird using a microscopic and individual 
approach, the answer is elusive. This is because the person 
only sees one wire or one wire at a time, and the presence 
of one wire does not keep a bird from flying away. In other 
words, the investigator will fail to see how the wires are 
connected. But the bird is in the cage precisely because 
of how all of the wires are connected. So the only way to 
identify oppression is to step back, to get a macroscopic 
view of the various relationships between the wires, the 
environment, etc. 
OPPRESSION IN THE DEATHS OF IMMIGRANTS
IN US DETENTION
Now that we have some background on US detention 
policy and the nature of oppression, we can return to the 
four cases that I introduced at the beginning of the essay. 
Clearly, I do not have time to detail how all four died as a 
result of oppression in US immigration policy here, but I 
will suggest some ways that we should see their treatment 
and resulting deaths as examples of oppression. First, their 
treatment and deaths resulted from structural problems, not 
random bad acts or incompetent individuals. US policies, 
practices, and norms around immigration and health care 
led to these deaths. The Enforcement and Removal Office 
(the agency in charge of inspecting facilities) does not 
impose meaningful consequences for failing inspection 
standards.34 “As a result, inhumane conditions, including 
egregious violations of medical care standards, prevail 
across an immigration detention system composed of 
more than 200 detention facilities.”35 According to four 
major human rights organizations, “Three failings stand 
out: (1) unreasonable delays in providing care, (2) poor 
practitioner and nursing care, and (3) botched emergency 
responses.”36 Even the government’s own reports in 2016, 
2017, and 2018 provide additional documentation of 
deficient medical care in ICE facilities.37 And despite 
new growth in immigration detention, the 
Trump administration has requested less money 
for Department of Homeland Security (DHS) 
oversight of detention to assure that conditions 
of confinement are safe, indicating that it plans 
to abandon basic standards developed over the 
past decade intended to protect the health, safety, 
and human rights of those held in immigration 
detention centers. These proposals would place 
more human beings than ever before into an 
abusive and wasteful system that already suffers 
from substandard medical care.38 
This is a systemic problem—it is a cage, not individual, 
unconnected wires.
Second, the system is set up in such a way as to place 
migrants in a double-bind. New detention policies have 
turned the decision to migrate and/or seek asylum itself 
into a double-bind––stay in one’s country and face violence, 
poverty, and economic deprivation, or come to the US and 
risk violence, detention, and ill health. No matter what any 
individual migrants does, she is vulnerable to negative 
consequences. 
Third, these policies place migrants in double-binds because 
of their social group membership and nationality. Not all 
migrants, even unauthorized ones, are detained. To the 
contrary, most detentions are still based on the discretion 
of ICE agents, because there are far too few beds to detain 
all of those who enter without authorization.39 ICE officers 
overwhelmingly use their discretion to target migrants from 
Mexico and Central America, and, within this group, LGBTQ 
migrants.40 There is no detention, for example, for those 
crossing the Northern Border without permission or proper 
documentation. Moreover, the Trump Administration has 
expressly said it wants to stop immigration from Central 
America specifically, and has threatened Central American 
governments to cut off aid if they do not help, indicating 
that these policies are, again, targeted toward specific 
groups and not all migrants. Beyond this, the Border Patrol 
has been directed by the Department of Homeland Security 
to target those coming from Central America.41 In fact, the 
now infamous zero-tolerance policy that has led children 
to be separated from their parents specifically directs all 
federal prosecutors to detain and arrest all who enter the 
United States “illegally” on the Southern Border42 and send 
them to federal prison or detention centers while they 
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wait for their cases to be heard. These individuals are in 
detention because of their national membership, not their 
actions. 
CONCLUSION 
Raul Morales, Moises Tino, Roxsana Hernández, Raquel 
Calderon de Hidalgo, and the dozens like them who died 
at the hands of our government came here in search of a 
better life––a life free of sexual violence, gang violence, 
starving wages, and constant uncertainty. Jakelin Caal 
Maquin and Felipe Alonzo-Gomez were simply following 
their parents. Instead of helping them, or treating them with 
even minimal decency, the US government detained them 
in such a cruel and inhumane manner that they passed 
from this world. I hope that by reframing their experiences 
as expressions of oppression, we can fight to make sure 
that those who follow them at least get the chance they 
deserve to come out of the process alive and well. 
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A Negative Path Towards Anti-Racist 
Immigration Policy 
Alan Chavoya 
NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY
Despite claims that the United States entered a “post­
racial era”1 and that racism is a thing of the past, racism 
has permeated US society in nuanced manners that have 
resulted in further racial stratification.2 As David Theo 
Goldberg argues, “What the claim about postraciality as the 
end of race suggests, rather, is simply that a certain way 
of thinking about race, and implicitly of racist expression, 
has been giving way to novel understandings, orders, and 
arrangements of racial designation and racist expression.”3 
While there have undoubtedly been noticeable legal shifts 
away from overt racism, these legal shifts, as critical race 
theorist Derrick Bell expressed, are merely “temporary 
‘peaks of progress’” and not the end of racism.4 Bell’s 
“racial realism” and his thesis on the permanence of racism 
is particularly illuminating for understanding the limits of 
legal reform for combating racism, especially the legal 
conundrum we face in this “post-racial era”: policy and 
legal reform are evidently limited in combating racism, yet 
policy and law are needed to respond to racial injustices. 
Rather than liberating society from racism, post-racialism 
and post-racial legal reform have functioned as obfuscating 
tactics utilized to preserve historically shaped structures 
and systems upholding racial stratification. In this “post­
racial era,” it is necessary to investigate those places 
masquerading as “race-neutral” that perpetuate racism 
and racial injustice. Nowhere is this clearer than in the 
“immigration debate.” 
The immigration debate is immersed in a history riddled 
with racist practices and projects of racialization. In the 
“post-racial era,” the immigration debate has dropped overt 
racism used to define citizenship and has instead proposed 
“race-neutral” policies to legally justify the categorizations 
of “citizen” and “migrant.” Overtly racial tropes have been 
replaced by tropes of lawfulness, concealing the racism 
of anti-immigration discourse behind the veil of terms like 
“illegal immigrants.”5 Post-1965 immigration policies have 
not only participated in engendering the drastic increase 
of dangerous clandestine methods of immigration from 
the Global South; they have also continued fortifying 
the racial border outlining citizenship.6 “Race-neutral” or 
“non-racist” immigration policy reforms have preserved 
the racial categorization used to facilitate the inclusion of 
legitimate members of this political community (citizens) 
and the exclusion of those who are deemed not worthy 
of entry (“illegal immigrants”). As Grant Silva succinctly 
remarks, “The immigration debate cannot be excised from 
discussion of racism, nor can racism be excised from the 
immigration debate. Tropes of lawfulness and ‘waiting in 
line’ are but red herrings.”7 
In accordance with Bell’s thesis on the permanence of 
racism, I argue that “non-racist” immigration policy reform 
does little more than contribute to the “myth of postraciality.” 
When racism and racial prejudice remain unaddressed and 
unchallenged, as I argue they are in what passes for the 
immigration debate in the US today, “preventive” strategies 
towards justice, such as those offered by liberal political 
philosophers like John Rawls, fail to adequately respond 
to the needs of racialized migrants. The insistence on 
overlooking race and racism while responding to societal 
injustices, like those produced by this nation’s immigration 
system, further perpetuates racial injustice by invalidating 
lived experiences of racialized minorities and diverting 
attention away from racism.8 
This essay first explains how whiteness remains a requirement 
for full-status citizenship despite the formal outlaw of the 
“whiteness clause.” Overtly racist immigration legislation— 
stretching from the 1790 Naturalization Act until the 1952 
Immigration and Nationality Act—enacted and endorsed 
whiteness as a requirement for citizenship.9 Nevertheless, 
following the 1952 and 1965 immigration reforms, which 
mark the legal abolition of both the “whiteness clause” and 
the national origins quota, whiteness remains a formative 
identity category in US society. It is a standard for inclusion 
used for determining which groups are worthy of receiving 
the rights and protections guaranteed by citizenship. 
Following Bell’s thesis on the permanence of racism and 
Marx’s criticism of the limits of “political emancipation” in 
his essay, “On the Jewish Question,” this section offers a 
criticism of “non-racist” efforts seeking to eliminate racial 
injustice strictly through the legal outlawing of racism in 
immigration policy. “Non-racist” immigration legislation 
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remains insufficient for successfully responding to the 
racial injustices suffered by migrants of color. 
The preceding critique of the inefficacy of “race-neutral” 
immigration policy allows for a return towards the question 
of justice. I ask: What would be justice for racialized 
migrants? My goal is to criticize how the typical path taken 
by political philosophers when entertaining questions 
of justice—namely, the positive path as proposed by 
Rawls—begins from a position of a well-ordered society 
inhabited by equal citizens and therefore lends itself to a 
“post racial” narrative. As an alternative, I argue that the 
“negative path,” one that begins from the experiences of 
injustice and inequality, as proposed by Luis Villoro, Naomi 
Zack, and Charles Mills, among others, is better suited to 
respond to the needs of racialized migrants.10 The former’s 
insensitivity to the present conditions of racial injustice in 
the immigration debate marks a dead end, while the latter 
indicates a much more viable and racially conscious path 
for responding to the needs of migrants suffering from 
racial injustice. 
By way of a conclusion, I highlight the need for explicitly 
anti-racist immigration policy. I am not attempting to offer 
a solution for the racism plaguing the immigration debate. 
While policy and law are necessary, they are not sufficient 
conditions for eliminating racism. I am instead suggesting 
that efforts at the level of law and policy aimed at responding 
to the needs of racialized migrants must account for their 
lived experiences by being anti-racist. While I agree with 
Bell’s skepticism of legal reform, I interpret his criticism as 
applicable to “non-racist” policy. In this sense, anti-racist 
policy offers a viable path towards actual racial justice that 
will not result in mere “peaks of progress.” 
PART I: ON THE LIMITS OF NON-RACIST
IMMIGRATION POLICY 
Marx’s essay, “On the Jewish Question,” provides a 
powerful critique of political emancipation within a 
community that elucidates the limited efficacy of non-racist 
immigration policy. Regarding the secularization of religion, 
Marx states, “The most flexible form of the opposition 
between Christian and Jew is the religious opposition. 
How is an opposition to be done away with? By making 
it impossible. How does one make a religious opposition 
impossible? By abolishing religion.”11 By “making 
opposition impossible” and “abolishing religion,” Marx is 
not suggesting a superficial approach, which he defines 
as “political emancipation.” Marx’s scathing critique of 
political emancipation is best summarized when he states, 
“The limitations of political emancipation are immediately 
evident in the fact that a state can liberate itself from a 
limitation without man himself being truly free of it, and the 
state can be a free state without man himself being a free 
man.”12 Thinking about how racism in immigration policy 
has prevailed despite its formal overrule, Marx’s critique of 
political emancipation can become a critique of non-racist 
immigration policy as merely a type of this limited political 
emancipation. 
Legally, the US has “liberated itself” from racism by making 
its overt forms unconstitutional, but the political members 
of the US, who are the ones legislating, upholding, and 
deciding rulings on immigration policy, have yet to be 
liberated from racism. Just as the state Marx is writing about 
emancipates itself from religion while its overwhelming 
majority does not cease to be religious, so too has the US 
immigration system emancipated itself from racism. It is 
in this way that non-racist immigration policy has assisted 
whiteness, which, in a “post-racial-era,” is allowed to 
remain publicly innocent while preserving the legacies 
of racism that have and will continue to construct it. The 
more “migrant” is defined in terms of illegality, the more 
“citizen” becomes an innocent category. 
Critical race theorists Ian Haney-López and Cheryl Harris are 
particularly insightful in their understanding of how legal 
reform and policy have both arbitrated the racialization of 
different categories and concretized racial stratification 
in the US. In regards to the racial formation of whiteness, 
Harris argues, “The law’s construction of whiteness defined 
and affirmed critical aspects of identity (who is white); 
of privilege (what benefits accrue to that status); and, of 
property (what legal entitlements arise from that status).”13 
Thus, law has functioned as a tool that defines racial 
categories and dictates the privilege or disadvantage of 
different racial identities. Immigration law, in particular, has 
displayed an affinity towards these projects of racialization 
in the US, crafting a border between lawful, legitimate 
members of the political community categorized as 
“citizen,” and those who are excluded and without rights: 
“illegal aliens” or “impossible subjects.”14 
From the genesis of immigration legislation in the US, 
whiteness and citizenship have been legally synonymous. 
The 1790 Naturalization Act is among the earliest 
instantiations of immigration policy to legally mandate 
whiteness as an official requirement for naturalization, 
which José Jorge Mendoza notes, “created an entire 
subclass of people (i.e., non-white persons) who were 
permanently ineligible for US citizenship, but not 
necessarily denied residency.”15 For the better part of 
the next two centuries, whiteness operated legally as a 
determinant for whom privileges and protections granted 
by citizenship could be extended. For the duration of 
this period, whiteness and policy dynamically shifted as 
new groups of migrants who did not neatly fit the black-
white racial paradigm posed a challenge to the previously 
established racial categories in citizenship law.16 As new 
groups of migrants entered the racial discourse, different 
policies were enacted to more rigidly define this border 
between citizens and non-citizens.17 Through elucidating 
investigations into the history of immigration policy and its 
overt relationship with whiteness from 1790 to 1965,18 two 
observations can be made: 1) whiteness is a dynamic racial 
identity whose meaning is modified through ever-changing 
social practices,19 and 2) immigration law is one of these 
social practices that has continuously responded to the 
needs of racially privileged groups in the US.20 
In the wake of the civil rights movement, the 1952 and 
1965 Immigration and Nationality Acts, two pieces of 
non-racist policy, have shaped the current Immigration 
and Nationality Act as they ended overt forms of racism 
and ethnocentrism in immigration policy. Along with 
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the abolition of racially discriminatory policies, the 1965 
immigration reform introduced a yearly numerical cap of 
20,000 migrants-per-year that was equally applied to every 
country. Both Ngai and Mendoza agree that the enactment 
of this cap disproportionately affected Mexican migrants, 
who, in the years prior to the cap, constituted over 400,000 
of temporary migrants in the US.21 In turn, the increase of 
unauthorized migrants, particularly Mexicans and Central 
Americans, necessitated the policing and surveillance of the 
US-Mexico border and the neighborhoods that appeared 
to harbor these migrants, i.e., Mexican neighborhoods, 
since according to Fox News, Guatemala, El Salvador, 
and Honduras are Mexican countries. These typically 
forceful policing tactics have become normalized within 
the immigration system and have reinforced the border 
in a manner that has, according Carlos Alberto Sánchez, 
intensified the racial definition of the categories “citizen” 
and “illegal,” the former representing whiteness, inclusion, 
and the right to have rights, while the latter represents 
racialized migrants who are excluded from having rights.22 
Current work in crimmigration law exemplifies the 
justification for these tactics by demonstrating how criminal 
law and enforcement has converged with immigration 
law and enforcement.23 This convergence has resulted in 
the further criminalization of migrants of color and has 
provided a clearer path for rampant deportations, ICE raids, 
and indefinite detention. 
Racially neutral immigration policy not only contributed 
to the increased policing of Mexicans or those who 
“look Mexican” in the US, but it also marked a shift in 
which “illegal immigrants” became targets of racist anti-
immigration discourse and tactics. The current version 
of the Immigration and Nationality Act provides racist 
sentiment a kind of camouflage in the form of tropes of 
lawfulness, which still dominate much of the present-day 
immigration debate. In this “post-racial era,” anti-illegalist 
sentiment has largely replaced the overtly racist sentiment 
against migrants, but it has nevertheless allowed the 
racism permeating the immigration system to prevail. This 
phenomenon is exemplified in current dog-whistle politics, 
which criminalizes migrants and veils racist sentiment 
behind cries for national security, despite empirical data 
showing that migrants are less likely to commit crimes than 
US-born citizens.24 
Another consequence of opting for “non-racist” immigration 
policies in the “post-racial era” is the ability granted to racially 
privileged groups to dissociate themselves from their 
histories of racism, that is, from their facticity or thrownness. 
Regardless of immigration reforms, immigration law is not 
displaying any linear “progress” towards something like a 
just immigration system. By purchasing into the linearity 
of progress, history is understood as something that can 
be left behind; something that, at best, is considered to 
minimally affect present circumstances. 
“Post-racialism” offers an understanding of historically 
racist practices against migrants, making racism a thing of 
the past that no longer exists in the immigration system. 
“Non-racist” immigration policy assumes this position 
and only serves to reinforce the illusion that racism in the 
US immigration system perished following the 1952 and 
1965 reforms. This position, which can be categorized as 
a disinterest in or dismissal of history, is exemplified by 
Michael Walzer’s work, which has significantly impacted 
much of the philosophical discourse on the ethics of 
immigration. While discerning how equal members of a 
political economy distribute power to one another, Walzer 
calls for an investigation into how the group is constituted, 
a task he clarifies by saying, “I am concerned here not with 
the historical origins of the different groups, but with the 
decisions they make in the present about their present 
and future populations.”25 For Walzer, all the community’s 
past wrongs do not factor into the consideration for how 
membership will be distributed. As Silva’s own analysis 
of Walzer points out, Walzer does take issue with racism 
and racist policies, but the dismissal of history limits how 
far we can challenge members of the political community 
in justifying their existence. When this dismissal occurs, 
“racial normativity is afforded opportunity to reside in the 
historic fabric of a political community’s existence.”26 The 
legacies of colonialism and racism remain imperceptible 
when a political community’s decision to extend or limit 
membership status is only oriented towards the future and 
fails to consider how its past shapes its present and future. 
Non-racist immigration policy is, at best, superficially 
concerned with legacies of colonialism and racism. Its 
emphasis on formally overruling overt forms of racism in 
the immigration system is insufficient for eradicating the 
institutional racism that facilitates the conflation between 
whiteness and citizenship, and migrant and criminal. 
Through non-racist immigration law, the US has only 
become “politically emancipated” from racism. The racism 
in the immigration system remains and more effectively 
targets migrants of color. 
PART II: TOWARDS ANTI-RACIST IMMIGRATION
POLICY 
In what follows, I explore two possible paths towards justice 
for racialized migrants: the positive and the negative path. 
After critiquing the former and arguing for the latter, this 
section concludes by suggesting anti-racist immigration 
policy as an alternative to non-racist policy. The return to 
the level of policy is necessary because, as Cherríe Moraga 
and Gloria Anzaldúa advise us, “Theory alone can not wipe 
out racism. We do not experience racism, whether directed 
at ourselves or others, theoretically.”27 
Luis Villoro’s “justice” chapter in Tres retos de la sociedad 
por venir: justicia, democracia, pluralidad offers one of 
the clearest and briefest articulations for perceiving the 
difference between what will be referred to as the positive 
and the negative paths towards justice.28 Concerning the 
point of departure for the positive path, Villoro states, “The 
theories most in vogue tend to proceed from the ideas of 
a rational consensus between equal subjects who relate to 
one another on terms that reproduced the characteristics 
of a well-ordered democracy.”29 For societies embarking 
on the negative path, “Instead of proceeding from the 
consensus for establishing justice, [they] proceed from 
its absence; rather than moving from the determination 
of universal principals of justice towards its realization in 
a specific society, [they] proceed from the perception of 
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 real injustice in order to project what could remedy it.”30 
While it is possible for the positive path and the negative 
path to reach the same conclusion, more often than not, 
they fail to do so because, as Villoro has laid out, they 
are responding to different needs. The positive approach 
desires the preservation of equality, or the prevention of 
unfair inequalities, among the members of its “well-ordered 
democracy,” and the negative approach to justice seeks to 
remedy the injustices plaguing a particular society. Without 
much debate, it is fairly obvious that the negative approach 
is more viable for actualizing justice for racialized migrants, 
for this approach is actually sensible to their experiences. 
Through critical readings of Rawls’s ideal theory of justice, 
one of the most popular positive approaches, it becomes 
quite clear how such a theory of justice cannot graph onto 
the realities of migrants of color. Rawls’s ideal theory of 
justice assumes a “well-ordered” just society, making it 
immediately difficult to imagine how this theory can be 
bridged with real injustices. In critiquing Rawls’s omission 
of race, Charles Mills articulates the meaning of the ideally 
just society in Rawls’s theory of justice as “a society 
without any previous history of injustice.”31 Recalling 
Walzer’s disinterest in history, Mills’s critique illustrates 
how Rawls’s ideal theory of justice cannot make sense 
of the past legacies of racism and colonialism that have 
shaped the current racial injustices many migrants of color 
are facing. Rawls’s theory is incompatible with the lived 
experiences of racialized migrants. The futural focus on 
how those people behind the veil of ignorance will enter a 
just society signifies that Rawls’s theory is only concerned 
with ensuring that the presently “just” state of this society 
will be preserved in the future. The belief that there is any 
society that is actually just in the sense that Rawls assumes 
is an illusion engendered by those racially privileged 
groups whose facticity corresponds to over five centuries 
of colonialism. 
The positive approach’s dependence on formal equality 
only extends to groups who are deemed worthy of 
consideration for access to full-membership status in 
the political community. Hence, passionate discourse 
around “equality for all” should always be interpreted as 
“equality for all lawful members of this particular political 
community.” Historically, the understanding of “equality for 
all” has remained true in the US. As the previous section 
demonstrated, only those who are able to become lawful 
US citizens are worthy of being treated equally. It is from this 
understanding of “equality” that immigration policymakers 
outlawed overt racism. According to Zack, “Good 
government, as well as bad government, has a dynamic 
material foundation, in the customs of a people, traditions, 
ongoing institutions, and whether or not officials on all 
levels obey just laws.”32 The ideality of equality and justice 
correspond to the material conditions that demand just 
laws. However, it should be added that only the conditions 
that matter to citizens are worthy of consideration. Thus, 
the needs of migrants of color are not accounted for. 
Contrasting the positive approach, the negative approach 
to justice begins from concrete cases of injustice. If we 
are interested in understanding justice for migrants, the 
negative approach makes the racial injustices of migrants 
of color the point of departure. Villoro’s analysis of the 
negative path towards justice is insightful for imagining 
migrant justice. Villoro highlights the relationship between 
exclusion, injustice, and justice. He indicates that it is 
only through the concrete experiences of a particular 
injustice that the constitution of the moral subjects of a 
particular political community can be reimagined to make 
the political community more inclusive. Hence, for Villoro, 
justice is not simply a perennial concept that must be 
theorized and contemplated before being actualized in any 
given community at any point in history.33 Justice is instead 
a response to a concrete injustice that renders unjustly 
excluded groups new members of the political community 
worthy of full moral consideration. This expansion of full 
moral consideration resonates with Zack’s applicative 
justice, which is defined as the “extension of existing 
practices of justice to members of new groups.”34 Both 
approaches not only allow for novel imaginings of what 
justice for racialized migrants will be, but they also provide 
blueprints for developing policy that can adequately 
respond to the injustices that migrants of color face. In the 
next section, I envision what this type of policy can be. 
CONCLUSION: IMAGINING ANTI-RACIST
IMMIGRATION POLICY 
In responding to the facticity of the people who are excluded 
unjustly, the negative path of justice demands that any type 
of response, in this instance, policy, take into consideration 
the present situation as one that is historically informed 
and shaped. Thus, the history of unjustly excluded groups 
must also be accounted for by responses to their situations. 
What would this mean for migrants of color? In one sense, 
it would suggest that non-racist approaches to policy do 
not suffice for actualizing something like migrant justice, 
since non-racist immigration policy fails to account for the 
legacies of colonialism and racism that have shaped this 
political community by building a racial border around its 
members. Policy that does account for the facticity of this 
situation is a bit challenging to define, for any effort to do 
so must also account for the dynamic material conditions 
to which it responds. The type of immigration policy that 
could respond to the lived experiences of migrants of color 
is what I imagine anti-racist immigration policy would be. 
Crimmigration law is a promising place where anti-racist 
immigration policy can be successfully executed in the 
manners previously described. Throughout the essay, I 
have pointed out how non-racist immigration policy has 
allowed racism to masquerade as anti-illegalist sentiments. 
This is particularly obvious in the current enforcement of 
disproportionate detention and deportation of migrants of 
color.35 Both practices are defined as civil or administrative 
mechanisms designed to effectuate the government’s 
immigration enforcement goals. Hence, the right to 
due process that is afforded to people treated under 
the criminal system is not required for migrants who 
are indefinitely detained and deported––the majority of 
whom are racialized migrants from Latin America and the 
Caribbean.36 Often, detained migrants are simply handed 
a piece of paper and deported without a trial. Enforcement 
tactics are not motivated by explicitly racist legislature. 
The amendments to the Immigration and Nationality Act of 
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1996, the creation of the Department of Homeland Security 
following the events of September 11, 2001, and the recent 
policy designed to end the so-called “catch-and-release” 
practices were justified by appealing to concerns for 
national security. 
At the level of policy, two things should occur: 1) a rejection 
of the national security justification for practices like mass 
detention and deportation; and 2) an extension of rights and 
protections to irregular migrants to ensure a just process 
while detained. Towards the first point, the burden of proof 
would be shifted towards the system to demonstrate that it 
is not being racist and that migrants actually pose a threat 
to national security, rather than simply being allowed 
to use dog-whistles like rapists, or MMA fighters, when 
describing migrants. As the system presently exists, the 
burden of proof is on migrants to prove they are not bad 
ones. Instead, the type of policy I am suggesting turns that 
around and forces the justifications of these policies to 
show they are not racist. The burden of proof must also be 
significant enough so that a handful of cases are not used 
to generalize all migrants. If this shift occurs, the current 
administration will have greater difficulty justifying its 
actions against migrants since the empirical data indicates 
that over three quarters of detained migrants pose no 
threat to national security and that migrants are less likely 
to commit violent crimes than US-born citizens.37 
Regarding the second point––the extension of rights and 
protections––I think it is necessary to do two further things: 
1) end mass detention and deportation as the primary 
tactics for enforcing immigration-related purposes; and 
2) eradicate indefinite detention. These two moves could 
help significantly reduce the population inside detention 
facilities and would alleviate the caseload for immigration 
judges. I call for these approaches because many ICE, 
CBP agents, etc., contend that they are understaffed and 
underfunded. I consider these excuses unacceptable for 
the conditions inside detention centers and the manners in 
which migrants are apprehended. However, if there are too 
many migrants, then reducing the population would mean 
they have to come up with other ways to justify their actions. 
In this sense, anti-racist immigration policy is a tactic that 
prohibits racism from hiding behind cries for protecting 
the nation from criminals. Obviously, these are very crude 
estimations for what anti-racist immigration policy could 
be. However, as a basis for anti-racist immigration policy, 
I think it is enough to motivate the purpose of this type 
of policy as shedding light on the various ways racism 
is housed in the immigration system. From here, we can 
begin tearing down the racism that is at play in this nation’s 
immigration system. 
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Immigration and International Justice 
Jorge M. Valadez 
OUR LADY OF THE LAKE UNIVERSITY 
Discussions about immigration often center on such 
issues as the economic liabilities or benefits created by 
immigrants, the potential threats to national security of 
poorly protected borders, the cultural impact of increased 
immigration, or the protection of immigrants’ human rights. 
These discussions generally take for granted that states 
have the unconditional right to regulate the terms and 
conditions under which people can enter state territory. 
The question of what justifies the territorial rights of states 
is rarely raised. Yet, the justification of the territorial rights 
of states is of central importance for the moral legitimacy 
of state immigration policies, which set the terms for long­
term admission and residence in particular countries. From 
a moral standpoint, it is important to inquire about what 
could justify the practice of states to routinely employ 
physical barriers and the threat of force to enforce control 
of their territorial boundaries. The power of exclusion is 
particularly important because preventing people from 
poor countries from accessing affluent states can doom 
them to a life of extreme poverty and deprivation or expose 
them to harm from rampant organized criminal activity or 
environmental devastation. 
Immigration is an international issue because it involves 
the regulation of movement of people across national 
boundaries. Since this movement is regulated by the 
coercive power of governments, immigration deals with 
issues concerning moral obligations and relations between 
states, i.e., issues of international justice. In this essay 
I maintain that the justification of the territorial rights of 
states, and the international obligations to which they give 
rise, are of central importance for identifying immigration 
policies that address global injustices. My focus will be 
on immigration policies, which regulate permanent or 
long-term residence in a country, rather than policies 
determining asylum, that are presumably designed to 
protect people from transient or temporary harms, which 
raise different kinds of moral considerations. 
This essay is divided into three parts. In the first part I 
examine the moral justification of the territorial rights of 
states within the context of international justice. In the 
second part I propose some principles of international 
justice that could be used to justify more open immigration 
policies strategically designed to address international 
inequalities and injustices. In the third section I suggest 
some immigration policy guidelines based on the view 
of international justice outlined in the second part of the 
paper. 
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 CHALLENGING THE TERRITORIAL RIGHTS OF
STATES 
Central to the question of whether states can legitimately 
exclude people from entering their territory is the issue 
of the moral justification of their territorial rights. John 
Simmons identifies state territorial rights as including the 
following: (1) the right to exercise legal jurisdiction over 
individuals within state territories; (2) the right to regulate 
the movement of persons, non-human beings, and 
materials across state boundaries; (3) the right to control 
the land and natural resources not privately owned within 
state territorial boundaries; (4) the right to regulate and 
tax privately owned land; and (5) the right to prevent the 
disintegration of the state’s territory by prohibiting such 
actions as territorial transfers to aliens or secession by 
substate groups.1 My analysis will center on the second 
and third territorial rights because, even though interesting 
questions arise concerning the justification of the other 
three state territorial rights, the second and third rights are 
the most relevant for immigration. Hereafter, when I talk 
about state territorial rights, I will be referring to these two 
territorial rights. 
Focusing on the second and third territorial rights, on what 
basis can a state justifiably claim that it has the exclusive 
right to control the land and natural resources that comprise 
its national territory? If we make the eminently reasonable 
assumption that every human being should have access to 
the earth’s land and natural resources to satisfy their basic 
material needs and to flourish, what gives states the power 
to tell the rest of the world community that they have the 
exclusive collective right to use and control those sectors of 
the earth that make up their national territories? States can 
hardly claim that they have a morally unconditional right 
to exercise these territorial rights, since it is historically 
well established that practically all states acquired their 
territories through conquest, invasive settlement, broken 
treaties, partitioning between imperial powers, and other 
morally illegitimate means. Even on those rare occasions in 
which states might have acquired their territories peacefully 
and without displacing pre-existing communities, they 
still cannot claim to have acquired their territorial rights 
legitimately, since they did not get the consent of the 
world community to obtain exclusive control of the land 
and natural resources comprising their national territory. 
A central issue here is how to respond to the realization 
that the territorial rights of states cannot be justified in a 
morally unconditional way. We could try to reconfigure the 
existing distribution of land and natural resources among 
the world’s people using some principle of justice that 
would ensure a fair distribution. This alternative, however, 
is highly unrealistic and would be practically impossible to 
implement. People have deep connections to their national 
territories, and it is utopian to believe that they would be 
willing to relocate en mass to satisfy some abstract principle 
of justice. National economic interests in maintaining 
control of land and natural resources are so strong that we 
cannot start from scratch and carry out a process of global 
land and resource redistribution. Moreover, it is not at all 
clear what principle of justice we could use to carry out 
this territorial distribution to ensure that it produced a fair 
outcome for all of the world’s people. Neither would it 
be easy, or even possible, to determine in a just manner 
who gets to live in which of the earth’s territories. Given 
the differential value of land and the earth’s resources 
and the historical uncertainty concerning which groups or 
individuals first occupied which territories, endless disputes 
would likely arise regarding who can legitimately claim to 
occupy sectors of the earth’s surface. Finally, no global 
political authority presently exists, or could realistically be 
developed in the foreseeable future, that could carry out 
such a redistribution in a way that ensured that it would be 
universally acceptable and just. 
THE CONDITIONAL LEGITIMACY OF STATE
TERRITORIAL RIGHTS 
Since we cannot start from scratch regarding collective 
control by political communities of territories, an 
alternative is to provide a conditional basis for recognizing 
the illegitimately acquired territorial rights of states. That 
is, just because the territorial rights of states cannot be 
justified in a morally unconditional way does not mean 
that we cannot provide a conditional justification for them. 
If from a realistic standpoint we must live, at least for the 
foreseeable future, with territorialized states, we could 
make their legitimacy contingent on their observance of 
certain principles of international justice. There may be 
compelling reasons why we may want to recognize the 
territorial rights of states, albeit in a way that places strong 
moral conditions on such recognition. It is particularly 
important that these reasons be consistent with the basic 
egalitarian principle of showing equal moral concern for 
all people and not merely members of our own state. 
We would then show that we are not recognizing these 
territorial powers merely for pragmatic reasons that do not 
give sufficient moral consideration to the plight of others. 
Our case for the conditional legitimacy of the territorial 
rights of states must therefore involve both pragmatic and 
normative considerations. 
Perhaps the best way to begin a conditional recognition 
of the territorial rights of states is to realize that it is a 
practical necessity for people to organize and coordinate 
their activities for the purpose of employing the world’s 
land and natural resources to satisfy their material needs. 
That is, it is an unavoidable real-world problem for 
people to find some socially organized way to extract, 
refine, develop, and employ the earth’s land and natural 
resources. Moreover, economic development occurs 
within sociopolitical and cultural contexts. Laws governing 
the ownership and use of property, the terms of legal 
contracts, the provision of credit and capital, informal 
norms governing economic transactions, and many other 
features of an economic system are embedded within 
particular political communities. States provide the needed 
stable socio-cultural and legal institutional frameworks 
within which short- and long-term economic planning and 
development can occur. And putting aside the practical 
reasons for recognizing states, perhaps the most important 
moral reason for the existence of political communities like 
states is that they enable individuals to treat each other 
justly and protect one another’s basic rights by providing 
the legal and sociopolitical institutions that allow for the 
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articulation, contestation, and implementation of human 
rights. Basic human rights—such as those governing 
property ownership, health care, free speech, and social 
welfare—can, and are, in fact, interpreted differently in 
countries with different sociopolitical cultures. A crucial 
moral function of self-governing political communities 
like states is to provide the institutional structures to allow 
their members to disambiguate, vote on, and enforce their 
interpretations of basic rights in accordance with their own 
cultural and sociopolitical traditions. 
Furthermore, if the institutional frameworks that make 
economic activity and political governance possible are 
to be normatively legitimate, they must be grounded 
on processes of self-governance that are ultimately 
accountable to the members of these political communities. 
The institutions and forms of sociopolitical organization 
of a society should be subject to revision and adaptation 
as people respond to the ongoing problems and issues 
that they face collectively as a political community. Self-
governance can be seen as the process through which 
people in political communities legitimize their collective 
decisions, coordinate their activities to successfully adapt 
to changing circumstances, and determine the course 
of their future. Also involved in self-governance is the 
capacity of a political community to determine who falls 
within its jurisdictional reach, who can participate in its 
decision-making procedures, and to whom its leaders owe 
democratic accountability. 
In the absence of a world government that provides the 
political, economic, and socio-cultural administrative 
structures to develop the earth’s natural resources, self-
governing territorialized political communities such as 
states seem to be viable alternatives. States could be seen 
as administrative units designed to provide the economic 
and sociopolitical structures needed for people to develop 
the earth’s resources and collectively govern their lives.2 
This is not to say that states are the only or best form of 
political organization that could fulfill these functions. In the 
indefinite future alternative forms of political organization 
could emerge that supplant states. At this point in 
history, however, despite overstated claims regarding the 
“demise” of states, they still remain the principal forms 
of political organization that people employ to govern 
themselves. And in the foreseeable future there are no 
feasible plans to dismantle or radically transform states. 
In fact, important recent developments, such as greater 
concerns about security and the increase in the value of 
scarce natural resources, have strengthened state claims 
regarding ownership of their land and natural resources.3 
These developments make it unlikely that territorialized 
states will disappear anytime soon. 
However, in order to function effectively as administrative 
units to develop the earth’s land and natural resources 
and exercise self-governance, territorialized political 
communities must be able to regulate entrance and 
membership. It is very difficult to see how political 
communities could undertake effective long-term 
economic planning—like determining a national savings 
rate to meet future economic needs and contingencies, 
for example—if they did not have accurate projections of 
the size of their population. Rapid and dramatic increases 
in population would make economic calculations for 
meeting social needs inaccurate or useless. For instance, 
sudden increases in population would mandate the rapid 
development of physical and social infrastructures to meet 
the needs of the new residents. Even wealthy countries like 
the US would find it difficult to expand and rebuild their 
physical infrastructures—including roads, bridges, sewage, 
transportation, and water and electrical systems—to meet 
the increased demands. Similarly, strategic developments 
in education and other social needs would be very hard 
to reliably carry out without accurate knowledge of the 
makeup and size of the national population. The problems 
that would arise from sudden large influxes of immigrants 
are not mere theoretical possibilities, for there are empirical 
indications that the numbers of people from developing 
countries willing to relocate to affluent countries are very 
great.4 Depriving self-governing territorialized political 
communities of the right to regulate their borders and 
regulate membership would undermine their administrative 
capacity in serious ways. 
These considerations show that it is important to balance 
the rights of national communities for self-determination 
with the rights of the members of the world community 
to have realistic opportunities to satisfy their basic needs 
and to flourish. State territorial rights are not absolute or 
morally unconditional, for they should be constrained 
by the recognition that they were illegitimately acquired 
through coercive or unilateral means. What moral 
obligations follow from the conditional recognition of state 
territorial rights? I propose that a morally principled way to 
grant conditional legitimacy to the territorial rights of states 
is to impose significant international moral responsibilities 
between states and the world community. States incur a 
profound moral debt to the world community when the 
latter recognize their territorial rights despite the morally 
illegitimate ways in which they were acquired. This moral 
debt creates a relation of moral reciprocity between 
states involving international justice obligations. More 
specifically, states are obligated to morally reciprocate by 
respecting certain provisions in three areas of international 
justice dealing with nondomination, compensation, and 
ecological integrity. These areas of justice jointly constitute 
a conception of international justice holding among states. 
In the next section I briefly discuss this conception of 
international justice and its implications for immigration 
policies. 
IMMIGRATION POLICIES AND INTERNATIONAL
JUSTICE 
The conception of international justice that I outline 
here is grounded on the idea that states are bound to 
the world community, and therefore to one another, 
by a nondiscretionary relation of moral reciprocity that 
arises from the recognition by the world community of 
their territorial rights. The continued recognition of these 
territorial rights, however, should be seen as conditional 
on states respecting certain provisions that are crucial 
for international justice, namely, the nondomination, 
compensation, and ecological integrity principles, which 
enable states to treat one another justly in the international 
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arena. These principles are also designed to support the 
functions that territorial rights enable states to perform, 
namely, the development of the earth’s land and natural 
resources within the context of self-governing political 
communities. It makes sense to impose these principles for 
the continued legitimacy of state territorial rights because 
they support the reasons for recognizing these rights in the 
first place. 
The nondomination principle requires states to support fair 
conditions of participation for all other states in the global 
economy. Given that the economic prosperity of states 
in the contemporary world depends on their successful 
participation in the global economy, it is imperative that 
they be able to participate on fair terms. They must be 
able to participate in the international economic system 
without, for example, unfair conditions of trade, finance, or 
intellectual property ownership imposed by more powerful 
states, who typically try to employ their greater economic 
and political strengths to secure unfair advantages. Powerful 
states, for example, limit developing countries’ access to 
their markets and heavily subsidize some of their domestic 
industries, making it practically impossible for developing 
countries to compete against them in the global market.5 
Even though poor countries may in some cases also 
subsidize some of their industries, these modest subsidies 
pale in comparison to the large subsidies of affluent 
countries, which use their greater economic resources to 
provide their industries with significant advantages. Since 
the rationale for recognizing the territorial rights of states 
is to enable them to develop a portion of a common global 
resource base, it is just to require that all states support fair 
conditions for economic development and participation 
in the global economy. The best way to ensure that this 
provision is met on an ongoing basis is through the creation 
of a just global system of trade, production, finance, and 
intellectual property. 
According to the compensation principle, states have 
an obligation to rectify certain inequalities and resource 
deficiencies that prevent underdeveloped states from 
participating successfully in the international economic 
system. The creation of the existing system of states 
sometimes involved unjust colonial processes of conquest, 
forced labor, and resource extraction. These unjust 
processes have played an important role in the present 
incapacity of some states and political communities to 
develop economically and to participate successfully in the 
global economy. The responsibility falls mainly on those 
states that benefited from historical exploitative practices. 
Yet, even in cases in which systematic exploitation was not 
involved, certain states emerged, as a result of contingent 
historical processes, with an impoverished resource 
base. These states still merit economic aid because of 
their participation in an administratively beneficial global 
partitioning of land and natural resources in which they 
emerged with material endowments of relatively lesser 
value. In either case, the world community has a moral 
obligation to provide economic and technological aid 
to impoverished states that, as the result of systematic 
exploitation or contingent processes, are unable to flourish 
materially and participate on fair terms in the global 
economic system. To ensure that such aid is employed 
effectively, its provision could be tied to the implementation 
of noncorruption measures by developing countries. 
The ecological integrity principle imposes on states the 
obligation to refrain from environmentally destructive 
practices that degrade the common resource base on which 
we all depend for our survival and well-being. States have 
the responsibility, according to this principle, to safeguard 
the ecological integrity of the territories that the world 
community has entrusted them with. Since territorial rights 
in effect grant states’ proprietary control over those parts of 
a common biosphere that comprise their territories, these 
powers could be seen as a form of ecological stewardship. 
Moreover, states should abstain from practices that have 
a negative environmental impact on territories outside of 
their own. Many ecological problems transcend national 
boundaries and thus the economic practices of states may 
affect other political communities as well. It is imperative 
that all states do their part in promoting the ecological 
sustainability of our common global resource base, 
particularly if they have been primarily responsible for the 
environmental degradation of our planet. 
Even though all three principles are important for 
international justice, the nondomination and the 
compensation principles are particularly important for 
fair immigration policies. To the extent that it can be 
established that economically and politically powerful 
states have undermined the capacity of weaker states 
to flourish economically and participate effectively in 
the global economy, policies should be implemented 
to address these past injustices. Even though, given 
limitations of space, I cannot make a detailed case for this 
claim here, it is reasonable to maintain that powerful states 
have in fact systematically hindered the capacity of poor 
countries to develop economically.6 As we observed earlier, 
wealthy countries have closed off some of their markets to 
competition from developing countries and have heavily 
subsidized some of their industries, to the detriment of the 
economic progress of the developing world. Moreover, the 
expropriation of enormous amounts of valuable resources 
such as gold and silver by European countries from Latin 
America played a significant role in the former’s economic 
and technological advantages, which they maintain in 
contemporary times.7 Even those countries that did not 
experience the brunt of colonial domination merit aid, for 
they may have ended up with resource-poor territories in 
the process of state formation. Within the context of the 
theory of global responsibilities that I outlined here, more 
liberal immigration policies could play an important role in 
the economic and social development of poor states. 
Immigration policies that address global inequalities 
should focus on two priorities: (1) a more liberal approach 
to immigration in which a greater number of low-
skilled workers are admitted and placed on the road to 
citizenship and (2) temporary migration of low-skilled 
workers from developing countries, which usually have 
high unemployment rates. Regarding the first of these 
priorities, some economically developed countries, 
particularly in Europe, need the influx of immigrant laborers 
who are allowed to attain citizenship status. Demographic 
projections indicate that many affluent countries, due to 
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declining birthrates and aging populations, will need a 
significant influx of additional laborers to fill the jobs that 
will be created in their low-skilled economic sectors.8 Even 
though at present there is considerable political resistance 
in wealthy countries to liberalizing immigration policies 
for low-skilled workers, the economic needs of wealthy 
countries should make these immigration policies more 
politically feasible. 
The remittances sent by immigrant workers to their home 
countries are a major source of foreign capital for poor 
and developing countries. In countries such as Mexico, for 
example, remittances provide a source of foreign currency 
inflow that is surpassed only by petroleum. In 2017, Mexican 
laborers working abroad sent home more than $28.77 
billion dollars in remittances, which is the highest amount 
ever recorded.9 Globally, the World Bank estimates that 
once records are finalized, remittances to low- and middle-
income countries will reach $528 billion dollars in 2018.10 
These figures show that remittances should be considered 
as a major component of development strategies for the 
developing world. In addition, those immigrants that return 
home provide important financial and social capital to their 
countries. Their knowledge, contacts, and experiences can 
provide much needed entrepreneurial impetus to their 
home economies and help improve their country’s social 
and political institutions. 
An advantage of temporary labor migration is that it does not 
undermine self-governance, since states would be able to 
regulate migrant flows more effectively if they realistically 
took into account the economic forces that drive the global 
movement of people. Further, by combining the legalization 
of foreign workers with strict enforcement of legal penalties 
for employers hiring undocumented workers, states could 
more adequately deal with the security problems created 
by not knowing whom those individuals are who are living 
within their borders illegally. Temporary migration policies, 
however, should include provisions that safeguard the 
human rights of laborers. Temporary worker programs are 
notorious for the exploitation of workers, and provisions 
should be put in place to prevent such abuse. Temporary 
workers have the right to work in the country of destination 
without fear of being exploited by their employers and 
others who may take advantage of their vulnerability. Given 
the long history of the exploitation of temporary workers, 
we need strong international organizations that can 
oversee and regulate temporary worker programs and that 
can impose enforceable penalties on states that violate 
worker rights. 
Finally, we should note that the immigration policies of 
regulated openness I advocate are more in line with the 
basic egalitarian principle of expressing equal moral 
concern for all of the world’s people than an open borders 
position. The realization that we owe a moral responsibility 
to all of the people in poor countries and not merely to 
those able and willing to immigrate is of fundamental 
importance for understanding why an open borders policy 
ultimately fails to respect this egalitarian principle. While 
the open borders position would help those with the 
resources and capacities to immigrate, it would not help 
the most vulnerable people in developing countries who 
are left behind, such as the disabled, the ill, the elderly, 
the very young, and the extremely poor who do not have 
enough resources to migrate. Further, as observed earlier, 
equality of opportunity to flourish should be understood 
within the context of the real-world constraints imposed 
by the need for self-governing political communities, 
including choice countries of destination, to effectively 
exercise their administrative functions. It is plausible to 
maintain that open border policies would undermine the 
successful performance of these administrative functions. 
It is also important to be mindful of the political feasibility 
of our proposals, and it is surely the case that open border 
policies are highly unfeasible from a political standpoint. 
International justice advocates cannot simply ignore the 
concrete problems that would arise, particularly for choice 
destination countries, if they embrace unrestricted policies 
of immigration. Ironically, open border policies would create 
an open market for immigration slots that would most likely 
be filled not by the world’s poorest and neediest people, 
but by those from countries of origin who are relatively 
better off, more highly educated, and more resourceful. 
Such policies would likely lead to a new order of global 
inequality, in which wealthy countries benefit from the 
influx of some of the most talented and resourceful people 
from developing countries, while poor countries would 
likely be worse off as a result of losing some of their most 
capable and educated citizens. We need regulated borders 
in order to prioritize helping the world’s neediest and most 
vulnerable countries.11 
Programs involving more fixed-term work visas would 
ultimately help to create more economically viable 
communities in developing countries, particularly if 
temporary worker programs systematically reinforce the 
connections between temporary workers and their home 
communities. Some countries in Latin America, for example, 
are already implementing such programs, in which 
immigrant donations to the civic improvement of their 
communities are matched by state and municipal funds.12 
Returning immigrants could use their capital, knowledge, 
and connections, as noted earlier, to contribute to the 
economic and social development of their countries and 
communities. In short, my position promotes the egalitarian 
principle of expressing moral concern for all people more 
than the open borders position, because it works towards a 
vision of global justice in which all human beings are able 
to flourish in self-governing political communities without 
having to uproot themselves from their families, friends, 
and communities in order to achieve a decent material 
existence. 
SUMMARY OF PROBLEMS WITH OPEN BORDERS 
Because the open borders position continues to be 
embraced by progressive thinkers with the belief that 
it reflects and promotes the interests and welfare of the 
world’s most disadvantaged people, it is important to be 
clear about the numerous problems with it. These flaws 
should be considered as serious by progressive thinkers 
because they may very well undermine the welfare of 
precisely the group of people whose welfare they are most 
concerned to promote. 
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1.	 As mentioned in this essay, it is likely that the 
immigration slots available under open borders 
(since countries, at some point, would have to 
place some limits on immigration) would be filled 
not by the disabled, old, very young, ill, and poor 
of the world but by those with more resources, 
connections, education, health, and so forth. 
2.	 Countries would not be able under open borders 
to strategically design immigration policies that 
specially favor the world’s neediest people. 
Policies designed to help the most vulnerable and 
needy would have to involve regulated, not open, 
borders. 
3.	 The Brain Drain phenomenon, which would likely 
be exacerbated by eliminating immigration 
restrictions, negatively affects the social, 
economic, and political development of some of 
the poorest countries in the world by facilitating 
the exodus of some of their most educated, 
capable, and entrepreneurial citizens.13 
4.	 The homelands of Indigenous groups, who have 
fought long and hard to attain control of their 
traditional homelands, would be threatened 
by the uncontrolled influx and eventual control 
of outsiders. Since Indigenous groups often 
inhabit ecologically rich lands, there would be 
strong incentives for outsiders to attain control 
of resources in their territories. Outsiders, upon 
arrival, could claim that for the sake of justice and 
equality they should have equal rights of political 
representation as members of the Indigenous 
groups (after all, a principal rationale for open 
borders is equality). 
5.	 Under open borders, choice countries of 
destination, even if relatively wealthy, would have 
trouble developing rapidly the necessary physical 
infrastructures, such as affordable housing, 
water purification systems, roads, bridges, dams, 
and sewage and electrical systems. They would 
also have difficulty providing the needed social 
infrastructural needs, such as education, health 
care, social security, legal services, and police 
protection for the rapidly increasing population 
under open borders. 
6.	 Under open borders, countries would not be able to 
address their past foreign policy decisions that now 
endanger the citizens of other countries who have 
helped them with their military and other initiatives. 
People in Iraq, for example, who cooperated with 
US personnel are now endangered for their prior 
cooperation by the groups now in control in Iraq. 
The US would be unable under open borders to 
provide preferential treatment for these Iraqis, 
since under open borders some groups could not 
be given preference over others. Regardless of 
what one may think about the original motivations 
of the relevant US foreign policies, the country 
owes a moral debt to these Iraqis. 
7.	 A new world order would likely be created under 
open borders, one with greater inequalities and 
injustices, as powerful and wealthy countries 
would benefit from the aptitudes, resources, and 
initiatives provided by the more talented people 
from other countries with relatively more resources 
and education. 
Even though the open borders position is motivated 
by justified concerns about global justice and equality, 
on close analysis this position would likely not achieve 
its commendable objectives. We need more carefully 
structured immigration policies that take into account the 
complexities of the actual world. 
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Are Our Racial Concepts Necessarily 
Essentialist Due to Our Cognitive Nature? 
Eric Bayruns Garcia 
THE GRADUATE CENTER, CUNY
The Corona neighborhood of New York City has been a 
predominantly Dominican neighborhood since the late 
1970s and early 1980s. One day in the summer of the 2000, 
I was on my way into Manhattan on the elevated number 7 
metro line, and I witnessed two Dominican women arguing 
quite loudly outside of the turnstile to enter the metro. The 
women’s heated argument devolved from personal insults 
to just one thing, which they said to each over and over. 
Their argument devolved into them yelling at each other 
that the other was blacker. Both women by US standards 
would be taken to be black. The argument occurred in 
Spanish and both likely came to the US recently, or at least 
as adults, as could be told by their Dominican accents 
specific to the cultural region of the Dominican Republic 
called Cibao. 
The takeaway from this anecdote is that these two 
Dominican women hurled what they thought would be 
one of the most hurtful insults that they could sling at their 
interlocutor, namely, that their interlocutor was very black. 
Verbatim, one woman yelled, “¡Tu eres mas negra!” and 
the other woman responded with “¡No, tu eres mas negra!” 
This translates to the first woman saying, “You are blacker 
than me” and the other responding “No, you are blacker 
than me.” By my lights, the Dominican idea of blackness 
contains essentialist negative content, where the content 
includes things such as inferior moral disposition and 
inferior aesthetic qualities. Here, the Dominican notion of 
blackness at least partly explains why the argument was so 
heated, because in Dominican culture attributing blackness 
to someone implies (1) that they are necessarily lacking in 
aesthetic value and (2) that they are necessarily morally 
deficient or inferior. And if someone implies that another 
person is necessarily aesthetically lacking and morally 
deficient, then this plausibly will cut deep as an insult. 
I argue that this anecdote is incompatible with recent 
work from Ron Mallon and Daniel Kelly on the nature and 
content of subjects’ racial concepts and representations. 
Specifically, it is incompatible with Mallon and Kelly’s claim 
regarding racial representations’ content in mixed-race 
cultures like those from Latin America. 
In the Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Social Science, Ron 
Mallon and Daniel Kelly argue that racial representations 
are non-trivially fixed by “innate, domain-specific, species-
typical mechanisms.”1 They claim that many social scientists 
and race theorists do not properly countenance these 
psychological mechanisms in their explanations of racial 
difference because many social scientists and race theorists 
have an anti-psychological and anti-individualist bias. This 
bias prevents race theorists from properly understanding 
the role that human psychology plays in creating unjust 
racial outcomes because these outcomes are a result of 
innate human dispositions to categorize people by race. 
Mallon and Kelly distinguish between two kinds of social 
constructionism about race. The first kind is parallel 
constructionism. Parallel constructionism is the view that 
both racial difference and racial representations are the 
product of joint human choice and decision. The second 
kind is hybrid constructionism. Hybrid constructionism is 
the view that joint human decision does not completely 
explain racial representations’ content but rather that a more 
complete explanation must refer to innate psychological 
mechanisms which constrain racial representation’s content. 
Mallon and Kelly endorse hybrid constructionism, and they 
claim that most race theorists are parallel constructionists 
where paradigm examples of parallel constructionists are 
Linda Martín Alcoff,2 Sally Haslanger,3 Charles Mills,4 and 
Paul C. Taylor.5 
Mallon and Kelly claim that hybrid constructionism 
predicts, at least, that (1) racial representations are stable 
over time and (2) that racial representations should vary 
more in mixed-race cultures than in cultures where there 
is less racial mixing. I argue that hybrid constructionism’s 
predictions do not obtain and thus hybrid constructionism 
requires further evidence. I argue that the historical record 
is inconsistent with hybrid constructionism, and I suggest 
that humans may not be innately disposed to categorize 
people by race even though we are likely disposed to 
categorize people into in- and out-groups. So, in this 
paper, I hope to show that there is an evidence set that is 
inconsistent with hybrid constructionism. 
Good prescriptions are based on good descriptions. 
So good anti-racist prescriptions should be based on 
good, or accurate, descriptions of why people’s racial 
representations are racist or have essentialist content. 
Mallon and Kelly’s view of the social construction of 
race, hybrid constructionism, is inconsistent with much 
of the philosophy of race literature. If people’s racial 
representations are constrained by innate-domain­
specific mechanisms such that they have essentialist 
content, then anti-racist prescriptions should reflect this. 
If parallel constructionism is true, then it plausibly makes 
sense to hold people morally accountable for holding, 
say, that whites are superior to non-whites, because racial 
representations are primarily the result of human choice 
and decision. On the other hand, if hybrid constructionism 
is true, it plausibly makes less sense to hold people morally 
accountable for holding the belief that whites are superior 
to non-whites, because racial representations are primarily 
the result of an innate-domain-specific-species-typical 
psychological mechanism. Or, at the very least, if hybrid 
constructionism is true, then the way that we hold people 
accountable for holding that whites are superior to non­
whites will importantly differ from the way we would hold 
them accountable if parallel constructionism was true. 
The paper proceeds as follows. In section one I explain Mallon 
and Kelly’s view that some of our racial representations’ 
content is due to innate human psychological mechanisms 
rather than solely, or largely, human choice. In section two 
I explain a study which suggests that we may not innately 
categorize humans by race. In section three I present 
evidence from antiquity that is inconsistent with hybrid 
constructionism’s prediction that racial representations are 
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stable over time. In section four I present evidence that is 
inconsistent with hybrid constructionism’s other prediction 
that racial representations should vary more in mixed-
race cultures because our innate mechanisms adapted 
to track “species-like” populations rather than mixed-race 
populations which are not “species-like.” 
SECTION I 
Mallon and Kelly suggest that there is a race puzzle. If 
race is not biologically real, then it is unclear how race can 
serve as a prediction basis for the social sciences. The idea 
here is that the social sciences require something real with 
causal regularity on which to base their predictions. The 
answer given by race theorists and social scientists is that 
categorizing groups of people can involve causal regularity 
because human social practices are done in accordance 
with categorizations. In other words, (P1) our decisions can 
affect our categories, (P2) our categories can affect our 
social practices, and (P3) our social practices have causal 
properties, so (C) our race categories can enable us to 
make predictions about people so categorized. 
If we categorize someone as a professor, then both the 
person categorized as a professor acts in certain ways 
because she is so categorized, and the rest of society acts 
in certain ways in relation to this person qua professor 
because she is so categorized. That this person acts in 
certain ways is what Mallon and Kelly call a social role 
where a social role is a set of expectations which the person 
who inhabits this role either consciously or unconsciously 
attempts to meet. Ian Hacking similarly points out that 
particular kinds of people can be constructed where kinds 
of people act in accordance with the idea of a particular 
kind because they have been categorized, either by others 
or by themselves, as a particular kind of person.6 Therefore, 
we can make predictions about this professor because she 
has been so categorized. 
Mallon and Kelly call this the standard answer to what they 
call the race puzzle. This answer partly explains why, say, 
white American economic outcomes, on average, differ 
from black American economic outcomes. By Mallon 
and Kelly’s lights, the standard answer involves that both 
racial difference in the world and racial representations 
are socially constructed. On the standard answer, enough 
humans choose to live with, not remedy, and perpetuate 
racial injustice such that racial injustice obtains. And, on 
the standard answer, their racial representations are also 
a result of human choice. Here, there is what Mallon and 
Kelly describe as social construction at two parallel levels. 
One level of construction obtains at the level of actual 
racial-outcome difference in the world. A second level of 
construction obtains at the level of mental representations 
of, say, white and black people. They call this kind of 
social construction, at two simultaneous levels, parallel 
constructionism. 
Mallon and Kelly reject parallel constructionism because 
“recent work in evolutionary and cognitive psychology has 
suggested that important features of racial representations 
are explained by appeal to mental mechanisms that are 
species-typical, domain-specific and innate.”7 Rather, they 
endorse what they call hybrid constructionism, where 
hybrid constructionism is the view that these psychological 
mechanisms constrain our racial representations such that 
they have some content rather than other content. The 
kind of content that these mechanisms cause our racial 
representations to have is content of a racially essentialist 
kind. 
Mallon and Kelly suggest that racial essentializing is a 
feature of our psychology, which was naturally selected or 
improved humans’ fitness in an evolutionary sense. A racial 
representation is essentialist if it represents a group of 
people asnecessarilyhaving certain features, characteristics, 
or properties. So, on a hybrid constructionist view, our racial 
representations are constrained by an evolved disposition 
to represent other groups in essentialist ways. This view 
differs from parallel constructionism because by Mallon 
and Kelly’s lights hybrid constructionism provides a more 
complete explanation of racial representations’ content 
because it appeals to human psychology, but parallel 
constructionism provides a less complete explanation of 
racial representations’ content because its appeal to human 
choice and decision cannot as completely explain our 
racial representation’s content. Mallon and Kelly suggest 
that some social psychology evidence supports hybrid 
constructionism. They cite experiments by Susan Gelman 
and Henry Wellman where children attribute cow behaviors 
to a baby cow even though, the child participants are told, 
it was raised by pigs.8 They take this to show that humans 
will associate properties typically associated with a kind 
even when environmental and developmental situations 
are changed. More importantly, they take this to show that 
humans may similarly associate black typical properties 
with a black child even though the child was raised by, say, 
white parents in a white community. Or, at very least, they 
take this to show that even young children represent others 
in essentialist ways. 
SECTION II 
In this section I briefly explain a study which suggests that 
humans do not have “innate, domain-specific, species-
typical mechanisms” such that humans naturally categorize 
people into groups that share some racially determined 
essence. I grant that we may have mechanisms that 
dispose us to represent people in an in-group and out-
group fashion according to some shared feature of a set 
of people. The study does not suggest that we do not 
have any such mechanisms, but rather it suggests that we 
do not have a mechanism of this kind dedicated to racial 
categorization. 
The study I explain below is a psychology study in 
which Shutts et al. test whether three- and four-year­
old children use social categories like gender or race to 
make first-personal and third-personal inferences about 
others’ properties and social relationships.9 The study’s 
participants were white male and female children from 
middle-class urban or suburban centers in New England 
and the Midwest. 
The study consisted of seven experiments. In the first 
experiment, gender rather than race was a “more potent 
guide to social preferences” when three-year-old children 
were asked to pick with whom they would rather be 
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friends.10 Here, seventy-four percent (74%) of children 
indicated that they would rather be friends with children of 
the same sex when presented with pictures of a male child 
and a female child. Fifty-four percent (54%) of children 
indicated that they would rather be friends with children 
of the same race when presented with pictures of a black 
child and a white child. 
In the second experiment, when participants were asked 
to select an activity that they prefer like “having a pool 
party” or “having a birthday party,” and then were asked to 
indicate whether children represented in photos of either 
(1) a black or a white child or (2) a male or female child 
also preferred the same activity, seventy percent (70%) 
of participants chose photos of children with the same 
gender, whereas, fifty-three percent (53%) of participants 
selected photos of children with the same race. Here, for 
three-year-old children, gender rather than race was the 
salient social category. 
Neither the third nor the fourth experiment showed any 
statistically significant use of both gender and race when 
three-year-old participants made third-personal inferences 
about either social activity preferences or social relationship 
preferences. 
Experiments five, six, and seven all tested four-year­
old children’s ability to make third-personal inferences 
about others’ social activity preferences and friendship 
preferences. In the fifth experiment seventy percent (70%) 
of four-year-old participants inferred that children prefer 
friends of the same gender. Sixty-eight percent (68%) of 
children in this experiment inferred that other children 
prefer to be friends with their own race. Here, the older 
set of participants, four-year-old children, used both and 
gender and race to infer others’ friendship preferences. 
Experiments six and seven tested to see if four-year-old 
children used race or gender to infer that people of the 
same gender or race prefer the same social activities. 
Neither race nor gender was found as a robust inference 
basis. 
I now consider what this study suggests for race as a 
category that humans innately use to categorize others. 
The study seems to suggest that race is not a category 
which three-year-old children use to first-personally infer 
whom they would like to be friends with and with whom 
they share activity preferences, whereas gender does serve 
as a basis upon which three-year-old children make similar 
first-personal inferences. Race also did not serve as an 
inference basis for four-year-old children when inferring 
about social activities. 
One explanation of the data is “that children are predisposed 
to consider gender information when evaluating people 
but do not possess dedicated mechanisms for evaluating 
others in accord with their race.”11 That is, here, gender 
seems more likely the innate category. This seems at odds 
with Mallon and Kelly’s hypothesis that we have innate, 
domain-specific, species-typical mechanisms which cause 
our racial representations to be essentialist in nature. 
Shutts et al. note that even on an evolutionary-psychology 
picture gender representations seem more likely to have 
mechanisms devoted to it than race because gender 
distinctions have been available much longer than race 
distinctions. 
Mallon and Kelly took Gelman and Wellman’s 1991 study to 
show that children represent species in essentialist ways.12 
They also took this as evidence in favor of their hypothesis 
that children categorize people by race in an essentialist 
way. Shutts et al. note that “children’s performance in 
Experiments 6 and 7 contrasts with previous findings that 
4-year-old children use gender and race to guide category-
based inferences about others’ biological (Gelman et al. 
1986) and psychological properties.”13 What seems to 
explain this inconsistency is that Gelman used noun labels 
like “girl” and “boy” to pick out targets which participants 
were supposed to match. Shutts et al.’s study did not use 
noun labels but rather experimenters used pictures and 
pointing gestures to pick out match targets. Shutts et al. 
point out that Waxman14 (2010) tested whether the use of 
noun labels in picking out match targets would make a 
difference, and in Waxman’s study “children did not engage 
in race-based property induction at all when the target was 
not described with a noun label.”15 
Waxman’s study suggests that the use of noun labels is what 
caused children to infer that cows would still exhibit cow 
behavior even though they were raised by pigs. If the use 
of noun labels is what caused children to categorize cows 
in an essentialist way, then Mallon and Kelly’s inferential 
leap to the conclusion that we, humans, innately infer in a 
similar essentialist way seems unwarranted. 
SECTION III 
In this section I present historical evidence that is 
inconsistent with Mallon and Kelly’s claim that racial 
representations are stable over time. Mallon and Kelly 
claim that racial representations should, on their view, be 
roughly the same throughout the historical record because 
we as humans are naturally disposed to categorize people 
in essentialist ways. Put another way, this mechanism 
determines that our racial representations have essentialist 
content. 
Race theorists largely agree that race as an idea or category 
was born sometime after Christopher Columbus reached 
the shores of the island of Hispaniola in 1492.16 Bartolomé 
de las Casas, in the fifteenth century, came up with the 
initial ordinal ranking of peoples because Europeans had 
to establish what kind of people, first, the Native Americans 
were and, then, what kind black Africans were.17 It was 
quickly established that Natives and blacks were human 
enough for salvation, but not human enough to enter 
reciprocal relations with Europeans. But this historical 
account of the idea of race’s genesis is inconsistent with 
Mallon and Kelly’s claim that racial representations should 
not vary. On their account, essentialist race notions must 
have been present long before Columbus reached the 
shores of the Taino (Native inhabitants) island of Quisqueya 
(the Native word still used today to refer to Hispaniola). 
Greek and Roman antiquity seems like a good place to look 
for essentialist racial representations, which are consistent 
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with hybrid constructionism because the Greek and 
Roman world was well aware and very familiar with sub-
Saharan and eastern African peoples who would qualify 
as phenotypically black today. It is well documented that 
there were sub-Saharan blacks living throughout the Greek 
and Roman world.18 
Race theorists and Greek and Roman scholars seem to 
largely agree that the modern notion of race, where race 
picks out some kind of biologically determined essence, 
did not exist in antiquity. Frank Snowden claims that even 
though the ancients (1) accepted slavery, (2) exhibited 
inter-cultural ethnocentrism, (3) valued notions of beauty 
derived from their own cultures over others, and (4) 
distinguished people from other places as barbarians, the 
ancients did not have anything “comparable to the virulent 
color prejudice of modern times.”19 According to Snowden, 
most scholars who have looked at the evidence share the 
view that “the ancients did not fall into the error of biological 
racism; black skin color was not a sign of inferiority.”20 
Now, Snowden does note that the Greeks, Romans, and 
even Egyptians largely viewed their “aesthetic canons” 
as superior to others.21 But he also notes in earlier work 
that there are numerous examples in Greek and Roman 
literature of Greeks and Romans expressing admiration 
for Ethiopian aesthetic canons. The ancient Greeks and 
Romans referred to dark-skinned Africans as Ethiopians. 
Preferring one’s own aesthetic canon can be explained 
by cultural influences rather than by appeal to innate 
mechanisms. Moreover, “on the whole, the number of 
expressed preferences for blackness and whiteness in 
the classical literature is approximately equal.”22 Thus, this 
aesthetic-preference point does not seem consistent with 
hybrid constructionism. Or, at the very least, this aesthetic-
preference point does not seem to be evidence for hybrid 
constructionism. 
Now, Benjamin Isaac suggests that Greeks and Romans 
were proto-racists.23 He argues that the roots of modern 
racism can be found in Greek and Roman antiquity. 
However, he admits that “Greek and Roman antiquity did 
not know of the sort of racism that Western civilization 
developed in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, since 
they had no concept of biological determinism.”24 On his 
view, Greek and Roman proto-racism was based in group 
difference, which was caused by different environments. 
That is, Greek and Romans were at worst environmental 
determinists because they attributed the differences that 
existed between groups not to biology or skin color, but 
rather to the ways that environments affect our physical 
and mental constitution. 
Isaac likens their proto-racism to ethnic prejudice. Isaac 
says, “If, we read that people are stupid and courageous 
because they live in a cold climate, then it can be argued 
that this is a form of proto-racism, since there is the implicit 
assumption that these people are stupid through physical 
factors beyond their control.”25 Here, even if we grant 
that the ancient Greeks and Romans were proto-racists, 
their racial representations’ content was not determined, 
or constrained, by an innate psychological mechanism, 
but rather their racial representations seemed free to 
track non-biological reasons for differences between 
genetic populations. Thus, hybrid constructionism is 
inconsistent with, at least, this historical evidence of racial 
representations in Greek and Roman antiquity. 
SECTION IV 
I now present sociological evidence that is inconsistent 
with hybrid constructionism’s second prediction that racial 
representations should vary more in mixed-race cultures 
because our innate mechanisms adapted to track “species­
like” populations rather than mixed-race populations 
which are not “species-like.” Mallon and Kelly take Latin 
America to be a case where racial representations vary 
because of population mixing. Latin America differs from 
the US because historically the US population has been 
and is less racially mixed. Put another way, Latin American 
populations are not sufficiently species-like for our innate 
mechanisms to track. As a result, Latin American racial 
representations do not have essentialist features which US 
racial representations have. 
The first bit of evidence which is inconsistent with hybrid 
constructionism’s second prediction is my own experience 
as mixed-race person or light-skinned Dominican. I have 
seen and experienced firsthand that Dominican racial 
representations have essentialist content. For example, 
when I was a child, I was praised precisely because I was 
light-skinned, and lighter skin tone was thought to be 
inherently better than darker skin tone. I also witnessed 
inter-familial maltreatment of family members because 
of their skin color. The motivation behind my family 
members’ maltreatment and my good treatment are racial 
representations which contain essentialist content. The 
content is roughly that blackness is inherently bad and 
whiteness is inherently good. The inherent value comes 
from necessary properties people who are either black 
or white have. In the Dominican Republic, blackness is 
associated with Haitians, and Haitians are unfortunately 
thought to be thieves, uneducated, and generally 
immoral. Whiteness is associated with Spain, where Spain 
is associated with refinement, good pedigree, and the 
Church. Linda Martín Alcoff similarly points out that “in the 
Dominican Republic, ‘black’ is defined as Haitian, and dark-
skinned Dominicans do not self-identify as black but as dark 
Indians or mestizos.”26 This seems inconsistent with Mallon 
and Kelly’s claim that racial representations will differ in 
societies which consist in mixed-race populations. Latin 
populations are mixed race and the Dominican population is 
a paradigm example of a mixed-race population, but racial 
essentialism is prominent in the Dominican population’s 
racial representations. 
Evidence from sociology shows that in Latin American
countries like Venezuela, Brazil, and the Dominican Republic
there is a correlation between one’s socioeconomic status
and the likelihood that one will either identify as white or
identify closer on the racial spectrum to white irrespective
of one’s actual skin-tone.27 Edward Telles and Tianna Paschel
suggest that “high-socioeconomic status tends to be
associated with whiteness, or at least with non-blackness.”28 
This suggests that in Latin America (1) either white identity
or an identity on the color spectrum closer to white is
preferred to black identity, and (2) there is some kind of
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desire to be whiter in people who recognize themselves as
insufficiently white. This is further evidence of essentialist
racial representations at work in Latin America where Mallon
and Kelly claim there should be none. 
However, one could object that the sociological evidence 
does not show that Latin American racial representations 
contain essentialist content because Latin Americans 
value white identity above others not because they think 
white identity is inherently or intrinsically superior to black 
identity but rather because they think it is economically 
advantageous. That is, the average Latin American person 
values white identity not because being identified as white 
indicates that they have more intrinsic worth than others, 
but rather because being identified as white provides more 
economic and social opportunities. 
The objection fails because even if Latin Americans are 
partly motivated by economic considerations to identify 
as white, Latin Americans are also likely motivated by non­
economic considerations to identify as white. In her study on 
Latin American censuses from 1850 to 1950, Mara Loveman 
concludes that “tacit beliefs about whiteness contained in 
US and Latin American censuses are very much alike.”29 
That is, Loveman concludes that racial representations 
in Latin America are similar to racial representations in 
the US. And racial representations in the US, by Mallon 
and Kelly’s lights, contain essentialist content due to our 
innate disposition to categorize by race. Thus, there is a 
tension between Loveman’s claim that Latin American and 
US beliefs about white identity are similar and Mallon and 
Kelly’s claim that Latin American racial representations 
should differ from US racial representations in terms of 
their respective essentialist content. 
Loveman points out that among Latin American censuses 
that collected race data, the white category always preceded 
other categories like mestizo, mulato, or indigenous. A 
mulato is someone of both black and white ancestry. A 
mestizo is someone of both indigenous and white ancestry. 
Loveman says, “That this presentational choice seemed 
‘obvious’ speaks to the successful naturalization of the 
idea that the category ‘white’ belongs at the top of any 
racial hierarchy.”30 That is, that the people who created 
the censuses uniformly assumed that the white category 
should be listed before other identity categories even in 
countries with non-white majorities suggests that they 
took for granted that whites were the superior race. This 
defeats the objection that only economic considerations 
motivate Latin Americans to value white identity over 
others because census creators do not obviously have an 
economic motivation to list the white category before other 
categories on census questionnaires. 
The only Latin American census from 1850 to 1950 that did 
not list the white category first was the 1921 census. This 
was the first Mexican census after the Mexican Revolution 
of 1910. According to Loveman, census creators listed the 
mestizo category first as a deliberate political act. She says, 
“The inversion of the ‘natural’ order of racial categories was 
clearly a political act by those who produced the official 
statistics.”31 The inversion of racial categories suggests that 
the dominant racial category was white. Moreover, if the 
white category was not imbued with negative features, then 
the inversion would likely not have taken place because it 
would not have risen to the level of something that should 
be done. A plausible explanation of the inversion is that 
whiteness was viewed by census creators as invoking 
things like the superiority of whiteness over mestizo 
identity such that they felt compelled to invert the order 
of the white and the mestizo categories. If this explanation 
is plausible, then Mallon and Kelly’s prediction, that racial 
representations should vary in mixed-race cultures like 
Latin America, should seem less plausible. 
CONCLUSION 
I hope to have made plausible the view that two of hybrid 
constructionism’s predictions do not obtain. The first 
prediction is that racial representations should be stable 
across history, particularly in populations with a relatively 
high degree of genetic reproductive closure. That is, across 
history, racial representations should exhibit essentialist 
content in societies where populations are relatively 
genetically homogenous because humans adapted innate 
psychological mechanisms which cause us to represent 
species-like populations as having necessary features. I 
have presented expert opinions that held that there is no 
evidence of essentialist racial representations in Greek and 
Roman antiquity. I take Greek and Roman society to consist 
in populations that had sufficient reproductive closure. Thus, 
there seems to be an inconsistency because according to 
hybrid constructionism, there should be essentialist racial 
representations in Greek and Roman antiquity, but there is 
no evidence of them despite evidence of a large array of 
racial representations which are not essentialist. 
I also hope to have plausibly suggested that hybrid 
constructionism’s second prediction does not obtain. 
I presented my own firsthand testimony of racial 
representations with essentialist content in the Dominican 
Republic and in a New York City Dominican enclave. I also 
have presented sociological findings and observations 
which seem inconsistent with this second prediction. 
Finally, I reviewed a study by Shutts et al. which casts 
doubt on the psychology study which Mallon and Kelly 
partly based their inference that we adapted an innate 
mechanism which causes our racial representations to 
have essentialist content. Shutts et al.’s study suggests that 
race is not used as an inference basis for three-year-old 
children in both first- and third-personal inferences, and 
it suggests that four-year-old children do not use race to 
infer third parties’ properties. This research seems to cast 
some doubt on Mallon and Kelly’s hypothesis that we have 
innate mechanisms which cause our racial representations 
to have essentialist content. 
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Epistemic Humility Now! 
Damían Bravo Zamora
UNAM & UNIVERSIDAD ANÁHUAC, MÉXICO
I. INTRODUCTION 
“Don’t be so overly dramatic about it, Chuck. What you’re 
saying is a falsehood, and they’re giving, [. . .] our Press 
Secretary, gave alternative facts to that.”1 
Genuine listeners are likely to have a hard time trying to 
understand this statement. If a falsehood is contrary to 
the truth, if you accuse someone of saying a falsehood 
and you endorse a claim that’s opposite to the alleged 
falsehood, then it would seem that what you are defending 
is not merely an alternative claim, let alone an “alternative 
fact”—whatever that means—but the truth. I won’t try to 
investigate what might have been meant by this particular 
utterance at this particular moment. I am more intrigued 
by the relation between this relativistic statement and the 
proposal, by the same group of people, to “build a big, 
beautiful, powerful wall” that would separate a rich world-
region and a poor one. And, in fact, my aim is the much more 
general one of investigating whether there is any relation 
between relativism, on the one hand, and exclusivism, on 
the other. I am also interested in the question whether 
there is a plausible alternative to relativism. 
For those familiar with the history of Western philosophy, a 
few familiar bells are probably ringing right now. There are 
no facts, we’ve been repeatedly told by philosophers, but 
only interpretations. Stated absolutely (“there are no. . .”), 
of course, relativism is self-stultifying. Do relativists believe 
in what they say? Do they believe in its truth? If they do, 
we have only to point out to them that it is inconsistent to 
believe in the truth of what one says if what one says is 
that there are no truths. If they don’t believe in what they 
say, then they are neither taking us nor themselves very 
seriously, and we may decide at this point either to keep 
on playing games with them or to do something else with 
our time, but it would certainly be foolish to keep on taking 
them seriously. We know all that since Plato. What has not 
been explored enough, I think, is the question whether 
relativism can avail itself, and wants to avail itself, of any 
thought or argument in order to counter those discourses 
that unabashedly claim the moral, intellectual, and cultural 
superiority of one people over another. Relativism and 
exclusivism have come hand in hand before. One of the 
stellar proponents of relativism, Friedrich Nietzsche, had 
no intention whatsoever to disguise his firm belief in the 
superiority of one part of humanity over the other part, 
or his desire to keep the “superior” and “strong” part of 
humanity separated from the “inferior” and “weak” one. 
Belief in the equal dignity of all human beings can only 
occur, according to Nietzsche, when one has adopted the 
viewpoint of the slaves. Thus, if one adopts the egalitarian 
standpoint, one has become, whether consciously or 
unconsciously, a victim of the slaves’ rebellion in morality: 
one has adopted the morality of resentment that stems 
from the slaves’ condition and their gradual revenge. 
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These worm-eaten physiological casualties are 
all men of resentment, a whole, vibrating realm 
of subterranean revenge, inexhaustible and 
insatiable, in its eruptions against the happy, and 
likewise in masquerades of revenge and pretexts 
for revenge: when will they actually achieve their 
ultimate, finest, most sublime, triumph of revenge? 
Doubtless if they succeed in shoving their own 
misery, on to the conscience of the happy: so 
that the latter eventually start to be ashamed of 
their happiness and perhaps say to one another: 
“It’s a disgrace to be happy! There is too much 
misery!”. . . But there could be no greater or more 
disastrous misunderstanding than for the happy, 
the successful, those powerful in body and soul to 
begin to doubt their right to happiness in this way. 
Away with this “world turned upside down”! Away 
with this disgraceful mollycoddling of feeling! That 
the sick should not make the healthy sick––and 
this would be that kind of mollycoddling––ought 
to be the chief concern on earth:––but for that, it is 
essential that the healthy should remain separated
from the sick, should even be spared the sight of 
the sick so that they do not confuse themselves 
with the sick.2 
A modern-day Nietzsche would perhaps add, “And what 
better way is there to separate the healthy from the sick, to 
spare the healthy the very sight of the sick and to prevent 
any admixture between these two sets of human beings, 
than to build a big, beautiful, powerful wall between them?” 
II. RELATIVISM AND EXCLUSIVISM 
My current concern, however, as I said before, is not with 
Nietzsche’s exclusivism as such, but with the relation 
between exclusivism and relativism. The latter can 
sometimes look like a reasonable dose of uncertainty 
that stems from the realization that we are creatures with 
finite intellects. However, as we will shortly see, Nietzsche 
seamlessly slips from this reasonable dose of skepticism to 
the self-stultifying claim that there are only interpretations. 
It is only the latter, nonsensical claim which, in my opinion, 
is inextricably linked to Nietzsche’s exclusivism. For only 
when you think that there are only interpretations, while you 
also think that interpreting is essentially “forcing, adjusting, 
shortening, omitting, filling-out, inventing, falsifying,”3 
only then, I suggest, is your view both self-stultifying and 
thoroughly defenseless against exclusivism. Only then is 
the way paved for you to feel entitled to decide, at some 
given point, that you’ve had enough of listening to the 
others’ perspectives. Up to that given point, you might have 
been clever and magnanimous enough to force yourself 
to view the world from the others’ perspectives. But, let 
us not deceive ourselves, you’ve always “known” that not 
all perspectives are equally valid. How could you possibly 
think that, on what grounds could you possibly argue that 
all perspectives are equally valid, when you believe that 
there is nothing in the world but interpretations, while, 
amongst those interpretations, you can always very clearly 
distinguish those that appertain to the bossy, healthy, 
and strong, from those that appertain to the servile, 
sick, and weak? Quite unsurprisingly, logical, scientific 
discourse, with its proclamation of epistemic democracy 
and its commitment to the attainment of an ever-wider, 
trans-cultural intersubjectivity, is to Nietzsche’s eyes an 
unequivocal sign of the decadence of Western civilization: 
Finally, as knowers, let us not be ungrateful 
towards such resolute reversals of familiar 
perspectives and valuations with which the mind 
has raged against itself for far too long, apparently 
to wicked and useless effect: to see differently, 
and to want to see differently to that degree, is no 
small a discipline and preparation of the intellect 
for its future “objectivity”––the latter understood 
not as “contemplation [Anschauung] without 
interest” (which is, as such, a non-concept and an 
absurdity), but as having in our power the ability to 
engage and disengage our ‘pros’ and ‘cons’: we 
can use the difference in perspectives and affective 
interpretations for knowledge. From now on, my 
philosophical colleagues, let us be more wary of 
the dangerous old conceptual fairy-tale which has 
set up a “pure, will-less, painless, timeless, subject 
of knowledge,” let us be wary of the tentacles of 
such contradictory concepts as “pure reason,” 
“absolute spirituality,” “knowledge as such”: –– 
here we are asked to think an eye which cannot 
be thought at all, an eye turned in no direction 
at all, an eye where the active and interpretative 
powers are to be suppressed, absent, but through 
which seeing still becomes a seeing-something, 
so it is an absurdity and a non-concept of eye that 
is demanded. There is only a perspectival seeing, 
only a perspectival knowing; the more affects we 
are able to put into words about a thing, the more
eyes, various eyes we are able to use for the same 
thing, the more complete will be our “concept” of 
the thing, our “objectivity.” But to eliminate the will 
completely and turn off all the emotions without 
exception, assuming we could: well? would that 
not mean to castrate the intellect?4 
As we can see, there is a small step between depriving 
oneself of the possibility of referring to the absolute 
multiplicity which is the universe—and that is exactly the 
possibility that one deprives oneself of when one says 
that there is only a perspectival seeing—and feeling 
entitled to disregard alternative perspectives deemed to 
be “inferior” to others. Nothing prevents slipping from 
one position to the other, since, if one believes that 
there are only interpretations and no facts, and also that 
some interpretations are “superior” to others, then there 
is no reason why one should give space to the “inferior” 
interpretations “for far too long.” 
III. EPISTEMIC HUMILITY AND THE ABILITY TO
REFER TO THE UNIVERSE 
Here is how pushing self-reflection and criticism a little 
further could have taken Nietzsche towards a radically 
different kind of philosophy, a more inclusive one. Not that 
he cared about it—he couldn’t care less, as we saw.5 But 
there are relativists, like Foucault, Derrida, and Rorty, who 
are not exclusivists, and whose philosophies constantly 
denounce hidden, unsuspected, contingent forms of 
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oppression (Foucault6), speak in favor of inescapably 
unrealizable emancipatory promises and unconditional 
hospitality towards the radical other (Derrida7), and promote 
transcultural solidarity (Rorty8). Since they leave Nietzsche’s 
relativism untouched, their expression of concern for the 
oppressed amounts to little more than a statement of good 
wishes. And we may, indeed, at some point have nothing 
else to say against exclusivism than that “we simply do not 
behave that way,” and nothing else to do except to defend 
ourselves against its violence. But not at this point. There 
is something to say about Nietzsche’s relativism; we are 
not obliged to buy it gullibly, nor to repeat it dogmatically. 
We are in a position not only to denounce untethered 
relativism as incoherent, but also to offer an alternative. 
And that gives us the possibility to reject exclusivism at this 
theoretical level. 
In order to identify something as our interpretation of 
something else, we need to assume a lot of things. What do 
we mean by our interpretation? Who are we in this thought? 
Is it us, humans? Then we are assuming the existence of 
a universe which we humans inhabit, which we interpret 
through concepts, theories, and discourses. This idea of 
the universe need not be one of a reified or hypostatized
universe: by “universe” we may simply refer to the all-
encompassing multiplicity of what there is; this does not 
imply that the multiplicity itself constitutes an independent 
individual object in its own right, apart from its members, 
a totality in the sense of a Cantorian set (“a many thought 
of as a one”). Classes, as Russell once realized, may be 
thought of as logical fictions.9 Nor does this idea imply that 
the objects which constitute the absolute multiplicity which 
we are calling “the universe” are of any particular kind. In 
other words, we need not yet be committed to any particular 
conception with regards to all the kinds of objects that 
populate and can populate the universe. But we assume, 
at least, that we humans are part of that multiplicity. And, 
unless we are arrogant to the point of absurdity, no self-
deceiving tendency should dissuade us from the thought 
that we are a very small, indeed preposterously minuscule, 
part of the universe. The better half of Nietzsche was 
undoubtedly familiar with this idea. He once wrote, surely 
as a criticism of the Hegelian pretension to be the very 
incarnation of Absolute Spirit (which is All There Is, and 
which attains its ultimate purpose, absolute knowing, only 
in the very act of philosophizing through nothing other 
than the Hegelian concepts themselves), that “if we could 
communicate with the mosquito, then we would learn that 
it floats through the air with the same self-importance, 
feeling within itself the flying center of the world.”10 
The crucial point, however, is that if we both take the
thought of our finitude seriously and at the same time want
to avoid self-stultification, then we have to recognize that we
are committed to the truth and objectivity of at least these
three thoughts: 1) There is a universe; 2) there is a way the 
universe is; and 3) we are embedded in that universe, i.e., 
we are part of it—a ridiculously small part of it at that. So, 
pace Nietzsche, at least these thoughts cannot be discredited
as mere interpretations, if interpretations necessarily
involve “forcing, adjusting, shortening, omitting, filling-out,
inventing, falsifying.” A contemporary philosopher, Thomas
Nagel, points in the right direction when he says: 
There are some types of thoughts that we 
cannot avoid simply having—that it is strictly 
impossible to consider merely from the outside, 
because they enter inevitably and directly into 
any process of considering ourselves from the 
outside, allowing us to construct the conception 
of a world in which, as a matter of objective fact, 
we and our subjective impressions are contained. 
. . . We discover objective reason by discovering 
that we run up against certain limits when we 
inquire whether our beliefs, values, and so forth 
are subjective, culturally relative, or otherwise 
essentially perspectival. Certain forms of thought 
inevitably occur straight in the consideration of 
such hypotheses—revealing themselves to be 
objective in content.11 
In other words, insofar as we want to describe some parts 
of our thought as subjective and perspectival, we are 
assuming that other parts aren’t perspectival in exactly 
the same way. These latter parts are the thoughts that we 
simply must have, and assume to be objective, in order 
to intelligibly state the possibility that certain parts of our 
thought are merely perspectival (are mere interpretations 
in Nietzsche’s sense). To repeat, these are thoughts like: 
There is a universe, there is a way the universe is, we are 
embedded in the universe, other beings (be they stones, 
numbers, gods, mosquitos, or subatomic particles) are 
equally embedded in the universe, etc. 
Nagel’s critique of relativism-subjectivism, on account of 
its self-stultifying nature, can only be fully appreciated 
if complemented with Nagel’s own “realist” position, 
defended in his book The View from Nowhere. Here is a 
passage which, I think, correctly captures Nagel’s ideas: 
Creatures who recognize their limited nature and 
their containment in the world must recognize both 
that reality may extend beyond our conceptual 
reach and that there may be concepts that we 
could not understand. The condition is met by a 
general concept of reality under which one’s actual 
conception, as well as all possible extensions of 
that conception, falls as an instance. This concept 
seems to me adequately explained through the 
idea of a hierarchical set of conceptions, extending 
from those much more limited than one’s own but 
contained in it to those larger than one’s own but 
containing it—of which some are reachable by 
discoveries one might make but others, larger still, 
are not. (The hierarchy could also include parallel 
conceptions, not intersecting our own but joined 
with it only in a larger one).12 
The universe is larger than us—far larger. There is no reason 
to deny that some of our concepts can refer to objects that 
exist independently of our cognitive capacities, and that 
some of our statements and theories describe parts of 
reality which are independent from us and our cognitive 
capacities. With our concepts, we can refer to black holes 
three million times larger than our planet, located 53 million 
light-years away from us; we can refer to light, therefore, 
which has been traveling at nearly 300,000 kilometers per 
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second for the past 53 million years—all this is thoroughly 
compatible with the fact that we are small and contingent 
creatures, which appeared in a small planet in a rather 
small galaxy only three million years ago.13 At the same 
time, nothing assures us that with our concepts we will be 
able to understand, describe, or even name absolutely all 
objects in the universe. We can certainly have a concept 
like universe or everything, and through it we can refer, 
generally, to all there is. That is to say, we “have the general 
concept of everything, which includes both the things we 
can name or describe and those we can’t.”14 But the only 
reasonable inference seems to be to the claim that the set 
of things we can name or describe is incredibly smaller 
than the set of things we can’t name or describe. Let us 
call this claim the epistemic humility thesis. “Humility,” at 
this stage, has nothing to do with morality or ethics. It is 
much more of a prudential, methodological injunction to 
anyone engaging in future theoretical enterprises: Don’t be 
an arrogant mosquito! 
IV. EPISTEMIC HUMILITY AND OPENNESS TO
ALTERNATIVE WORLDVIEWS 
But we are not far away from the moral realm, either. I do 
not mean to say that morality can be rationally derived from 
a set of non-moral claims. What I do mean to say is that 
the epistemic humility thesis gives us what untethered 
relativism cannot afford: a reason to oppose exclusivism 
at the epistemic level. And even though this opposition 
is carried out on prudential grounds, it has important 
consequences, which may be seen as a precondition—a 
necessary but by no means sufficient condition—for an 
attitude of openness to alternative worldviews. 
We said before that relativism is defenseless against 
discursive proposals of oppressive practices. Since 
there are no facts but only interpretations, but amongst 
interpretations some can be seen to belong to the 
powerful, while others can be seen to belong to the 
oppressed, then all we have is “superior” and “inferior” 
interpretations clashing against one another. There is no 
non-arbitrary point of view from which one could advocate 
in favor of either the viewpoint of the oppressed or that of 
the oppressor. More importantly, there is no non-arbitrary 
point of view from which one could say that all viewpoints 
are equally valid. For relativism, this latter claim can only be 
seen as an expression of sympathy for the oppressed and 
a desire for their perspective to be taken into account— 
but then, again, this sympathy may be completely absent, 
as it was in Nietzsche’s case. Epistemic humility, however, 
does afford a reason, hence a non-arbitrary thing to say, 
regarding the principle that all perspectives are equally 
valid. The reason is that “from the point of view of the 
universe,” there is no reason why any perspective should 
have more value than any other. All earthlings, including 
humans, are not unlike minuscule mosquitoes when 
considered in relation to the whole universe. And just as 
there is in principle no reason why any particular mosquito’s 
perspective is superior to any other particular mosquito’s 
perspective, there is also in principle no reason why any 
particular human being’s perspective should be superior 
to any other particular human being’s perspective. The very 
idea of objectivity, of an independently existing universe 
common to all perspectives and the ultimate object that 
those perspectives attempt to describe, presupposes the 
equality-in-principle of at least of those beings who have 
the same set of cognitive capacities. 
My current claim is that even though there are dangers 
involved in these ideas of objectivity and equality-in­
principle-of-all-perspectives-of-beings-with-the-same­
cognitive-capacities—as there are dangers in any general 
idea—they are nonetheless indispensable if epistemic 
humility and openness to alternative worldviews are ever 
to play a role in our cultural and political lives. To see why 
these ideas are dangerous, we need only think of the way 
in which science may be and has been violently imposed 
upon peoples and individuals with different worldviews 
and practices. To see why these ideas are nonetheless 
indispensable for a more inclusive coexistence between 
different worldviews, we need to take into account the 
following factors: 1) Violent imposition is not a necessary 
feature of science or of any other enterprise of reason 
that aims at objectivity—indeed, as many philosophers 
from diverse traditions seem to agree, it is contrary to 
the spirit of rational argumentation to even attempt to 
impose a belief through violent means15; 2) to deny the 
existence of an independent, objective universe is a self-
stultifying position—and there is nothing more radically 
opposed to the possibility of reaching an understanding 
between alternative views than a self-stultifying position: 
only non-self-stultifying positions may be presented to our 
interlocutors with the hope of attaining a common, shared 
view of a common, shared world; and 3) to say that the aim 
of a rational enterprise is the theoretical one of articulating 
an objective worldview accessible to all beings with 
common cognitive capacities is not to be confused with the 
proposal that any belief in particular is unrevisable—it is 
only to say that if any revision is proposed (if a viewpoint is 
eventually discovered to be merely subjective after all and 
an alternative view is suggested), it should be considered 
and evaluated with the same aim of articulating a more 
objective viewpoint. And even though the result of the 
revision will be a viewpoint, there is no reason to think that 
such a viewpoint will be personal or subjective, if by that 
we mean, as Nietzsche does, falsifying. Trivially, a thought 
is a thought, a theory is a theory, and a worldview is a 
worldview. But at least as long as some of our concepts and 
theories can be used to refer to an independently existing 
reality, there is no reason to think that any proposed 
revision will speak of a reality that only exists because we 
do. To go back to Nagel’s The Last Word: 
The aim of situating everything in a non-first­
person framework—a conception of how things 
are—is one to which there is no alternative. But 
that does not tell us what specific types of thought 
belong to this finally impersonal domain. . . . The 
aim of universal validity is compatible with the 
willingness always to consider alternatives and 
counterarguments—but they must be considered 
as candidates for objectively valid alternatives and 
arguments.16 
The aim of locating our views in a universally valid
framework, the recognition that there are some extremely 
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thin thoughts we can’t get outside of (like the thought that 
we are embedded in the universe, that there is a way the 
universe is, that it is larger than ourselves, etc.): these are 
the kinds of ideas and aims that a relativist finds pretentious 
and dangerous. I have conceded that they are dangerous, 
but I believe that the charge of pretentiousness stems from 
a misunderstanding. For only the aim of situating our views 
in a universally valid framework, and only the idea that 
we are embedded in a universe indescribably larger than 
ourselves, make it logically possible to think that some of 
our own views may be merely personal, parochial, arbitrary, 
contingent, perspectival, falsifying. And unless we are able 
to do this, we will never be able to respect views alternative 
to our own as alternative views of the shared universe: we 
could never be in a position to realize that we were wrong 
about anything. It is hard to find an epistemic attitude more 
absurd, and more arrogant, than this. 
V. CONCLUSIONS 
If what I have been arguing is correct, untethered 
relativism should be rejected, not only because it is 
self-stultifying, but because it is theoretically harmless 
against exclusivism. Even presupposing that a relativist 
wants to reject exclusivism, it has nothing to offer in this 
confrontation, except feelings of sympathy and solidarity 
for those oppressed. Those feelings are important, but 
it is also important to know that there is an alternative to 
relativism. Epistemic humility has the advantage that it is 
not a self-stultifying position, and also that only under its 
motivating ideas and aims does the claim that we may be 
wrong about the shared universe make any sense at all. 
Of course, exclusivists may not even be ready to rationally 
discuss their ideas, having realized that entering into a 
rational discussion of worldview implies recognizing that 
they might be wrong. If exclusivists are explicit about this 
refusal, then, indeed, there is nothing more to do at the 
rational level. Only then should we give up and recognize 
that our spade has turned. 
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Trump’s inauguration ceremony. 
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Section 14, p. 91. All emphases are in the original text. 
3.	 Ibid., Third essay, Section 24, p. 112. 
4.	 Ibid., Third essay, Section 12, p. 87. Emphases in the original. 
5.	 But in case any doubts linger on, see the following passage: 
“The amount of ‘progress’ can actually be measured according to 
how much has had to be sacrificed to it; man’s sacrifice en bloc
to the prosperity of one stronger species of man—that would 
be progress . . .” On the Genealogy of Morality, Second essay, 
Section 12, p. 52. 
6.	 See Michel Foucault, “Nietzsche, Genealogy, History,” 76–100. 
7.	 See Jacques Derrida, Specters of Marx. The State of the Debt, the 
Work of Mourning, and the New International, 94. 
8.	 Richard Rorty, Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity, 5. 
9.	 For defenses of a non-hypostatized idea of the universe, see 
Peter Simons, “The Universe,” 236–50, and Damián Bravo Zamora, 
“On the Soberer Conclusions that May Be Drawn from Kantian 
and Cantorian Antinomies,” 221–38. 
10. “On Truth and Lie in an Extra-moral Sense,” 	The Portable 
Nietzsche, 42.
11.	 Thomas Nagel, The Last Word, 20, 23–24. As we will shortly see, 
this criticism of relativism should be conceptually distinguished 
from the claim that there are unrevisable truths. For discussion 
of Nagel’s position, see Timothy Williamson’s The Philosophy of 
Philosophy, 260, and James Levine, “Logic and Solipsism,” 238. 
12. Thomas Nagel, The View from Nowhere, 98. 
13.	 Cf. Pallab Ghosh, “First Ever Black Hole Image Released,” https:// 
www.bbc.com/news/science-environment-47873592. 
14. Nagel, The View from Nowhere, 98. 
15.	 Friar Bartolomé de las Casas (XVI century) famously criticized 
the violent indoctrination of the original peoples of the Americas 
during Colonization, because in his opinion the best way to 
bring a people to the “true doctrine” (by which he meant the 
Christian faith) was through reason and persuasion, which 
is essentially opposed to violence. (Del único modo de atraer 
a todos los pueblos a la verdadera religión [México: Fondo de 
Cultura Económica, 1942], 303). In the words of Enrique Dussel: 
“[For las Casas] the only way to bring the members of a foreign 
culture into a doctrine which is unknown to them is, by making 
use of the art of persuasion—through “a persuasive way, by 
means of reasons that appeal to their understanding and which 
are softly attractive in relation to their wills”—, to count on the 
free will of the listener so that, through no coercion, he can 
rationally accept the arguments offered. Fear, punishment, and 
the use of war and weapons are evidently the remotest means 
for such a rational acceptance of reasons” (from “Meditaciones 
anticartesianas,” 305). Thomas Nagel has a related view, insofar 
as he thinks that reason is subject to its own standard, hence 
not to any external (e.g., psychological) standard, like fear of 
coercion: “When we juxtapose simple logical or mathematical 
thoughts with any other thoughts whatever, they remain subject 
only to their own standards and cannot be made the object of an 
external, purely psychological evaluation” (The Last Word, 58). 
Perhaps this idea is better known in Western philosophy through 
the influence of Immanuel Kant, who in his Groundwork of the 
Metaphysics of Morals argues in the following way: “Now I assert 
that to every rational being having a will we must necessarily 
lend the idea of freedom also, under which alone he acts. For 
in such a being we think of a reason that is practical, that is, has 
causality with respect to its objects. Now, one cannot possibly 
think of a reason that would consciously receive direction from 
any other quarter with respect to its judgments, since the subject 
would then attribute the determination of his judgment not to 
his reason but to an impulse” (Ak. 4:448). Other thinkers (like 
Karl-Otto Apel and Jürgen Habermas) could be cited as being of 
a piece in this regard, and it would undoubtedly prove rewarding 
to inquire into the differences and similarities in their views, but 
this comparative exercise has to be left for a future work. 
16. Nagel, The Last Word, 68 and 69. Emphases added. 
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ARTICLES 
Approaching Racial Embodiment,
Aesthetics, and Liberation in José Carlos 
Mariátegui’s Seven Essays 
Omar Rivera 
SOUTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY
In his wide-ranging socialist writings, Mariátegui re-
contextualizes political crises, texts, and works of art 
from and for a Latin American positionality.1 He analyzes 
them through alternative and marginalized historical and 
geopolitical frames in order to shed light on the complexity 
of his revolutionary juncture. He also puts into dialogue 
philosophers, artists, and political leaders from different 
eras, locations, and intellectual lineages. This is certainly 
a risky interpretive practice. It emphasizes unexpected 
aspects of theories which do not fit within accepted 
understandings, and aligns thinkers that are usually taken 
to be at odds with one another. It seems that, having 
shown that Latin America does not follow the economic, 
intellectual, and political developmental chronology that 
is apparent from Europe, Mariátegui cultivates a critical 
perspective in which affinities and tensions between 
various historical, epistemic, and social positions can come 
to be redrawn.2 This eclectic theorizing responds to the 
demands of the urgent, transitory, non-systematic, and 
dynamic character of Mariátegui’s situated philosophical 
and political reflections. Mariátegui’s originality owes much 
to this approach. Without it, his Indoamerican socialism 
would not have been articulated.3 In this paper I follow this 
approach as I interpret Mariátegui’s own texts in relation 
to decolonizing critiques of the concept and experience of 
race. 
My discussion does not cover the way in which racist 
assumptions determine Mariátegui’s socialism, including 
his writings on aesthetics. This is an issue that has been 
convincingly investigated and argued.4 Instead, I draw 
from a notion of racial embodiment from W.E.B. DuBois, 
Frantz Fanon, and Linda Martín Alcoff, and bring it to bear 
on Mariátegui’s Seven Essays and its Peruvian context.5 
This allows me to revisit his conception of race in relation 
to indigenista literature and explore embodied registers 
of the possibility of liberation that may otherwise remain 
implicit in his texts. 
In my view, racial embodiment has two axes. First, it is the 
experience of one’s body subject to an entrapping, racist 
gaze that projects meanings upon it (by “body” I mean 
posture, physical occupation of space and time, memory, 
affects, habits, and pre-reflective senses of self and 
belonging). I am referring here to senses of being behind 
in time and outside of space, to feelings of invisibility 
and disidentification, to being overwhelmed by guilt and 
nostalgia, among other embodied experiences. Second, 
racial embodiment involves a physical resistance to racist 
gazes in the development of affective detachments from 
it that sustain the formation of alternative and affirmative 
senses of self. Double consciousness exemplifies this, and 
I emphasize its embodied and affective dimension from 
within an oppressed positionality. Here lies the possibility 
of joy and other festive emotions, self-determination, 
and connectedness to places and lineages through 
marginalized cultural artifacts and narratives, among other 
examples. These two axes of racial embodiment, namely, 
entrapment and resistance, operate simultaneously and 
render fragmented oppressed selves. This fragmentation, 
however, can be partially offset by physical processes that 
consolidate the release from racist gazes, and the formation 
of resistant selves that enable the possibility of liberatory 
praxis. In this sense, racial embodiment can be approached 
in terms of its liberatory potency. In the discussion that 
follows, I reveal this potency through a study of Mariátegui’s 
reflections on aesthetics and liberation. 
THE PROBLEM OF RACE IN MARIÁTEGUI’S
LIBERATORY AESTHETICS 
In the seminal text in Latin American philosophy, Seven 
Essays for the Interpretation of Peruvian Reality, Mariátegui 
reveals persisting colonial structures underpinning 
economic, social, and political forms in a nascent modern 
Peru, and identifies Andean indigenous populations as 
embodying critical perspectives and praxical potencies that 
seek to overcome these structures. In order to demonstrate 
the existence of such an agent that would anchor and enact 
a struggle for liberation, Mariátegui falls into the trap of 
constructing a fixed representation of a specific indigenous 
racialized identity.6 For this reason Mariátegui is drawn to 
“indigenismo,” an aesthetic trend that strives to capture 
representations of the “Indian” in order to show their pivotal 
role in the Peruvian national and political imaginary.7 This 
mixture of racial, liberatory, and aesthetic frames points to 
one of the greatest weaknesses in Mariátegui’s revolutionary 
theory. He makes essentializing, representative claims 
that problematically romanticize indigenous Andeans, 
sometimes reducing them to stereotypical figures, and 
denigrate other racial and ethnic groups (like Chinese 
immigrants, people of African descent, and mestizos). 
Thus, he ends up enacting an entrenched racism in order 
to bolster his political program.8 Some of these disturbing 
claims appear in the seventh essay, “Literature on Trial,” 
the section on “indigenismo” in particular. In fact, the knot 
between Mariátegui’s racist views and his investment in 
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an aesthetic representation of Andean colonized subjects 
as revolutionary agents has been seen as grounds for the 
dismissal of the interpretation of Peruvian literature in the 
Seven Essays as well as his indigenous socialism more 
generally. I intend to complicate this dismissal in order to 
shed light on a different articulation of the problem of race 
in postcolonial contexts that I find in his texts. 
By focusing on racial embodiment, in the discussion that 
follows I mobilize some of Mariátegui’s own texts against 
the racist, representative strain that undermines his 
aesthetic and liberatory theories. In “Literature on Trial,” 
for example, one not only finds evidence of Mariátegui’s 
racist proclivities but also an understanding of race that 
unsettles them. Referencing Vilfredo Pareto, Mariátegui 
puts forth race as a constellation of physicalities that 
express “inclinations, interests, aptitudes for reasoning, 
observation, the state of knowledges.”9 More importantly, 
these kinds of physicalities (that, in my view, also include 
affect and memory) are subject to transformation depending 
on “external factors,” like “the actions of one society upon 
another,” which include colonialism and its legacies.10 In 
other words, Mariátegui shows a historical, experiential, 
and physical understanding of racial determinations and 
finds them to be modulated by sociological and political 
factors, including oppression. This does not make him 
immune to racist views or save him from the representative 
aporias of liberation. Yet it reveals that he does not always 
hold an essentialist understanding of race and that he 
suggests a dynamic and contextual approach to racial 
embodiment, which complicates his adherence to the kind 
of racist representative aesthetics of liberation I described 
above.11 This opens the possibility of reading Mariátegui’s 
engagement with indigenismo beyond representative 
commitments that correspond to a colonialist racist gaze, 
and of exploring whether there is an implicit aesthetic 
mobilization of the liberatory potency of racial embodiment 
in the Seven Essays. 
AN APPROACH TO RACIAL EMBODIMENT AND
AESTHETICS IN MARIÁTEGUI’S WORK 
Mariátegui’s liberatory philosophy, especially in the Seven 
Essays, has two aspects: a “critical” one that involves a 
socialist analysis adapted to Latin American postcolonial 
conditions and a “resistive” one that explores the possibility 
of liberatory praxis informed by physicalities (affects, 
cultural habits and memories, perceptual orders, and 
other embodied, pre-reflective enactments) of oppressed, 
racialized, colonized peoples. In my retrospective reading, 
a guiding intuition of the second aspect appears to be 
that the study of racial embodiment reveals conditions 
for resistance. Racial embodiment appears in this respect 
as physical enactments both submitted to and resisting 
negating constructions of colonized identities. Resistance 
here comes to pass with memorial sensibilities that set 
into play excluded cultural lineages supporting alternative 
imaginaries and senses of self. As I noted in the beginning, 
this ambiguity means that racist projections can be 
divested of definitive sense, and resistant configurations 
of racialized identities can emerge articulating unforeseen 
possibilities of liberation. 
I find that, like in Fanon’s Black Skin, White Masks, racial 
embodiment in Mariátegui’s writings can be understood 
on the basis of temporal determinations of racialized 
experience and affectivity.12 In this sense, Mariátegui 
can be interpreted as exploring non-linear, non-episodic 
temporalities in relation to resistant physicalities. Such 
physicalities do not undermine dominant racist projections 
by embodying and inhabiting a non-oppressive, 
alternative, defined present. Instead, they let intentions 
gathered through resistant pre-reflective meanings 
(informing embodied cultures and senses of identity of 
the oppressed) germinate into praxical liberatory options. 
These intentions are effective as transformative renditions 
of an heterogeneous, indeterminate present, one that 
cannot be captured within episodic temporal logics. Such 
a “present,” then, cannot be delimited solely by dominant 
meanings that exclude the racialized and oppressed. A 
concomitant experiential factor in this account of resistant 
racial embodiment is the lived memorial awareness that 
the embodied hold of racial domination converges with 
temporalizations of the present as a closed totality of 
meaning. This awareness attests to physical and sensuous 
temporalizations that are beyond the purview of such 
convergences and allow for the remembrance of silenced 
histories as informing diverse ways of being present.13 
A close reader of Mariátegui, Aníbal Quijano, connects a 
modern concept of race with progressive temporalities that 
deem colonized, racialized peoples to be in an irrecuperable 
past, negating their coeval cultural and historical efficacy.14 
Bringing him, Fanon, and Mariátegui together, I note that 
there is an intrinsic relation between the colonial/modern 
concept, embodiment and experience of race, and temporal 
sensibilities that articulate senses of self and culture in 
terms of totalized presents configuring episodic logics 
of past/present/future. The gaze that entraps racialized 
bodies through projected racist meanings works in concert 
with these temporalizations that articulate the colonized 
as in the past, which explains experiences of racial 
embodiment modulated by pastness, such as feelings of 
being always behind in time, nostalgia, and guilt. At the 
same time, the resistive dimension of racial embodiment 
implies temporalizations that are expressed memorially 
and affectively as comportments toward the past beyond 
its reduction to sequential logics and to the present without 
investments in its totalizing and exclusionary closure. In 
this sense, the liberatory potency of racial embodiment is 
concretely manifest as a modulation of memory in which 
linear temporalities recede in their definitive, colonizing 
force. These are resistive disruptions that enable porous 
worlds of meaning across power and temporal differentials 
to mix, overlap, and diverge in physical registers that are 
repressed by colonialism and its racist legacies.15 In my 
discussion of Mariátegui’s indigenismo I focus on this 
aesthetic form’s involvement in such disruptions that 
makes possible a recovery of silenced cultures and their 
histories. 
Approaching indigenismo in this way implies renouncing 
objectivist and individualistic dispositions toward works of 
art and literature. Specifically, it implies emphasizing the 
affinities between aesthetic experiences and participation 
in rituals or festivals in postcolonial contexts. According 
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to Alberto Flores Galindo, festivals, the procession of El 
Señor de los Miragros in particular, crystallized Mariátegui’s 
conception of the possibility of the revolutionary 
commitment of heterogeneous collectivities, inclusive 
of indigenous peoples. I suggest that it also defined his 
understanding of liberatory art as eliciting crowded, unruly, 
festive intimacies that relax social and political orders 
and transgress dominant delimitations of embodied, pre­
reflective senses of self and communal belonging. In terms 
of the resistive temporality of racial embodiment, the time 
of festivals is not sequential and linear, but it engages the 
present as a return to itself that reconfigures the past in the 
present. The present of the festival is, then, open, versatile, 
indeterminate. It becomes embodied via affective and 
memorial enactments released from dominant gazes 
and that engender critical perspectives. I find that the 
relationship between this non-linear, open present and 
aesthetics in Mariátegui is most apparent in his attraction 
to surrealism as a joint political and artistic movement.16 
My project here is to show that his engagement with 
“indigenismo” can also be understood on the basis of 
temporalities that disrupt linearity, and in a way that brings 
to the fore the liberatory potency of racial embodiment. 
RACIAL EMBODIMENT AND “PICTURESQUE”
AESTHETICS 
In “Memory, Moment, and Tears,” Pablo Oyarzún writes: 
“In an immediate temporal sense, trauma is something of 
the past that continues to happen in the present . . . it is 
something that never ends to belong to the past.”17 He calls 
this insistence of the past “traumatic memory” and finds 
that it “persists for us . . . Latin Americans.”18 In it the past 
is with the present but excluded from it, haunting it. It is 
trapped in a gap of time that cannot be integrated within 
the closure of the present, a closure that secures episodic, 
progressive, linear time. 
However, “traumatic memory” is an unstable affect 
that can be submitted to the enforcement of a strict 
differentiation between past and present that confines 
the colonized in a former stage of a linear sequence. The 
modern, racist gaze can yield such enforcement. This kind 
of physical, temporal oppression is apparent in Fanon’s 
phenomenological description of a corporeality of always 
being “late,” one that blocks black bodies from action by 
internalizing the oppressor’s projected racist meanings. 
Affectively, it is manifest as nostalgia for a petrified past 
and guilt for not joining the sequential flow of history. This 
constellation of sensibilities musters a reactive embodied 
entrenchment in progressive temporality and closed 
delimitations of the present, which facilitates essentializing 
constructions of racial identities as “past.” An effect of this 
is representative, static, folkloric, and abstract renditions of 
colonized identities that have no relevance in the present 
and leave it untouched. These are fixed constructions that 
compromise the historical efficacy of excluded cultures 
defined by lineages of oppression, undermining their 
critical positionalities and liberatory potencies. 
I extend Oyarzún’s point to mean that the racial embodiment 
of trauma, unfolding as paralysis and guilt, spreads across 
different social spheres as a sensibility that results from 
Latin American histories of colonization and a shared 
sense of an irrecuperable pre-Columbian past. It can yield 
aesthetic forms that aspire to constitute a national imaginary 
on the basis of a neat, episodic, historical progression that 
would leave the present intact and univocal in its closure, 
a present in which every past is resolved and absorbed, 
and in which every future is contained as a sequential 
projection of itself. An example of this is what Mariátegui 
calls “picturesque” aesthetics. It renders representations of 
racialized peoples striving to fully capture identities in ways 
that fit within dominant logics of the present. This leads to 
fetishizations, ornamentations, and other fabrications. This 
aesthetic form focuses on and values cultural cohesiveness 
and addresses political crises via homogenizing, 
progressive cultural, and national representations. An 
example of it is the literary trend of “surviving colonialism” 
that tries to configure a colonial identity but can’t help but 
produce imitations of Spanish colonial literary forms. The 
emphasis here is on representations that seek to force 
processes of self-identification on the part of creoles, 
mestizos, and indigenous peoples that would settle into a 
solid identity. In “Literature on Trial” Mariátegui is critical of 
subsuming literature under such goals because it supports 
processes of identification that enable reactionary politics. 
According to him, such literary forms become divorced 
from revolutionary junctures, and occlude the relationship 
between aesthetics and liberation. In particular, Mariátegui 
suggests that “culturalist” investments do not engage the 
present in its social and political contradictions, and in its 
potency for transformation. 
Perhaps one of Mariátegui’s most insightful contributions 
in this regard is his thesis that “mestizaje,” as it was taking 
form in his time, has an affinity with this kind of culturalist 
aesthetics. José Vasconcelos’s mestizaje, for example, is 
driven by progressivism, futurity, and a messianic optimism. 
It has an affirmation of racial mixing that acquires a redemptive 
tone, one that is invested in a utopia that, Mariátegui 
argues, “ignores the present” and is, thus, ineffective in 
revolutionary terms.19 Uriel García’s mestizaje is not utopian 
or messianic, but remains dangerously culturalist: he sees 
in mestizaje a syncretic cultural formation that can yield 
a totalized national identity. This commitment to cultural 
identity, in Mariátegui’s view, disconnects García’s work 
from the social, political, and economic conditions that 
affect the lives of the “mestizos” themselves.20 He writes: 
“mestizaje must be analyzed not as an ethnic issue, but 
as a sociological issue,” otherwise it becomes coopted to 
surreptitiously maintain a political stasis.21 For Mariátegui 
to analyze mestizaje as a “sociological” issue means to be 
attentive to contradictions within the present that attest 
to revolutionary potencies beyond progressivism. This is 
why Mariátegui concludes that an “ethnic” mestizaje is 
ultimately drawn to “evolve toward the social stage, or the 
kind of civilization of whites.”22 Mestizaje in this sense turns 
into an “ethnic problem that is . . . completely fictitious and 
presupposed.”23 It is important to stress that “indigenismo” 
can appear to fit within a “picturesque,” culturalist aesthetic 
form as well, since it can fall into abstract representations of 
“Indians.” In fact, Valcárcel’s Tempestad en los Andesargues 
for a historically continuous and consistent indigenous 
identity that would neatly compose a national imaginary, 
compromising the cultural complexity of indigenous and 
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mestizo lineages in modern Peru.24 As I noted earlier, 
Mariátegui’s own engagement with indigenismo can be 
seen as making similar claims, which emboldens some of 
his representative and racist views. 
RACIAL EMBODIMENT AND “INDIGENISTA”
AESTHETICS 
Attention to racial embodiment in relation to “traumatic 
memory” and “picturesque aesthetics” shows a deep 
connection between the affective and memorial effects of 
colonization and specific aesthetic forms that emerge in 
colonial and post-colonial contexts. So far, I have suggested 
that representative and essentializing determinations of 
social and racial identities can be understood as repressing 
the disruption of linear temporality entailed in “traumatic 
memory,” and as an affective re-entrenchment of an 
episodic historical logic in which the colonized fit in the 
past, and the colonizers in the present and future. In this 
section I develop an alternative unfolding of “traumatic 
memory” that does not fall back into linear temporalities 
and that I find suggested in Mariátegui’s analyses of 
revolutionary memory and “indigenismo.” 
The following quote from “La Heterodoxia de la Tradición” 
speaks to this: 
The ability to think about history and the ability to 
make it or create it come to be identified with one 
another. Perhaps the revolutionary has an image 
of the past that is somewhat subjective, but it is 
animated and alive. . . . Revolutionaries incarnate 
the will of society of not becoming petrified within 
a stage. . .25 
This statement suggests a “liberatory memory” in which 
the past is indeterminate: “tradition is heterogeneous and 
contradictory in its components.”26 It yields an “image 
of the past” that cannot be resolved and left behind by 
a totalized present (or “petrified stage”), but is effective 
and “alive” impeding its closure. In my view, this particular 
memorial sensibility is an unfolding of “traumatic memory” 
that, rather than neutralizing the past, potentializes it 
in its excess of the present under the purview of linear 
temporality. The way in which the past haunts the present in 
traumatic memory is here modulated assuming a liberatory 
potential. This affective and memorial configuration can 
express a will that resists being “petrified” in a determinate 
historical “stage” enclosed by dominant social, political, 
and economic forms. 
This sheds light on why, in his Defensa del Marxismo, 
Mariátegui does not posit class consciousness as a sufficient 
condition for revolutionary action. Class consciousness 
understands itself from within the present as a totality, 
as if it were a part of its structure, overdetermined by its 
economic logic. It, thus, easily falls prey to reformism and to 
progressive historical determinisms sustained by episodic, 
linear time. In revolutionary junctures, class consciousness 
has to be exceeded, shaken off, by a revolutionary will that 
affirms the present in its lack of closure, in its indeterminacy, 
as an untimely creation. It is moved by a liberatory memory 
that lets the past disrupt the present so as to set into play 
silenced cultures and histories as sources for the articulation 
of resistant agencies. Resistance is here expressed in this 
memorial disruption of linear time in which the colonized 
ceases to be confined to the past. 
In this respect, for Mariátegui, revolutionary will is sustained 
by sensibilities of a “morality of producers” that “does not 
emerge from an economic interest: it is formed in the class 
struggle, waged with heroic spirit, with passionate will.”27 
This critique of class consciousness as a revolutionary 
factor can be applied to any identity category, including 
a racial, specifically indigenous, identity. This is why, even 
though Mariátegui identifies Andean indigenous peoples 
as a group having a pivotal role in his socialist revolution, 
he often resists understanding the Peruvian revolutionary 
juncture as exclusively an ethnic or racial issue. In particular, 
sustaining these kinds of junctures does not depend on 
affirming a racial identity comprehended within a definite 
past, present, or national imaginary. 
At the same time, in my view, racial embodiment and the 
physicalities of oppression that it involves figure in both 
Mariátegui’s analysis of the temporality of memorial and 
affective conditions for liberation and his interpretation 
of “indigenismo.” In particular, for him this literary form 
is about indigenous nostalgia. He follows influential 
indigenistas in this respect. Valcárcel, for example, 
focuses on an indigenous nostalgia for a pre-Columbian 
past that he seeks to redeem through an indigenous 
resurrection. Enrique López Albújar sometimes presents 
indigenous peoples as nostalgically attached to a past 
irremediably foreign to modernization, radicalizing their 
uprootedness and leaving it unresolved (as in “Ushanan 
Jampi,” for example). It seems to me that Mariátegui 
unfolds “indigenismo” in a different direction: to explore 
a modulation of the nostalgia of racialized, colonized 
peoples (which can be seen as an affective register of 
“traumatic memory”) that is not anchored in a petrified 
past but uncovers a form of “liberatory memory.” As he 
puts it, “literary indigenismo translates a mood, a state of 
consciousness of the new Peru.”28 
Mariátegui asserts that the indigenistas “collaborate, 
consciously or not, with a political work of vindication— 
rather than restoration or resurrection.”29 “Vindication” here 
carries a sense of the past that has to be understood as 
eluding the futural temporality implied in “restoration” and 
“resurrection.” It does not sediment colonized identities 
for the sake of redemptive political projects, but returns 
colonized peoples to the present in its fragmentation. 
Aesthetically, it eludes the lure of “picturesque” 
representations. “Restoration” and “resurrection,” instead, 
connote possible resolutions of the past in the logics of a 
definite present and projected future, which allows for neat 
sequential and episodic temporalities. In this sense, they 
are reactionary political goals. 
Mariátegui points to a “vindication” with aesthetic 
ramifications when he states: 
What gives the Indian the right to prevail in the 
vision of the contemporary Peruvian is, above all, 
the conflict and contrast between his demographic 
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predominance and his social and economic 
servitude.30 
The aesthetic issue here is not that a representation of 
the “Indian” belongs to a vision that captures a Peruvian 
cultural and national identity. It is, rather, that an imaging 
of indigenous, colonized, and racialized peoples comes 
to prevail over, that is, overpower, a national and cultural 
vision. The “Indian,” Mariátegui writes, cannot be “valued 
and considered . . . as a national color or aspect, allocating 
him in the same plane as other ethnic elements of Peru.”31 
This is not, then, an issue of the culturalism of “picturesque” 
aesthetics, but of its disruption as a form of vindication. 
I suggest that the “indigenista” nostalgic, racial imaging of 
indigenous peoples that “prevails” over definite national 
imaginaries can be seen as modulating (or “translating”) 
a sensibility (or “mood”), eliciting a physical (specifically 
affective and memorial) dis-identification from linear, 
episodic temporality and the closure of the present it 
implies. This would be a nostalgia informed by “liberatory 
memory,” one that does not “petrify” a past that is “animated 
and alive” and that irrupts into the present releasing it to 
social and political forms informed by repressed pasts with 
creative potencies. In this sense, “traumatic memory” gives 
way to “liberatory memory” and an indigenista aesthetics 
of “vindication,” rather than a “picturesque aesthetics.” In 
its temporalization, an “aesthetic of vindication” enjoins 
sensibilities that sense the heterogeneity of the present 
fractured by a multiplicity of pasts (those of excluded 
Andean indigenous lineages in particular) without seeking 
to resolve it. Specifically, nostalgic sensibilities expressed 
aesthetically can come to determine willful, revolutionary 
dispositions within the political contradiction between the 
indigenous “demographic predominance” and their “social 
and economic servitude” as a critical juncture that exceeds 
totalizing renditions of the present.32 
“Indigenismo,” in this sense, allows for a temporalizing, 
physical (specifically affective and memorial) enactment 
in which racist projections (with tendencies to essentialize, 
de-historicize, and abstract oppressed identities) are 
destabilized by nostalgic attachments to colonized 
lineages and cultures as past but also as formative of a 
volatile, revolutionary, and heterogeneous present. This is 
a present in which excluded social and political imaginaries 
can become definitive and resistively meaningful. 
“Indigenismo,” then, sets into play an aesthetics that elicits 
processes undergone at the level of racial embodiment and 
supports articulations of liberatory praxis informed by pasts 
released from comprehensive logics of domination. In this 
respect, “indigenista” representations do not conform to 
a cohesive, “picturesque” aesthetic program that bolsters 
reactionary politics, but betray cultural irreducibilities, 
missed encounters, tensions, and power differentials 
that do not settle into a historical “episode” or determine 
a defined colonized identity. Through this disseminative 
force, “indigenismo” is an aesthetic that opens festive sites 
for the formation of crowds, of peoples, in contagious and 
transformative physicalities that affirm the inconclusiveness 
of the present as an opening toward liberation. I suggest, 
then, that ultimately Mariátegui’s “indigenismo” not only has 
to be understood as an aesthetics that does not dissociate 
itself from revolutionary politics, but also as a transformative 
embodied process that can only be discerned within the 
fervor of peoples memorially attached to possibilities 
sheltered in the heterogeneity of their present (such as that 
of participants in celebrations like the procession El Señor 
de los Milagros). It is not surprising, then, that Mariátegui, 
in his famous polemic with Luis Alberto Sánchez, does not 
characterize “indigenismo” as an articulated program, but 
as a dynamic movement formed by the turbulent spirit of 
its revolutionary times and exceeding detached, lettered, 
and comprehensive attempts to fixate it. 
CONCLUSION 
I began by noting a critique of Mariátegui’s aesthetics, 
namely, that its representative investments in indigeneity 
can essentialize Andean peoples and cultures in order 
to support his revolutionary program. This would be a 
lettered manipulation reinforcing racist frameworks upon 
indigenous and other colonized peoples, and facilitated 
by “indigenismo.” In this sense, attention to Mariátegui’s 
aesthetics, especially in the context of the Seven Essays, 
can yield devastating critiques of his socialism both in its 
analytical and liberatory aspects. My intent in this paper is 
not to disprove these critiques or to show that Mariátegui 
is not racist. Rather, I offer a counter-reading by turning to 
thinkers that focus on racial embodiment and approaching 
Mariátegui’s writings through them. This enables me to put 
his rendition of “indigenismo” in dialogue with his concern 
with affectivities and aesthetics of resistance (found on his 
treatments of surrealism, for example). This intersection 
allows for an approach to “indigenista” aesthetics as 
a site in which physicalities, through destabilizing 
temporalizations (manifest in memory and its affective 
registers, like nostalgia), undo the nexus between dominant 
racist projections and totalized, reductive renditions of the 
present, and allow for the gathering of resistant meanings 
that inform liberatory praxis from otherwise excluded 
cultures and histories. I also put forth a related analysis 
of a reactionary “picturesque” aesthetics that shows in 
Mariátegui’s own texts resources to launch a critique of 
the kind of essentializing representational aesthetics that 
he falls into. In some ways, then, I read Mariátegui against 
himself, a tortuous hermeneutic that is, after all, part of his 
legacy. 
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América Tropical, On the Force of Latino/ 
a/x Thought 
Alejandro Vallega 
UNIVERSITY OF OREGON
“AMÉRICA TROPICAL”
In 1932 the Mexican muralist David Alfaro Siqueiros painted 
an 80-foot mural in Los Angeles titled “América Tropical: 
Oprimida y Destruida por el Imperialismo.” It would be 
his only one in the United States. After much controversy, 
officials of the city of Los Angeles had it whitewashed. 
Only with the rise of the Chicano mural movement in the 
1960s did the mural again become an issue, and in 1988 
the Getty Foundation begun working on its recovery. The 
original colors were never recovered; there were no color 
images of the original. What was so incendiary about 
Siqueiros’s image? The mural depicted an indigenous 
Mexican crucified on a double cross beneath the American 
eagle, while two men with rifles aimed at the eagle from 
a nearby building. In his rendition of the Americas under 
North American capitalism one did not find Carmen Miranda 
with her fruit hat or “Ricky Ricardo” (Desi Arnaz) with his 
“babalooooo” and calling cheerfully, “Lucy! I am home!”1 
Instead, it was the harsh reality of Latino/Latina experience 
in North America and the analogous exploitation of peoples 
of color throughout the Americas that Siqueiros depicted 
with a crucifixion; the crucifixion an image that echoed 
the words of Guaman Poma de Ayala, when in 1600, in his 
Chronicle, he reminded the king of Spain that the colonizers 
had made a new sacrificed Christ out of the peoples of the 
Americas.2 If one remains with the Latino/a/x experience 
and in light of that history of coloniality, without denying 
or diminishing the violence suffered under it, one sees 
in the affirmative creative sense that there is a present 
and potential shaping force underlying its life, lineages, 
histories, and thought. In this sense Siqueiro’s image 
becomes a portal, a passage towards a new understanding 
of Latino/a/x presence in North America and, as a result, 
new paths open for understanding philosophy in light of 
the Latino/a/x articulate ways of being. In the following 
pages I begin to open this space as a path towards Latino/ 
a/x philosophies that may be engaged as an elemental 
force for thinking philosophically our lives today. 
Given the rise of Latino/a/x populations in the United 
States, their vote and economic presence have begun to 
raise questions about how to understand them and how 
to make their energy, creativity, and potential work for 
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North America. No longer is the issue that of recognizing 
a minority; the aim is to take advantage of and incorporate 
a new social, economic, political, and cultural force now 
unavoidably an element of the North American future. To 
this point, the traditional “orientalizing” of the Latino/a/x will 
not do, since it is clear that stereotypes, while providing a 
comfortable rubric for white America for the allocation of the 
non-white Americans, do not express the latter’s thought, 
visions, and aspirations. In short, a whole world––ways of 
being and of giving articulation to life––underlie the Latino/ 
a/x experience, and it is this level of existence that would 
have to be engaged in order to begin to engage Latino/a/x 
minds and ways of life into a North American social political 
project. The ontological and existential level of engagement 
with the Latino/a/x experiences requires much more than 
the questioning and representation of a single ethnic or 
racial identity (the general and homogeneous image of the 
Latino/a/x held in the general North American imaginary). 
Moreover, a serious and substantial engagement would 
mean a transformation in North American consciousness. 
To say it in another, more direct manner, the issue is not for 
Latino/a/x lives and thought to become another tradition 
among North American traditions. It is not about getting a 
place at the table because the force of Latino/a/x existence 
lies elsewhere, in other modalities of being, other ways 
of being in the world and making sense of existing. We 
bring unthought and unimagined ways that will require the 
reinvention of the spaces and epistemic frames traditionally 
used to think and engage the world. This is why Gloria 
Anzaldúa, María Lugones, Chela Sandoval, and Linda Martín 
Alcoff, each in their own register and way, expose us to 
possibilities often unimaginable for the previous North 
American academy and intellectual tradition. 
In my discussion I want to emphasize as well as dismantle 
the traditional racial determination of Latino/a/x identities 
in order to engage the possibilities for philosophical 
thought that underlie Latino/a/x lineages, histories, and 
experiences. This should also be sought at the level of 
intersectionality (race, gender, and labor form a tripartite 
system of oppression and exclusion, and only in dealing 
with the three may something like a liberatory or decolonial 
turn occur). However, for reasons of space, here I will 
keep mainly to race. I show in the following pages that 
given the distinctness and diversity of lineages, histories, 
memorials, and affective experiences that underlie 
Latino/a/x consciousness, thinking with it is not merely 
a matter of including another group into the already 
operative epistemic space, values, and logics that orient 
and frame contemporary North American and Westernizing 
philosophies. Ultimately, Latino/a/x distinctness figures 
diversifying possibilities which bear the opening to the 
transformation in the epistemic delimitations that orient the 
traditional homogeneous understanding of the disposition 
and kind of knowledge today seen as philosophy. In other 
words, to engage Latino/a/x thought would mean to begin 
thinking philosophy by rethinking it out of those concrete 
and distinct experiences that underlie the all too general 
and often obscuring term “Latino/a/x,” and even “latinx.” 
In what follows I focus on three fundamental issues: the 
displacement of the traditional racial term “Latino”; the 
exposure of the coloniality of power and knowledge that 
sustains the racial framing of Latino/a/x experience and 
thought; and the possibility for rethinking philosophy that 
opens in light of the Latino/a/x influx of living thought 
beyond this system of oppression, exploitation, and 
exclusion. 
LATINO/A/X DISTINCTNESS 
Following a great part of the North American imaginary, the 
term Latino/a/x inscribes many peoples, histories, lineages, 
and ways of being under a single image. Latinos/as/xs are 
thought to come from “south of the border,” and with this 
pseudo geographical allocation appears the general image 
of a non-white, mixed-blood, Spanish-speaking person who 
has immigrated to the United States from South America, 
Central America, or Mexico. With this categorization Latinos/ 
as/xs join the racial binary logic W. E. B. Du Bois captures 
with precision and foresight when he speaks in The Souls 
of Black Folk (1903) of “the color line,” i.e., the racism that 
separates white from colored races3 and which organizes 
the question of race throughout the modern world with 
its various forms of colonialism. Two other issues become 
salient here: As Edward Said shows in Orientalism, the races 
under the white gaze are subject to allocation through 
the masters’ imaginary.4 Thus, the Latino/a/x becomes 
the exotic, tropical, sexualized fruit, the illiterate manual 
labor, the warm-hearted ignorant child like “simpatico,” 
or the criminal problem: three images clearly portrayed 
throughout the Hollywood industry, thus throughout the 
world. The racist binary may be further engaged when 
one considers Frantz Fanon’s sharp psychiatric diagnosis 
of modernity. As the thinker from Martinique points out in 
Black Skin White Masks, the race division exposes a shared 
existential neurosis of the colonizer and the colonized, 
which takes place both at the psychological as well as at 
an epidermic level.5 In these terms the Latino/a/x only sees 
their future in becoming white, Anglo Saxon-like in mind 
and image, and the white believes themselves to be in 
charge, superior to colored people, and bearing the only 
possible destiny of humanity on their shoulders. 
These analyses clearly situate Latino/a/x existence within 
a racist frame that expands throughout modernity in its 
westernizing form.6 But taking the image of a single binary 
division for understanding Latino/a/x reality obscures its 
even more complicated character. This becomes evident 
when one considers this experience in light of its Latin 
American lineages. As the Mexican philosopher Leopoldo 
Zea points out in “Negritude and Indigenism,” following 
such earlier claims as those of Azara in 1781,7 the issue 
of race in Latin America concerns not a distinct color line 
but mestizaje, a broad range of encounters, a palimpsest of 
racial differentiations and configurations.8 This term refers 
to a mixing that already begins in the sixteenth century, as 
documented by the chronicles of the period. Along with the 
destruction of the indigenous cultures Spanish rule, with 
its intention to include rather than exterminate, resulted in 
the mixture behind mestizaje. From this history appeared in 
Latin America mestizos, mulatos, criollos, castizos, cholos, 
and Zambos, to recall but a few names among the many 
inflections of the diversified and diversifying development 
of the Americas’ population.9 This clear lack of white and 
indigenous purity leads Jose Martí to say that there are no 
races in America.10 But the diversity of mestizaje does not 
exclude the recognition of distinct histories and lineages. 
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If Du Bois’s clear-cut color line seems insufficient, it is 
because underlying it runs a radical diversifying reality with 
respect to lives, traditions, and ways of being. 
Underlining the many “mestizo” configurations, the distinct 
formations of peoples and lives in the Americas does not 
only make impossible the reduction to a single type and 
sense of existence of the peoples that today begin to 
appear as a force in North America under the single name 
“Latino/a/x.” More importantly, in that diversity one finds 
a profoundly rich background in light of which Latino/a/x 
thought and consciousness may be grounded. The register 
is not racial but concretely ontological: the issue is that of 
the distinct ways of being and determinations of identities 
one finds behind the Latino/a/x consciousness as indicated 
through the distinct diversification of lineages. In order to 
begin to engage this distinctness one may look into the 
roots of the racist prevalent system of power, and at its 
implications for our understanding of what counts for 
knowledge and philosophical thought. In this way a limited 
horizon becomes evident with respect to the epistemic 
projection that delimits the very possibility of engaging 
Latino/a/x experiences, identities, and thought. 
LATINO/A/X DISTINCTNESS UNDER THE
COLONIALITY OF POWER AND KNOWLEDGE 
To speak of Latino/a/x experiences in their distinct 
articulate configurations of senses of being means to 
open a way towards many springs for the development 
and rethinking of philosophy today. This becomes evident 
when one considers the place of Latino/a/x philosophy in 
the very history of modern Western thought. This may seem 
an anachronic claim, inasmuch as Latino/a/x philosophy 
seems something new. However, the relevance and 
place of Latino/a/x experience and thought in modernity 
becomes evident when one considers genealogically the 
lineages behind it. 
Peruvian sociologist Aníbal Quijano makes evident in 
his work that modern Western thought centered around 
the ego cogito arises as the result of the long history of 
colonization of the Americas and the transatlantic trade, the 
development of a system of power and knowledge that is 
perpetuated to date and underlies capitalism, imperialism, 
colonialism, and today’s globalizing free market economy. 
In his essay “Coloniality of Power, Eurocentrism, and Social 
Classification,” Quijano exposes the origins of this system 
of oppression, exploitation, and exclusion, calling it the 
coloniality of power and knowledge.11 This system’s two 
basic poles are the development for the first time in world 
history of a single means of economic exchange and the 
control of production for the sake of the accumulation 
of wealth (the development of Capitalism) extending 
throughout the world, and the creation of a racial difference 
that accompanies the first.12 The notion of a natural race 
difference between white European and the colored races 
sustains the economic calculative project of progress. This 
difference situates the white Europeans as naturally above 
the other races, while the other races become the natural 
brute labor to be put to use and exploited by the white 
Europeans and their “educated” descendants. This racial 
difference repeats the inequality wrought by force (not 
reason) between conquerors and conquered, but this time 
in terms of the relationship between the ego cogito or the 
rational subject, and its other, the barbaric, the native, the 
uncivilized darker races.13 This binary racial division spread 
throughout the world and created a new human division, 
exemplified in the case of the Americas in the separation 
between peoples of color, those who are descendants of 
Europeans, and the Europeans themselves. This hierarchy 
is established through years of a systematic practice in 
which a differentiation is made by a series of allocations: 
each type/group/race is physically given a separate place 
in the city; their difference is also established by work 
functions and their wage assignments (or lack thereof, 
i.e., servant, slave, etc.). These differentiations result in a 
social placement, and in turn, the social placements and 
types of work produce an epistemic hierarchy. Depending 
on the required education, fitting type of work, and social 
standing, a certain natural potential and level of mental 
development and intelligence come to be assigned. As a 
result, peoples of African descent and indigenous descent, 
and many others, become the other of reason and of the 
project of white and mestizo modernity in Latin America. 
This appropriative and destructive configuration of “the 
other” is crucial to the configuration of Western identity in 
its European and later North American forms of domination. 
Given the new separation, the European mind may now 
distinguish itself from its “other,” an “other” that has 
never been in a dialectic relation of power with the West 
or westernizing thought. Having constructed the other of 
Western rationalism, Europe and later North America and 
those who identify with them may recognize themselves 
by contrast: they see themselves as origin and inheritors 
of reason, and as angels of the project of freedom, 
equality, and justice that accompanies their version of the 
enlightenment which is a matter of calculative instrumental 
rationalism wedded to infinite capital production. 
This brief genealogy exposes the foundation of the color 
line, and particularly, given its origins, this narrative 
touches the heart of the Latin American and Latino/a/x 
mind in North America. It is this racialized consciousness 
and degradation that is shared by Latin American and 
Latino/a/x thinkers in their quests for liberation. In the case 
of the latter, Mexicans, Puerto Ricans, Central Americans, 
and those Spanish-speaking peoples from other parts of 
the Americas or of such descent in North America take the 
place of the lower race with respect to the white Anglo 
Saxon and westernized ways of interpreting the world that 
still constitute the social, political, economic, and cultural 
centers of power. 
Two other basic elements of this system are central to 
the understanding of philosophy and to the exclusion of 
Latino/a/x thought from the halls of the academy. Because 
the white European and later North American westernizing 
mind is thought of as the most advanced, its present state 
marks the apogee of human existence. At the same time, 
and as a result of the same ego-centrism, the only future 
for humanity may be found in the further development of 
its power and knowledge. This sets up a specific timeline, 
a historical unilinear way of looking at existence, in which 
present Western or westernizing rationalism determines the 
present and plays out the future, while all other cultures and 
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ways of being appear as parts of a past, or as backwards 
ways of understanding, at best with the potential to adapt to 
the single westernized vision of present and future (hence, 
in spite of the catastrophic economic situation in Europe 
and North America one still thinks of westernized countries 
as first-world nations, while relegating all others to being 
“emerging nations”).14 One sees the way this timeline 
operates explicitly among philosophy and the social 
sciences when one considers the set of binary terms that 
expose the timeline’s epistemically exclusionary character, 
as they determine the way objective/scientific knowledge 
looks at the phenomena and potential knowledge through 
the difference between Eastern-Western, primitive-
civilized, magic/mythic-scientific, irrational-rational, 
traditional-modern, and so on.15 With the development of 
the coloniality of power and knowledge appears a sense of 
temporality that creates a certain disposition and through it 
provides the limits and horizons for all human knowledge. 
The experience of existence is situated by a temporality 
determined by the project of calculative production and 
manipulation prevalent in westernizing rationalism and its 
version of reason and the enlightenment. 
In making explicit the way the system of the coloniality of 
power and knowledge situates Latino/a/x identities and 
thought, it is clear that the interpretation of Latino/a/x 
thought and experience under this system may only lead 
to exclusion by inclusion. Either Latino/a/x thought seeks 
to become closest to white westernizing thinking, or it may 
be interpreted as a backwards way of thinking and being 
that has been surpassed. In the first case the histories, 
lineages, and ways of being and of configuring the sense 
of experience distinctive of Latino/a/x lives must be 
abandoned. In the latter case some aspects of Latino/a/x 
thought and experience that fit the westernizing patterns 
may be kept, but only as secondary elements, adornments, 
and primitive insights that do not affect true knowledge 
and the furthering of human progress. In remaining with 
this epistemic framework nothing substantial may come 
from Latino/a/x existence and knowledge. The ways of 
being and articulate configurations of existence of Latino/ 
a/x lives are denied agency and the possibility of any 
transformative originary impact. 
THINKING WITH LATINO/A/X DISTINCTNESS:
INVISIBLE MODERNITIES
The narrow frame within which Latino/a/x thought and 
experience fall under the coloniality of power and 
knowledge may be undone, and Latino/a/x experiences 
reveal a rich and profound spring of possibilities for 
philosophy, when one takes seriously Quijano’s argument 
concerning the birth of modernity. In “Modernity, Identity, 
and Utopia in Latin America,”16 Quijano shows that just as 
in the case of the creation of the modern racial identities, 
modernity develops not only in Europe but also inseparably 
in Europe and the Americas.17 Undoubtedly with the 
Enlightenment one finds in Europe a shift from the religious 
to the secular.18 But the Peruvian sociologist adds: 
If one considers the characteristic traits of the 
Enlightenment—the interest in the scientific 
investigations of the universe and the resulting 
discoveries: the acceptance of the often radical 
intellectual risks implied in this behavior; the 
critique of existing social realities and the complete 
acceptance of the idea of change; the disposition 
to work reforms, against social prejudices, arbitrary 
power, despotism, and obscurantism—if these are 
the initial features of the movement of modernity, 
they are as documentable in colonial America 
as in Europe during the eighteenth century. . . . 
The intellectual and social movement of the 
Enlightenment . . . was produced and practiced 
simultaneously in Europe and America . . .19 
In the Americas one preserves a difference within modern 
thought that becomes obscured whence calculative 
rationalism becomes fully equated with the Enlightenment. 
Together with calculative mathematical physics one finds 
the ideals of freedom, equality, and liberty, in the form of a 
humanist project. As Quijano explains, it is this humanism 
that is severed from the calculative operation of production 
of wealth in the name of progress in Latin America. And 
this separation makes explicit a possibility of a humanist 
modernity not yet taken up by westernizing rationalism 
and the project of capitalism. The humanism Quijano has 
in mind comes alive for him in the indigenous movements 
that shape anew the political horizon of the Americas, 
in a transformative encounter between indigenous and 
European, westernizing traditions. Furthermore, this 
encounter points to a fundamental and radical difference 
between the Latino/a/x experience and westernized 
thought. 
In the same essay Quijano shows that, unlike westernized 
temporality, in Latin America temporality is not unilinear in 
its operation and development but simultaneous. What in 
westernizing thought appears as a past leftover, in Latin 
America occurs as various levels of practices which overlap 
to constitute realities, identities, and senses of being. This 
pyramidal experiencing of temporalities is lived concretely. 
Quijano offers the classic example of the overlapping of 
forms of exchange that together constitute one reality 
(bartering, serfdom, agriculture, industry, capitalism). 
In short: The temporality of Latin American experience 
unsettles the single history of progress established by the 
coloniality of power and knowledge. Furthermore, with the 
simultaneity of temporalities the ways of being and giving 
articulate configurations to existence thought meaningless 
return to become essential to the understanding of 
existence. No longer must philosophy follow the path of 
exclusion of the westernizing epistemic binary mentioned 
above. 
Quijano’s analysis opens a wide path, perhaps 
unimaginable with respect to how existence, temporality, 
intersubjectivity, and cosmological thinking may be 
engaged in light of this simultaneous temporality at 
play in Latin American experience. For our purposes 
here, two points are crucial, and dramatically lead us 
back to Latino/a/x experience and thought, and do so 
by resituating the issue of their philosophies. First of all, 
from inside modernity, not as the other of westernizing 
rationalist capitalism, appear the excluded ways of being 
and thinking that remain to be engaged in order to take up 
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in full the question of modernity. From the excluded, the 
silenced, the humiliated minds and lives that constitute the 
underbelly of westernizing modernity arises a boundless 
flood of experiences, histories, lineages, and ways of 
giving determination to identities and of articulating ways 
of being. These remain to be thought, and those who carry 
these traditions in North America are the Latino/a/x peoples 
with their distinctive ways of being. They are the way to a 
philosophy that is coming, if philosophy will turn to its own-
most activity of giving critical articulation to life from life. 
Secondly, if this is the case, Latino/a/x philosophy poses a 
radical challenge to how one thinks philosophical thought 
and how one engages in it: that is, since the lineages and 
traditions that become central to this originary and radical 
modernity will not be found by only reading traditional 
texts, but in the literature, chronicles, and oral traditions of 
the Latino/a/x past, as well as in the way their lives in their 
practices, and projective imagination begin to configure 
other horizons and hence other possibilities for thought.20 
To return, in closing, to Siqueiro’s mural. In light of our 
discussion, the figure of the Latino/a/x in North America 
appears not only as the site of oppression and suffering, but
as a reminder and exhortation to engage a past and present 
that, along with that history of violence, brings forth what 
has remained for so long the blind spot of westernizing 
rationalist modernity, that is, the thought and lives of the 
oppressed, the silenced, excluded, and exploited: lives 
that bear unimaginable and fecund paths for philosophical 
thought, and for learning once again, the sense and depth 
of humanity and its originary expressions and spacings 
for freedom. Understood in this way, Siqueiro’s image 
does not call for the inclusion of Latino/a/x thought into 
North America, but for the transformation of the spaces of 
knowledge in light of Latino/a/x experiences, our histories, 
and ways of being, a reality from which philosophical 
thought may occur anew today. 
ENDNOTES 
1.	 Ironically, “babaloo” is the father of the world in the Afro-
Caribbean Lukumi, or Santería, tradition. 
2.	 Felipe Guaman Poma de Ayala, El Primer Nueva Corónica y Buen 
Gobierno, trans. Jorge L. Urioste (Mexico, D.F.: Siglo Veintiuno, 
2006). 
3.	 W. E. B. Du Bois, Writings: The Suppression of the African Slave-
Trade / The Souls of Black Folk / Dusk and Dawn / Essays and 
Articles (Library of America, 1987). 
4.	 Edward Said, Orientalism (New York: Vintage Press, 1979). 
5.	 “I believe that the fact of the juxtaposition of the white and black 
races has created a massive psycho-existential complex. I hope 
by analyzing it to destroy it.” Frantz Fanon, Black Skin White 
Masks (New York: Grove Press, 2008), 12. 
6.	 By “Westernizing,” I intend the calculative rationalism wedded to 
capitalism and its timeline and model of progress that becomes 
identified with modernity. 
7.	 In Viaje de la América Meridional, Félix de Azara writes, “Mixture 
improves the races and I think that these mestici have more 
ingenuity, sagacity and culture than the children of Spanish 
mothers and fathers.” In Miguel Rojas Mix, Los Cien Nombres de 
América (Barcelona: Lumen, 1991), 302. 
8.	 Leopoldo Zea, “Negritud e Indigenismo,” La Filosofia como 
Compromiso de Liberacion (Venezuela: Biblioteca Ayacucho, 
1991), 304-305. 
9.	 On African migrations’ impact in Latin America: Dina V. Picotti, La 
Presencia Africana en Nuestra Identidad (Buenos Aires: Ediciones 
del Sol, 1998). 
10. José Martí, “Our America,” Latin American Philosophy for the 21st 
Century, ed. Jorge Gracia and Elizabeth Millán-Zaibert (New York: 
Prometheus Books, 2004), 251. 
11.	 Aníbal Quijano “Coloniality of Power, Eurocentrism, and Social 
Classification,” Coloniality at Large: Latin America and the 
Postcolonial Debate, ed. Mabel Moraña, Enrique Dussel, and 
Carlos A. Jáuregui (London: Duke University Press, 2008), 181. 
12. Ibid., 182. 
13.	 “. . .a supposedly different biological structure that placed some 
in a natural situation of inferiority to the others.” Ibid., 182. 
14. Ibid., 190. 
15. Ibid. 
16. Aníbal Quijano, “Modernity, Identity and Utopia in Latin America,” 
Boundary 20, no. 3 (1993). 
17.	 Ibid., 201–16. 
18. Ibid., 141. 
19.	 Ibid., 142-43. 
20. As José Martí states, “Our Greece must take priority over the 
Greece which is not ours.” Martí, “Our America,” 248. 
The Marxism of José Revueltas: A Struggle 
Against Orthodoxy 
Sergio Rodrigo Lomelí Gamboa 
UNIVERSIDAD AUTÓNOMA DEL ESTADO DE MORELOS, MEXICO
“Bitter is the encounter with evil, with its people, 

with its space.
 
Evidently one was born for something else,
 
Something out of time and out of sense.
 
One would have wanted to love, sob, dance,
 
In another time and another planet
 
(even if it had been the same one).
 
But everything is forbidden, the sky, the earth.
 
They do not want us to be inhabitants.
 
We are suspected of being intruders in this planet.
 
They persecute us for it;
 
For going, for loving, for moving without being 

told to and without chains.
 
They want to capture our voices,
 
To leave nothing left of our hands,
 
Of our kisses, or anything that our bodies love.
 
It is forbidden to be seen.
 
PAGE 38	 FALL 2019  | VOLUME 19  | NUMBER 1 
APA NEWSLETTER  |  HISPANIC/LATINO ISSUES  IN PHILOSOPHY
 
 
They persecute all joy. 
They are dead and they kill us. 
We are killed by the dead. 
This is why we will live.” 
–José Revueltas, October 4, 1968 
This poem was written just two days after the student 
massacres of 1968, after the Mexican government ordered 
to suppress a peaceful demonstration in the Plaza de las Tres 
Culturas in Tlatelolco (Mexico City). Five thousand soldiers 
and 200 tankettes surrounded the plaza and opened fire 
against a gathered crowd killing hundreds of students and 
civilians, and incarcerating 1,000 others. 
As in Paris, and Prague in former Czechoslovakia, and the 
United States, there was a big social movement in Mexico 
during 1968. If one observes only its immediate causes, one 
could say that it grew out of something quite unpolitical, 
a brawl between students from the National Polytechnic 
Institute and students from a private school; though it 
quickly became radically political. But in a larger sense, 
the 1968 movement was the result of the accumulation 
of social unrest over the past decades, having to do with 
the government’s repressive policies against labor unions, 
such as the repression against the rail workers and teachers 
(both in 1958). 
The events leading up to the massacre in the Plaza de las 
Tres Culturas were part of the student movement, in which 
members of the whole university community took part. 
José Revueltas was one of the main intellectual figures 
associated with this event. 
LIFE AND CONTEXT 
José Revueltas was born in 1914 in Durango, Mexico, 
which is a state in the northern part of the country. It is 
not a border state, but lies just beneath Sonora, Chihuahua, 
and Coahuila, which share the largest portion of the border 
with the United States. He was born in a middle-class 
family of prominent artists: Silvestre Revueltas, his eldest 
brother, was a famous classical music composer; Fermín 
Revueltas was a painter, part of one of Mexico’s avant-
guard movements, Stridentism; and Rosaura Revueltas, his 
sister, was an actress, who had a role in Herbert Biberman’s 
1954 film “The Salt of the Earth.” 
The Revueltas family moved to Mexico City in 1920, where 
José Revueltas started going to a private school, El colegio 
alemán. After his father’s death, he transferred to a public 
school. And then by 1925 he quit school and for the next 
four years taught himself at the National Library. 
José Revueltas, his family, and his social and political 
environment are constituted greatly by the post-
revolutionary context in Mexico. The alleged “Revolutionary 
Party” was in power, and would be for over seventy years, 
and though it upheld the pretention of being a revolutionary
party, it had rather nationalist tendencies. The Revueltas 
family was very left wing in its political views, which was 
not a rare thing at the time. But José was a radical, in 
the best possible way. He was a radical critic, not only of 
capitalism but also a radical critic of dogmatism and of the 
bureaucratic and totalitarian deformation of socialism. 
He is better known for his extended literary production. He 
has several novels and short stories, and even cinematic 
scripts. His literary work is of late appreciation, but there 
is a growing agreement among scholars today that he 
is on par with Juan Rulfo as one of the greatest Mexican 
novelists. 
He is also known for his political activism, which lasted 
throughout his whole life. He was first incarcerated at 
the age of fifteen for attending a rally at the Zócalo. That 
incarceration lasted six months. A few years later, in 1932, 
he was incarcerated again and was sent to a maximum-
security prison at the Islas Marías, where he spent three 
months (It was after this experience that he wrote his 
first published novel, Los muros de agua [Water Walls], 
and then again in 1934 for organizing a strike of peasant 
workers in Nuevo Leon, another northern state. Finally, 
he was incarcerated in 1968 for his participation in the 
student movement; this time he was sent to “El palacio de 
Lecumberri,” a prison in downtown Mexico City. 
His theoretical and political production has had less 
attention, although recently there has been a renewed 
interest in exploring this area of his thought. He was a 
self-taught Marxist philosopher, and an extremely original 
one at that. The fact that his political thought has survived 
throughout decades but has not been prone to study has 
to do with the fact that he was permanently critical not 
just of capitalism and state policy, but of the communist 
party politics as well, which made him, and his theoretical 
production, a bit of an outcast. He was expelled from the 
Communist Party in Mexico, but made the effort to be 
reaccepted. His expulsion was related to the publication 
of a novel which deviated aesthetically from the accepted 
“socialist realism.” One of the main characteristics of this 
artistic movement was the idea that the purpose of art 
was to promote socialist ideas, and that the party, and the 
proletariat, had to be portrayed, always, as highly positive 
characters or forces in society. Nonetheless, in his 1949 
novel Los días terrenales (The Earthly Days), Revueltas 
explores the hypocritical contradiction in the morals of 
some party policies and militants who were willing to 
instrumentalize the life of even their own family, in order to 
fulfill their “historical duty.” As an example of this, there is a 
pathetic scene where a militant of a socialist party is writing 
a report of a meeting while his baby daughter is dying in 
the next room. He decides not only not to do anything 
about it, but to prevent his female comrade and the mother 
of his child to do anything about it, because, to his eyes, 
that life is worth nothing compared to the historical mission 
of the proletariat. Evidently, party leadership did not take 
Revueltas’s novel well and expelled him from the party, 
arguing that he showed existentialist and anti-Marxist 
deviations in his aesthetics.1 
The use of literature to explore some of his existential 
questions is well known. In one of his later novels, Los 
errores (The Mistakes), he deeply criticizes Soviet purges 
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and persecution of heterodoxy and dissent, and comes up 
with a very subtle term to name a condition or an emotion 
only known to those who have militated in an orthodox 
political organization: “party anguish.” This sensation has 
to do with the anguish generated by the fear towards one’s 
own party and its potential repression over one’s own 
actions. Revueltas explores how different people react 
towards this condition, and how it is sometimes related 
to massive delations, ostracism, rebellion, and resistance, 
and inserts one of the main themes throughout Revueltas’s 
thought: the struggle for autonomous consciousness. 
In 1960, he renounced the party altogether, due to 
differences with the leadership, and founded an organization 
called the “Liga Leninista Espartaco” (Espartacus-Leninist 
League). Towards 1963, he was expelled from this 
organization for being too critical. The members of the 
league argued that Revueltas’s public opinions about the 
discrepancies between Marxist-Leninist parties around 
the world contravened the organization’s interests. They 
thought that a member of a political organization did not 
have the individual right to think publicly regarding political 
issues. 
Reflecting over public opinion regarding his own person, 
Revueltas said: 
They have me for a heterodox Marxist, but in 
reality, they do not understand what I am: a 
product of Mexico, a monstrous country which we 
could symbolically represent as a being with the 
simultaneous shape of a horse, an eagle, a snake. 
Everything is contradiction amongst us.2 
The fact remains that his thought is difficult to categorize 
because it changes through time and never settles with 
accepted forms. But this is difficult to grasp. 
Often, from an external point of view, that is to say a point 
of view which is not formed or informed on Marx’s take on 
society, one would think that Marxism is something quite 
homogenous. Therefore, there would be such a thing as a 
single theory or a unified body of theoretical theses common 
to all Marxian thought. But that is simply not true. There are 
multiple theories, sometimes even hostile amongst each 
other, which strangely fit the mega-general description of 
“Marxist theory”: such is the case of Althusser and Luckács, 
or Sartre and Plejanov, or Mariátegui and Che Guevara, or 
Mao and the Soviets, or Luxemburg and Lenin. There is 
no such thing as “Marxism,” in singular. Instead, we could 
speak, as it has been done, of a thousand Marxisms. Even 
so, it would be not very serious not to acknowledge the fact 
that there was the ideological and political pretension to 
homogenize and hegemonize Marxism as a single, unified 
theory. That pretension was held by the totalitarian and 
repressive Soviet State and its international organization, 
the Comintern. 
One of the tasks of all philosophers who think that Marx’s 
thought is still alive and profoundly relevant for our 
present day society is to criticize the official Soviet version 
of Marxism (and the official social-democratic version of 
Marxism), to denounce them as dogmatic doctrines rather 
than critical deconstructive theories, and to show the 
possibilities of a Marxian thought not constrained by the 
ideological and political straitjacket of any orthodoxy. 
Thus was the work of the best critical theory; that was the 
way Benjamin or Sartre approached Marxism. The intention 
of this text is to show, if only just a glimpse of it, in which 
sense José Revueltas did the same for Marxian thought in 
Mexico. 
We must insist that José Revueltas is not an anomaly in 
this sense. There is not so much of a tradition of critical 
Marxism in Mexico, but there is a constellation of relevant 
critical Marxism produced in Mexico, which converges 
around the Faculty of Philosophy and Literature at the 
National Autonomous University of Mexico (UNAM). The 
constellation is formed by several philosophers such as 
Adolfo Sánchez Vázquez and Bolívar Echeverría, both critics 
of official versions of Marxism. 
There is one last thing I would like to mention regarding 
Revueltas’s life. There were two major political processes 
which marked breaking points in José Revueltas’s thought. 
I’ve already mentioned the second one, the 1968 student 
movement, in which Revueltas took an active part and from 
which he developed the notion of “autogestion” to which 
I will come back later. But there was another one before 
that: the struggle of the railroad workers during 1958 
and 1959. This was ten years before the 1968 movement. 
José Revueltas reflected profoundly on its outcome, and 
it enabled him to break away theoretically from the party, 
through the publication of a political work entitled “Ensayo 
de un proletariado sin cabeza” (“Essay of a Headless 
Proletariat”) in 1962. 
Through a superficial reading of this text, Revueltas may 
come off as an über-Leninist, criticizing all communist or 
socialist parties in Mexico for adhering to true Leninism, 
which is partly right. But there are, as well, different 
sorts of Leninisms. This has to do with the Stalin regime. 
After Lenin’s death in 1924, Stalin took control over the 
party and the Soviet State. During this period, the name 
of the orthodox Marxist doctrine conducting the Third 
International Workers Association changed to “Marxist-
Leninist.” So there was a time during which if someone 
stated that he was a Marxist-Leninist, he meant that he 
adhered to the Third International, and probably militated 
in a “communist” party, and was in favor of Stalin’s national 
and international policies. So, in some circles, stating that 
someone is a Leninist might imply that someone is in fact a 
Stalinist—which is not Revueltas’s case. 
During the Stalin era, Marxism was adopted as a positive 
scientific doctrine, which revealed alleged eternal positive 
truths. During this period, there were some parts of Marx’s 
theoretical production that were not seen with good eyes 
and were not published by the Stalinist International 
press. In Mexico, this press was called “Editorial Progreso” 
(“Progress Press”) and it published the standard canon for 
Marxist-Leninist thought. A text which was not published 
as part of the canon in this press was the “Economic and 
Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844,” discovered in 1932. 
There, Marx writes prominently about alienated work. 
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Through the “Essay of a Headless Proletariat,” Revueltas 
tries to fuse together Lenin’s party theory to Marx’s theory 
of alienation contained in the “Economic and Philosophic 
Manuscripts.” He is, to my knowledge, one of the few 
Marxian theorists to have done so. This opens the arena of 
the philosophical problem engaged by Revueltas’s take on 
Marxism. 
MARX’S THEORY OF ALIENATION 
To understand Revueltas’s contribution to a theory regarding
the philosophical problem of organization, one must have
a basic comprehension of Marx’s theory of alienation.
As I have said before, the Economic and Philosophic
Manuscripts deal with this issue explicitly, though some
specialists would argue that all of Marx’s theory has to do
with this problem. Throughout this paper, I subscribe to this
position, in contradiction to positions like those sustained
by Althusser, which hold that Marx’s later work got rid of his
early philosophical influences. To my eyes, Marx’s greatest
work, Capital, is a book regarding alienation. The problem
regarding alienation may be synthesized this way: relations
of production developed in the capitalist society alienate
people. This means, in its stronger sense, that people are no
longer the active producers of their social environment, but
rather passive reproducers of a social form which is being
subjectively designed elsewhere. In its root, the problem
of alienation describes a loss of subjectivity on behalf of
human beings. They are no longer the subjects of history,
but rather its objects, and sociality is being modeled by a
logic or rationality that is alien to all human purposes, which
is the value rationality of capital. A new pseudo subjectivity is
born, which is called capital, or, in other words, value which
has the ability to valorize itself, to make itself bigger. In one
of the most telling bits of Capital, Marx puts it like this: 
[T]he circulation of capital, suddenly presents 
itself as an independent substance, endowed with 
a motion of its own, passing through a life-process 
of its own, in which money and commodities are 
mere forms which it assumes and casts off in turn. 
Nay, more: instead of simply representing the 
relations of commodities, it enters now, so to say, 
into private relations with itself.3 
Capital starts behaving as the new social subject. It is in its 
name that decisions are being taken in all aspects of human 
life: from the simple things such as where do we work or 
what do we do for a living; what do we study (this applies in 
some cases, in other not some much; for instance, studying 
philosophy is quite an anti-capitalist gesture in itself); 
what commodities are produced and where; but also the 
complex macro-economic problems: international policies, 
immigration policies, economic policies, etc. 
Lukács wrote a groundbreaking book in 1923 called History 
and Class Consciousness. There he explained the narrow 
relationship between his take of Marx’s theory of alienation 
and the problem of political organization. From his point 
of view, the problem regarding organization is not merely 
a technicality, but a true philosophical problem. And it is 
from this point of view that I want to approach Revueltas’s 
comment and critique towards Lenin’s work regarding 
organization. 
Lenin’s party theory tries to respond to the problem of 
alienation in its most basic form. For him, alienation implies 
a political problem specific to the working classes. As the 
proletariat is subject to alienating working conditions, their 
consciousness is limited. On its own, the proletariat can 
only reach what he calls a “trade-unionist” consciousness, 
which means that the proletariat will not struggle on 
its own for the radical transformation of society, but will 
struggle for better conditions of exploitation, such as a 
better salary, a shorter workday, more civil rights, etc. This 
being the situation, Lenin designs a party theory which, to 
his eyes, shortcuts the alienation problem in its political 
consequences. Revolutionary consciousness will come 
to the proletariat from outside the working class; it will 
come from the most radical intellectual sectors of the 
bourgeoisie, which will struggle alongside the proletariat 
for the emancipation of society. This thesis, by the way, 
was shared with Karl Kautsky, leader of the German social-
democrats. So the party is formed by a compact cell of 
intellectuals who decide the party’s actions and politics, 
and a broad specter of militants and sympathizers who must 
execute the leadership’s commands. So, in Lenin’s party 
theory, there is a clear monopolization of the subjective 
activities regarding party life and organization.4 
Lenin’s party theory is pretty standard for his time—it had 
conspiratorial and revolutionary objectives—but in its 
general form it was not unlike Max Weber’s depiction of 
modern parties throughout modern democracies: 
The following is common to all parties: a nucleus 
of people have in their hands the active leadership, 
that is to say the formulation of slogans and the 
choosing of candidates; a group of people is 
adhered to them which fulfill a much more passive 
role and finally the rest of the members of the 
political association just play a role of objects . . . 
choosing one of the candidates and programs that 
the party presents to them.5 
Weber theorizes over the consequences of this kind of 
political organization in much the same way as Marx had 
done. The outcome is a reification and bureaucratization 
of politics, where the ends are substituted by the means. 
Weber calls this problem the “iron cage.” 
REVUELTAS’S CRITIQUE OF PARTY POLITICS,
AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE THEORY OF
“AUTOGESTION” 
[A]utogestion means that a determined something, 
is managed and directed by its own decision 
towards the point where it has set itself to arrive.6 
The main thing to understand is that for José Revueltas, 
party organization is a philosophical problem which has 
to do, mainly, with a cognitive problem. For him a Marxist 
organization deals with the issue of organizing class 
consciousness. It answers the question, “How do alienated 
people radically change the world?” So, for Revueltas, the 
question regarding organization is not a mere technical 
question, but rather an epistemological problem. It was 
always so, but by 1968–1971 his version of a Marxist 
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organization developed into its final form, which greatly 
deviates from the Leninist perspective. 
There are several theoretical texts written either during the
1968 movement or during his imprisonment at Palacio de
Lecumberri that deal with this subject. In a text edited with the
title “Notas sobre la organización” (“Notes on Organization”),
Revueltas reflects on the notion that a party has to deal with
two main issues: on the abstract and theoretical level, it has
to deal with something he calls “cognitive democracy,” and
on a more practical and concrete level, the party needs to
deal with the organization of consciousness. 
On the concrete, practical level, a party must act as one; 
there must be a unity in its action. But on the abstract, 
theoretical level, a party must allow for the free concurrence 
of opinions and tendencies, whether they be different or 
even in conflict with one another. Revueltas imagines a party 
where theoretical discussions are held unrestrictedly and in 
absolute freedom with the participation of every member 
of the party, where there is no subject which is considered 
taboo. This way, the subjective moments of party life are 
not monopolized by a single instance or committee. When 
the theoretical issue is resolved, then praxis overcomes the 
abstract level in a unified political action.7 
His conceptions regarding organization are a result of his 
participation in the 1968 Movement where he built the 
notion of “academic autogestion.” During the student 
strike, the university was alive with political, cultural, and 
theoretical activities. Revueltas saw in that experience the 
deepest emancipatory potentialities. He thought that in that 
experience you could see the most radical expression of 
academic freedom. He saw a critical and dialogical exercise 
of student activism: all students and solidary teachers 
building knowledge subjectively and democratically. 
What is academic autogestion? It is to proceed 
with academic courses inside and outside curricula 
with the help of solidary teachers and students. 
It is to debate, to question, to refute, on round 
tables, seminars, assemblies, the issues and ideas 
of our time and our society [. . .] We need to create 
the most diverse forms of democratic organization 
for action, for dialogue, for controversy, ample, 
constant, tireless: committees, councils, symposia, 
encounters, dialogues with writers and intellectuals 
of all tendencies.8 
Revueltas understood academic autogestion as the 
interruption of a university practice which only ratifies the 
status quo. Academic autogestion is student action that 
takes on the critical practice of producing knowledge, goes 
beyond curricula, and makes the totality of political and 
social problems an object for reflection and consciousness. 
What is autogestion? A University and a superior 
education which are free, active, open to every 
national or international problem and willing to 
take action with them and regarding them, through 
study and analysis that flow into militant political 
activity.9 
Revueltas understood that the core problem with alienation 
is the split dichotomy between subject and object. 
When that happens, subjectivity tends to be reified. That 
happens both in party life where the subjective leadership 
is monopolized by a single group, and in processes of 
traditional education, where all subjectivity relies on the 
teacher, and passive objectivity on the student. Revueltas 
saw in the 1968 student movement a subversion of this 
relationship, a conquest of subjectivity by students, an 
exercise of free criticism and unrestricted plurality, and he 
used that experience to theorize party life and to subvert 
traditional party theory. 
This posits a problem for traditional Marxist organizations. 
The perspective of self-organization, or “autogestion” has 
been a subject of discussion between left-wing currents 
for a long time. Historically, it has been associated with 
political anarchism. More and more recent critical political 
movements around the world have tested more horizontal 
ways of organization: this has to do with the fact that 
traditional Marxist-Leninist organizations have been proved 
dangerous, alienating, and false. 
What I think is extremely worthy of Revueltas’s thought 
is that his theoretical commitment was never towards an 
author or towards a doctrine, but rather towards social 
reality and towards social movements, and I think it is 
reality that should confront our ideas and conceptions, 
and not the other way around. The willingness to transform 
one’s ideas and to reassess our own conceptions is the 
basis of critical thinking, and I think Revueltas is a good 
teacher for that. 
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THRESHOLD 
This is the era of the displaced and the refugee. In this era, 
it is urgent to reflect philosophically about displacement 
and exile as an existential situation, about the social stigma 
and the legal fragmentation of refugees as historical 
figures. In this text we approach exile from the point of 
view of philosophy. 
Initially, we approach exile from a socio-political perspective 
whereby a person or group are forced to leave or remain 
outside of their country of origin due to well-established 
fears of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, 
nationality, or public opinion. This exposes a relationship 
between violence and contemporary exile. It is enough to 
contemplate the world’s horrors first seen in the Great War 
of 1914,1 an event that marks the beginning of the most 
violent period (hostile, criminogenic, and mortal) in the 
history of human kind (approximately 160 million killed 
in the twentieth century as a result of war conflicts).2 We
see here the rise of instrumental rationality, applied over 
individuals and collectives, through very efficacious ways 
in order to manage fear, destruction, and the victims 
themselves.3 
Considering such violence, the last six decades provide a 
testimony of the wide deterritorialization generated by the 
same interstated, intrastated, and substated wars, taking 
place for the sake of dictatorships, segregation, ethnic 
cleansing, genocide, civil wars, international interventions, 
coup d’états, military coups, and a rampant capitalism,4 all 
of which helps us outline the figure of the exile show up 
again in every latitude, for each historic paradigm of forced 
deterritorialization, and it helps settle the theoretical-
affective closeness with another kinds phenomena. In 
this way, Castles and Miller state that “There are a few 
people, in industrial or developed countries, that have no 
personal experience about migration or its effects; this [is 
a] universal experience.”5 
The proximity between the phenomenon of forced 
deterritorialization and “resettlement” (migratio) promotes 
a tight linkage among contemporary mobilization studies, 
even though it is not necessarily that one phenomenon is 
reduced to the other, so that it is enough to witness this 
mobilization’s frictions, rejections, links, and joints on urban 
spatiality, urged by exiles, expatriates, refugees, asylees, 
stateless, and travelers.6 About this, Edward Säid says that 
“modern culture is in great measure an exile, emigrates 
and refugee’s work [. . .] the difference between exiles 
from before and the ones of our time is (we can emphasize 
it) the scale: our time it is the refugee era, the one of the 
displaced one, of the massive immigration.”7 
What I seek here is to explore some structural factors 
about the exile phenomenon through “philosophical 
archaeology,”8 so long as this method tries to put in 
perspective the operational forces that survive between 
the crisis of exile and its consolidation in Western history. 
We seek to think about contemporary exiles and about 
extraterritorial exclusion, and, in this way, propose a 
conceptualization which will help to outline pertinent 
aspects of exile, in concerns of other current human 
extraterritoriality phenomena. 
ONE AGAINST THE ONE: THE EXILE 
The importance of being in community, to be with others
in law and to live in common, will be understood in an
negative way, by the exile, whom is left, by decree,
“Without family, lawless and homeless.” 
The exile shows, in this way, the terrible, threatening 
idea that was cultivated by tradition with philosophical 
naturality: besides this property or community dominion, 
besides this cosmos, the scenario is harsh. The other, the 
senseless space, the far beyond (acosmia, káos) becomes 
an outside without destiny, without realization, without 
consecration, without work, without a place: “And he who 
cannot live in community, or who has no needs for its own 
sufficiency, is not a member of the city, it is a beast or a 
god.”9 However, the Stagirite forgets the third possibility: 
that there’s someone who cannot live in community, and is 
by imposition an exiled, someone who was and no longer 
is a member of the city. 
As it was told, in front of the possibility of the dissolution 
of those who love war among their own (the exiled 
criminal), law should resist, strain, and totally submit the 
same undoable forces that threaten the order. This was 
understood by the Hellene with a great juridical clarity. 
This may have made exile’s specialization and historical 
clarification to have specific gradations (filled with possible 
ethical, sociocultural, religious, or political causes), evident 
at the interdiction made by Plato as a theoretical legislator. 
In The Laws, Plato observes the dangers of bloodshed 
inside the city-community, whereby what the philosopher 
does, about this, the widest crossovers between voluntary, 
involuntary, and “intermedial” homicides (by temper, 
thymos) performed by doctors, friends, from children to 
parents, from parents to children, between siblings, from 
master to slave, from slave to master, between slaves, from 
a freeman to foreigner and vice versa, between foreigners, 
between the citizens and the slaves.10 
From this, Plato infers that the exile will work not only as a 
punishment (law’s punitive execution), but also as a regulator 
of revenge and the contagious violence released by 
bloodshed within the city limits, which enables the Platonic 
justice (diké). In this regard, the evocations to purifications, 
the attendance to temples and ritual processes works as a 
device, not only for legal administration or at the free use 
of law forces, but, altogether, these evocations increase 
the punishment actions as a mediation with sociocultural 
representations being jeopardized. 
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Under this criteria, Plato determines that the use of the force 
starts when the crime’s author ignores the containment 
“preludes” generated by the philosophical reason and 
the creator of law (reasonings coming from moderation, 
temperance, and bravery) and the reasoning (logón) 
(coming from rites and collective opinions) that affirm the 
fulfillment (revenge payment) which will be paid by the 
alleged murderer at the Hades.11 In effect, Plato exposes 
this experience on the geometric mode, of which the Greek 
was the artificer: a metric techné of the force abuse and 
the correspondent punishment with excessive force of the 
law. Violence with violence is paid, even though inside 
the law this will have the qualitative trait of a revenge, 
not only legal but legit and impersonal, this that will be 
called justice (diké): is the city-one (with its institutions and 
juridical instruments) against the criminal. 
This is the subject of energy and its equilibrium, of its
virtue (areté) traveling from the epic’s spirit and the
Nemesis of the fifth century BCE tragedy.12 For Plato, the
city building and its maintenance inside virtue will depend
on the relations of forces individual-community;13 but
when this relation overflows, the rigor of the community
force, turned into power, it is emphasized at the same
time. 
The Platonic speech submits, precisely, the law of exile 
to an obligation: “what is close to the greatest evil should 
have the greatest punishment”;14 since there are other 
regulatory mechanisms for action, like those quoted by 
Plato: the view of social institutions, the victim’s avenger 
or the fear (fobouméno) to Hades justice. The exile’s 
punishment (phygén epibálein), with the criteria of The 
Laws, involves the search for narrowing and confining 
its author as a public enemy;15 all of this evidences i) the 
irreducibility of an irreversible criminal violence (a cause 
of death), ii) the corrosion and destructiveness of social 
links created over homicide (the community juridical 
derealization), iii) the possibility of becoming contagious 
(revenge: “deaths that should be purged through other 
deaths”)16 as a correspondent violence, and iv) the 
arbitrariness (sociopolitical disequilibrium) that could be 
carried by a homicidal act. 
Facing this homicidal violence—executed by that one 
who “loves war among their own”—Plato issues laws of 
exile that seek to isolate, to disarticulate, to set apart, and 
to turn the aggressor defenseless, making him part of a 
non-human, non-divine, non-animal dimension, but larval: 
behaviors and attributes of a being that is not alike or 
absolutely other, instead has been devalued by its own 
acts to a condition under which he could be killed. 
It is possible to find, in this way, a compensatory relation 
between the act and the punishment. The community and 
the punished one appear before the application of the 
law through violence: the violence of that who dissolves 
the links, promotes and instills harm, in detriment of 
other or others’ integrity; harm deliberately chosen and 
imparted by the agent, and that is undesired by that or 
those who suffer it;17 and here the force of the community 
law appears, which looks to fix the broken link by not only 
neutralizing the violence and its contagion but also the one 
who created it. In this point, it is pertinent to go to Girard
when he states that: 
the damages that violence can trigger are so 
big, and the remedies are so random, that 
the importance falls over prevention. And the 
preventive field is fundamentally the religious 
field. The religious prevention can have a violent 
side. . . . The “clever” utilization of certain violence 
properties, specially its aptitude to move from one 
object to another one.18 
To kill someone is not something that inside of the legal 
framework could match with revenge or compensation (as 
it was on Ancient Greek pre-law); even though the exile 
is not going to work as a punishment, neither in Plato nor 
in the Athenian law, solely on the juridical field, instead 
of that it works on the juridical geometry mixture, social 
sanction, and ritual process. This is legible in The Laws. 
If Plato assumes the exile’s intensities, this can’t be reduced 
into a subjective gesture of the Athenian philosopher; 
instead, it will be an operative concept perceptible to Plato 
and that is beneath the Athenian society of the sixth and 
fifth BCE centuries. The latent force of the law, of which one 
should run and be afraid of (fobéo) works under a parameter 
where the coercion is legit and the applied violence is 
legal: and this follows the idea of the community virtues, 
considering this like a well-governed and well-educated 
city. Gernet is clear about it: 
precisely in this family relationships order, [the 
curse] can be directed with a view to satisfaction 
and sanction, to the whole group. We have then 
have the background of a characteristic part of 
city’s right, which guaranteed the respect of familiar 
moral with particular procedures in cases where an 
internal discipline was not enough; it happened, 
in example, when the homicide revenger was not 
showing up and, overall, in the case of “mistreats”, 
about a certain relatives’ category. The case makes 
us think about one of the Rome’s “royal laws”, 
many of them, at least, and it can be say without 
doubts, represent an authentic reminiscence of an 
old habit: in virtue of a ploratio of the father or the 
mother “mistreated” by the son, this was entrusted, 
under the sacer appellation, to the “relatives’ gods” 
[Legis Regiae, IV, 1]. Disposition that is not much 
less juridical, since even the social sanction that 
goes with it has a religious nature. But, what does 
ploratio really mean? . . . the “consecration” of the 
guilty one equals to an out-of-law declaration. In 
order words: the ploratio fulfillment, magical act, 
can have an analogous effect to the one that will 
be accomplish after the juridical proceedings.19 
It turns out, then, that the one without family, lawless and 
homeless stated by Nestor, sang by the Iliad poet, has been 
consolidated on the cursing writing of law. The testimony 
brought by the Platonic writing is relevant as a structural 
exile factor, compiled on The Laws: the city, the “all against 
one,” is not fortuitous that the law about homicide and 
exile are right up next20 to the exhibition made by the Old 
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Athenian to his interlocutor, Clinias, about the laws related 
to those who are disposed by the gods of the city (the 
wicked),21 to the traitors,22 and to all of those who damage 
the laws affecting the constituted order (“unfair facts, in 
general”).23 
LAW SAYS IT SO: “KILL HIM WITH IMPUNITY” 
If the Athenian constitution was based on the city-
state organic idea,24 this could give us a clue about the 
concentration of powers (juridical, political, and civil-
religious), followed by minimum basis for individual 
rights; so the city, as a sociopolitical community, gets 
consolidated with almost unlimited and direct sovereignty, 
with the power to punish (juridical category, unsuspected 
until then).25 
So it seems a “natural” sequence what will be disposed by 
the Platonic law against the criminal, who was sentenced to 
exile “in the name of the whole city”: 
if someone with premeditation and injustice kills 
someone of his lineage by his own hand, he 
should first be set apart of the common activities 
so as not contaminate temples, the market, the 
seaport or any other public gathering, the same if 
there is or there is not someone to prohibit it: the 
law prohibits it, in effect, and it will be prohibiting 
it in the name of the whole city. . . . The guilty one 
will be punished with death and will not be buried 
in his victim’s country, not only because of his 
ungodliness, but also because of his immodesty. 
If he runs away and refuses to be judged, the 
banishment will be perpetual (phygón). If one 
of this banishers (pheygéto) puts a step on the 
deceased’s land, the first of their close ones who 
finds it, and even one of the citizens, kill him with 
impunity, or, tie him well and deliver him to the 
magistrates who judged him, to be killed. . .26 
As it can be seen, the deterritorialization criteria as a 
sign of exile as punishment in all its intensity is just the 
beginning of the way the event will be happening. The 
force of the whole community’s power, the name that signs 
this force, the name of the city, has in its act the power to 
transform everything that is related to it into law: it shapes 
power (violence as a damage in the form of law) and the 
individuals as citizens, but, besides that, it has the power 
to deform individuality by a force applied until the limit, not 
only the territorial limits but also the existential limits that 
makes the human being humane, as Aristotle says. 
The exiled criminal carries the weight of the punishment 
that is tied to a process in which not only he is everyone’s 
enemy, but anyone is also his enemy under “a simple and 
brutal principal”:27 he is the common enemy, a public and 
notorious wanted criminal. 
Certainly, the juridical factor (the regime, power, and the 
force of the law) totally transformed the interpersonal 
and tribal notion as a wound to the city’s commonwealth 
because it took care of—on the sociopolitical space 
qualification, that we recognized as polis, and the acts 
made on this space—attracting and involving the violent 
events of individuals against individuals in a more abstract 
relationship. 
The transformation, today we understand it, is a 
sophisticated sign: that one that goes from individual 
revenge to justice. To restore the community’s functionality 
(broken by the unfair events) Greek thought introduced the 
law that fulfilled the promise which will be the direct threat 
to the aggressor who forgot to be afraid of the onto-juridical 
equation everybody-one. That is why a fellow citizen’s 
(“brother,” that of the same lineage, born from and in this 
political cosmos: a homeland, a phratría)28 murder becomes 
a common problem and its shared solution becomes a civic 
duty: the city is the one cursing, banishing, pursuing, and 
executing; it is what exempts all juridical responsibility to 
whoever kills the pursued one, i.e., the exiled one. 
EXILE 
[a] person obligated to abandon or to stay out of 
his native country because of fears about being 
persecuted due to race, religion, nationality or 
public opinion; a person who considers his exile 
as temporary (even if it can last a long lifetime), 
with the hope of coming back to his homeland, 
whenever the circumstances allows it to, but it 
seems precluded or incapable as long as the 
factors that put him into the exile are still present.29 
In contrast to these considerations, we should specify that 
if the exiled was, before modernity, punished—in a direct 
and personal way—not only by ideological motifs but by 
juridical reasons, this was done because he was a disturber 
of the peace, as it can be seen since Homer and Plato. 
It will be emphasized that in this horizon of comprehension 
of antiquity, communities are built by social networks, 
managed in a direct way and by direct representation, 
for which proximity and recognition were made by social 
bonds, formal and informal deals from some individuals to 
others. In this direction, Elnadi and Riffat say this about the 
exile: 
On those remote times in which the community 
regulated in its minimum details the behavior of 
each one of its members, to exclude on of them 
was, practically a death sentence. Not only the 
group protection was denied, and he was left 
alone in front of the unknown, but also the link with 
his ancestors and the possibility of . . . building 
a home was forbidden. He had no more psychic 
support points to give him confidence. Lost for the 
community, was also lost for himself.30 
This geographic and demographic framework (space legal 
qualification and sociopolitical of the individuals) is “the­
one” that Plato considers while thinking about the city-
state, even though the exile will keep on operating also 
under similar circumstances within the Roman pre-law, 
early medieval law,31 and the Spanish pre-law.32 The exile is 
conceived, time after time, under this fundamental context 
in which the juridical history of the communities is looking 
to punish, by implementing a prevention mechanism 
about the violence spread and contagion, order alteration 
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or against any other fact that could endangered the 
community; all of this from the discursive relations created 
between the common order (philosophical-ontological), 
public crimes (juridical), the stigmatization (moral­
religious), the rights (juridical) deprivation and persecution 
until death (existential threat). 
With these measures it was possible to set a rational procedure
structured for penal repression that goes from one side to
the other. From there, to comprehend the community on its
foundations implies, rigidly, to mark not only the horizontal
and progressive line of a positive consciousness of itself
that goes from the myth to the law, passing by the literary
paideia to its consecration in philosophy and law.33 The
political community inherited by the West and reproduced
in its fundamental characteristics time and time again along
the centuries is forged also by the underlying violence and
the exclusion principles which are made of violence,34 that
which changes its forms, gradates, and intensities, but that
is latent, potentially active, to act against its own (those
called by the community as “ours”: polités, civies, neighbor,
or citizen) in all the legitimacy and legality; since in all the
variants created by the West, the community is not losing (on
the contrary, it seems to intensify) its constituent potential of
repression and exclusion.35 
Like this, beyond the known geographic relegation, the 
most evident factor of exile, the accusation of a crime 
(publicum) weighs in the penal infraction, which at the 
same time authorizes, by the civic law, so that any citizen 
could apply against the aggressor the persecution and 
impugn death: “should be subjected to process for whom 
will like to pursue him in the name of the deceased one.”36 
The fearsome figure shows the metamorphosis: anyone 
can be a “hunter of exiles” (phygadotherás) as part of the 
right granted by the city; since the exiled is not a fellow-
citizen (phratér) anymore, an equal and is now within the 
line of being in a barely defined zone (man-animal: larva) at 
being deprived of rights, security, and political recognition. 
The “forced estrangement” of the enemy of the people 
has become the penal infraction of “all against one,” 
that arithmetically corresponds—and not without some 
strangeness—to that who with his violently deliberate 
action has become into the “one against all.” 
This shows, certainly, the most evident characteristic 
and the most referred to in the history of the exilic 
condition: banishment. Because the exile is represented as 
banishment, our tradition deploys the concept to individual 
or a collective in movement, escaping, estranging away.37 
This has its profound significance. 
THE CONCEPTUALIZATION OF EXILE 
Insofar as the punishment that holds the exile 
becomes clearer, it is necessary to bring attention to 
deterritorialization as the most evident factor in exile, but 
not the only one. From here we are prepared to show the 
exile within the current context and to coordinate it with 
significations through time, with the purpose of giving an 
account of its meanings and the way they are interlaced 
between diverse eras and contexts. 
Based on the information analyzed, what we have pointed 
out as exile arises in a determined historical moment and 
gets consolidated, at first as a term, then as the conceptual 
system of the community who signs and confirms the 
regulation of a moral, religious, philosophic, juridical, and 
political network. 
In this way, we can conceptualize and suggest that exile 
means a set of criteria that shows regulated actions 
beginning with the juridical consolidation of the political 
community. Because this is a specialized mechanism, 
a group of discursive and operational instruments of 
territorial exclusion destined to revoke the individual’s full 
use of his citizenship rights, belonging and recognizing the 
sociopolitical links of the community. The displacement 
activated expel the communal disturber and his violent 
actions, living him without protection or security, therefore, 
as criminal—an individual violent toward the community 
and violated by it—is at the will of whoever wishes to kill 
him without impunity. 
The relationship settled by the Aristotelian definition of 
man as a living animal capable of a political existence and 
also capable of articulation places the possibility of the 
word itself to what is politically agreed, what is fair and 
what is not, what is good, and how to persevere in it.38 
This is confirmed by Aristotle: “this thing’s community is 
what constitutes the home and the city.”39 The impediment 
to this common word places the exile—who has a voice 
(phoné) but not a word (logos)—in a zone, not only of 
political recognition, but also of existential indifference: 
for which the Platonic mandate of not interacting with the 
infected being due to the violence he triggered against the 
community gets stronger. 
According to the above, exile as punishment is not only 
a forced displacement, a criminal neutralization, or 
community strangeness; as if this is not enough, the exile 
is asked to live the criminal “abandonment” “a bando”40— 
abandoned, forlorn, by the humane ordering that inscribes 
and sorts the ways of living in a determined space. 
We recall that the Greek polis not only created a space
but also invented and founded the close relationship
between political reality and ontological reality in order
and measure. That is why the deterritorialization in which
existence gets formalized (“family-less”), the elimination
of rights proclaimed in a common speech (“law-less”),
and the roofless state (“home-less,” without protection)
in which the exiled has been left in—“an out of” from the
humane concurrence—will be the clear goal of the juridical
mechanism. For this, forced exclusion was not only of the
geometrical space—like the community neither was the
individual’s arithmetical addition; instead, exile consisted
and consists in the complexness of space as a vital horizon.41 
The exile depends on the juridical tensions that regulate,
sanction, limit, indicate, and control the situation (the here
and now) with an absolute, continuous, and supposedly
universal pretension (held on the idea of juridical-political
and ontological proximity equality) to talk about civilized
relation to prescriptive spaces, the we and the inside, against
external spaces, the outside in which the savage, barbarian,
and uncontrollable ruled by legitimate space prevails.42 
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In this way the punished one is the derealization of every 
right and every familiarity. Deprived of rights, from “his 
zone” (that is not “his” because it was neither created nor 
elected), the community keeps the exiled in an extraordinary 
tension, because for him the community has become 
something that threatens and pursuits him, that hunts him: 
“whoever finds him can kill him without impunity.” 
The Greek comprehended that exile was not only fulfilled 
by geographical marginalization, but also by its very 
possibility: the power of the law, of what is “commanded 
by the community,” to decree and triggered the force 
of the law converted into violence in the search of the 
disarticulation and even the unpunished elimination, given 
that the exiled has no identity, is no longer a citizen, and 
has been deprived of his appropriations (cultural, political, 
and religious) and his properties (economical and social). 
The criminal (exiled not because of being the exiled and a 
paradigmatic figure stops being a criminal to the eyes of 
the law) is the alterity of this possible violence for which 
the community, the harmed sociopolitical body, has not 
a designated place; it means it has not and is not giving 
destiny, space, or time because the spaces generated by 
the community are within its legal frameworks, as are the 
city walls. 
CONCLUSIONS
Exile is a punishment that transfigures life as “death-in­
life.” The exiled life carries the taste for violence of an 
entire people (he is the killer of a “brother” in the law or 
deaf to what the community commands). He who is exiled 
is intermedium and an unrelated being and is also the 
sociopolitical-juridical sign of a profound alteration that 
was able to distinguish and select the accurate factors to 
get a contradictory relationship: death in life, that which 
does not achieve the corporal punishment or the absolute 
and explicit suppression of the criminal existence. 
With this it is possible to devise criteria that evidences 
destructive actions, regulated by a displacement, expulsion, 
and a declared unprotectedness, capable of putting the 
individuals that were once a community inside a grey and 
undetermined zone. 
The severity of exile during Antiquity has at a time 
“positive,” “beneficial,” “necessary,” and “insuperable” 
criteria for the community so conceived within the promise-
threat dynamic under which the collective regulations 
work. But, in general, exile is still very much operative in 
modern nation-states, this because the definition of space, 
the delimitation of borderlines and legal systems, opens 
places and generates coexistence spaces (voluntary and 
forced), but, at the same time, closes these places, thereby 
relegating and abandoning entire sectors of the population 
in sociopolitical death zones. This is possible due to the 
consolidation of identity into “citizenship” in the process 
of democratization. With this consolidation it was possible 
to guarantee, in a positive way, the union of civic identity, 
rights of belonging and participation: “nationality.” But, on 
the other hand, the nation-state promoted and kept the 
power to deny citizenship and challenge rights and entry 
to some individuals to the juridical-political space.43 
Nowadays, and beyond the geopolitical dimension, there 
is the city’s topopolitical power, which concentrates 
itself, wealth, and other dynamics that flow through an 
intermittency of rights, obligations, punishments, juridical-
political process, everyday reconfiguration of sociocultural 
alterations, control, security, violence to privacy and 
intimacy, defenselessness, etc.44 And for this very reason it 
has been necessary to create new structures of power that 
restrain space, diversity, encounter, and conflict.45 
In this current panorama we talk about the reach and 
meaning of exile. Perhaps, if it has been possible to explain 
with any clarity the notion of territorial displacement as an 
alteration factor for individual dispositions, the analysis 
should yield figures who had committed no “crime” at all, 
but are submitted to punishment similar to exile. 
Exile, not only as deterritorialization, but as a disqualification 
of life, can contribute analytic criteria to those individualities 
and collectives that exist in states of warfare, familyless, 
lawlessness, homelessness, as they are displaced 
migrants, refugees, indigents, vagabonds, street children, 
unemployed (job-less), all of whom are abandoned to a 
social, economic, juridical, and political homeless situation. 
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Book Excerpt: Marx on Bolívar 
Susana Nuccetelli 
ST. CLOUD STATE UNIVERSITY 
Some reactions to Bolívar’s social and political philosophy 
have focused on aspects of his moral character. A prominent 
critic of this sort is Karl Marx, who in 1858 published a 
biographical note about El Libertador in The New American 
Cyclopedia. After declaring that Bolívar had some traits 
of moral character unworthy of someone called “The 
Liberator,” Marx goes on to ascribe to Bolívar moral vices 
such as cowardice, envy, brutality, disloyalty, boastfulness, 
despotism, and frivolity. Surely, these are bad traits of 
character for anyone to have, and especially for a military 
commander. But Marx here is engaging in a series of ad 
hominem (i.e., arguments against the person) that may be 
fallacious depending on the facts about Bolívar’s actions 
and attitudes during the Wars of Independence. Evidently, 
only if based on accurate relevant evidence concerning 
those facts can criticism of this sort have any force. And 
even if it has force, it may leave Bolívar’s philosophical 
thoughts untouched. On my view, we should be suspicious 
about Marx’s arguments against the moral character of 
Bolívar because they count with an exceedingly weak 
evidential support: Marx’s sources were narratives by a 
few European historians of the time, who probably had no 
firsthand knowledge of the facts of the war. Without further 
support, we have no reason to accept, for example, the 
charge that “the few successes of the corps [of Bolívar] 
were entirely owed to British officers, such as Col. Sands.” 
Or that once the Spanish threat was reduced, Bolívar “no 
longer thought it necessary to keep up the appearance of 
generalship, but leaving the whole military task to Gen. 
Sucre, limited himself to triumphal entries, manifestos, and 
the proclamation of constitutions.” 
On the other hand, the unreliability of Marx’s sources is by 
no means established. His critique has supporters (e.g., 
Draper 1968) who argue that, charitably construed, Marx 
objects to Bolívar’s propensity to favor authoritarian power, 
something amply illustrated in the constitutions he wrote for 
Bolivia and Gran Colombia. True, Marx says that one of those 
documents qualifies only as a “Bolivian Code, an imitation 
of the Code Napoleon.” Marx, of course, was not inclined to 
endorse the universal value of democracy, a form of polity 
that he predicted would become obsolete after the decline 
of capitalism, when society gets ripe for entering the next 
historical phase––namely, that of a proletarian revolution 
leading to socialism. But democracy was a progressive 
polity for him during the phase of capitalism. On the other 
hand, the phenomenon of restoration of empires during 
capitalism, to which he referred as “Bonapartism,” was 
reactionary during that phase, Marx thought, for it implied a 
regression to absolute monarchies of a previous historical 
phase, even if they do not involve a return of power to a 
king. 
Could Bolívar respond to the charge of Bonapartism? It is true
that he declined the offer of the throne of Gran Colombia.
But although he was not interested in becoming its king,
he did entertain the possibility of being its president for
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life, and also exerted dictatorial powers more than once.
Furthermore, during the Wars of Independence he did
cultivate a friendship with British imperialism, something that
should have been suspicious to Marx––as equally must have
been Bolívar’s enthusiastic praise for absolute monarchy. 
In addition, numerous writings strongly suggest that 
Bolívar did not endorse democracy as usually understood 
as form of polity for Latin America. If this is what Marx really 
meant to say, I might agree. However, at no point does 
Marx provide textual evidence that he had read Bolívar. 
And he does not engage with Bolívar’s arguments, which is 
something I’ll do next. 
There is abundant textual evidence of Bolívar’s sympathies 
for authoritarian governments. It suffices to look at classic 
texts such as the “Manifesto of Cartagena,” “Jamaica 
Letter,” and the “Angostura Address”––or the constitutions 
he wrote for Bolivia and Great Colombia. Bolívar repeatedly 
offers, as a reason for preferring centralized governments, 
the hypothetical claim that liberal democracy would 
undermine aggregate happiness, safety for all, and political 
stability. For this hypothesis, he offers only the dogma 
that Latin Americans cannot have democracy because of 
their unique history––and, most important, their unique 
mixed racial and ethnic backgrounds. On his alternative for 
them, they should accept the leadership of a centralized 
government run by privileged Criollos, who were the only 
people electable in his system. Consider the people of 
Gran Colombia: had they accepted Bolívar’s constitution 
for them, they would have had a government with an 
elected president for life and an elected but hereditary 
senate dictating all their laws and regulations. In addition, 
what Bolívar called “Moral Power” would have been vigilant 
of their actions or beliefs, ready to censor them when 
considered “immoral.” After 1823, during a brief period as 
dictator, he in fact created such a branch of government, 
which in turn made illegal the teaching of Bentham’s 
writings (in what Andrade and Lugo-Ocando [2018] regard 
as a concession to the Catholic Church). 
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BOOK REVIEW 
Rape and Resistance 
Linda Martín Alcoff (New York: Polity, 2018). Paperback, 
$24.95. ISBN: 978-0-745-69191-6. 
Reviewed by Juan J. Colomina-Alminana 
UNIVERITY OF TEXAS, AUSTIN
Professor Linda Martín Alcoff’s book Rape and Resistance is 
both timeless and timely. It is timeless because it centers 
on the historical institutional factors that allow and condone 
sexual violence and assault. It is timely because it demands 
a recalibration towards the victims’ personal experiences 
and voices based on prominent, recent activist events that 
discredit and, even too often, criminalize victim reports by 
those very same institutions that are supposed to protect 
but simply ignore and silence them. Taking a stand with 
other epistemologists of resistance, Alcoff’s main purpose 
is, then, to develop “a program that focuses not simply on 
getting the word out, but on reforming and transforming 
the conditions of reception in the public domains in which 
ours words emerge” (24). Unlike others, though, she 
does not push a relativistic agenda where every voice is 
given their space, but a local and “pluritopic” assessment 
of context where we can base “the transformative and 
subversive potential of survivor speech [as] absolutely 
dependent on its truth-value” (54). My comments revolve 
around this point. 
One of Alcoff’s goals is to resist the widely held idea that 
sexual violence, and particularly rape, is a byproduct of war 
and militarism, and in general, of concrete deviant situations/ 
events and individuals. And I cannot agree more. As Alcoff 
shows, we must “denaturalize” rape and sexual violence as 
an anomaly and, instead, move towards an argument that 
demonstrates sexual violation is “a systematic sanctioned 
practice . . . an orchestrated practice” (25). Only then can 
we make institutions and leaders accountable for such 
practices. As an example, one can take the case of rape 
in prisons. The inmate is incarcerated as punishment and, 
very often, left by themselves once inside. When raped, 
the mainstream assumes that is simply a byproduct of 
carceral life, and few ever question the double punishment 
of sexual violence. Alcoff does not provide further details 
on how to address this problematic in her book, but it is 
obvious how her approach to sexual violation would look 
into this case. 
Second, Alcoff accounts for the vilification of the victims by 
the same institutions that are supposed to protect them— 
being silenced by certain sensationalist press/media (or 
all media in general) by the blaming of the victims (“What 
was she wearing?” “Why did you not defend yourself?” 
“What were you doing there so late?”), and what, lastly, she 
defines as a culture of “harsh public criticism and threats” 
against the victim of sexual violation in general (28). Alcoff 
labels this “the second rape” (29): the public humiliation 
and harassment that victims often suffer after reporting 
the events. (In fact, Alcoff links this with racism as well, 
since victim vilification may vary depending on the race 
and class of the victim and perpetrators, which highlights 
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the racialization of criminal activity. This is a separate issue, 
which is, of course, very important as Alcoff shows us, but 
I will not analyze it here.) Thus the “second rape” gives us 
the impression that “the public visibility of rape and sexual 
violence is today a complex phenomenon,” and of course it 
is (28). However, it seems to me that there is some tension 
between addressing this problematic, even by institutions 
and media that publicly and on paper say so, and the 
way that these same institutions actually handle these 
situations. I am thinking specifically about Title IX policies 
in universities that are, it seems to me, in place only to 
protect the “image and reputation” of the institution and 
not to protect students or victims, as has been obvious in 
recent polemic (and some still not public) cases, including 
at my own institution. 
Alcoff’s book, though, puts emphasis not on the hidden 
agenda that many institutions have but rather upon what 
she sees as: 
a contestation over the epistemic and discursive 
terms in which sexual violations can enter the 
larger public domain [and] the conventions about 
who can speak, what they can speak about, who 
will be accorded the title of expert, or credible 
witness, how the circulation of speech occurs, and 
what the subsequent effects of the speech will be 
in both discursive and extra-discursive, as well as 
legal and extra-legal, arenas. (29) 
Of course, this raises some kind of tension, or even
contradiction perhaps, between allowing and encouraging
victims to speak up and the ways that their speech is
handled. At this point, Alcoff provides some suggestions
to alleviate the tension: We should all understand how
victims’ speech is framed and circulated; we should build
better practices about the selection and handling of stories,
and about institutional policies (and even ethical norms) to
encourage a more responsible way of covering stories (30);
and we should not forget that these norms and practices
could only apply to and affect institutions, and never
individuals, if we actually want to preserve primary liberties
and rights. In brief, Alcoff suggests that we, as a community
that cares about victims, should “aim for a world in which the
patterns in which our speech circulates can become more
perspicuous as well as subject to critical analysis” (31). 
Accomplishing this, Alcoff says, requires individuals to 
be educated in a way that encourages the development 
of what José Medina labels “meta-lucidity”: The second 
order capacity of reflection upon the ways in which 
one arrives to know something, the skill of being aware 
of one’s own biases, which includes, as Alcoff insists, 
awareness regarding those things upon which we are 
“meta-insensitive,” as well (that is, blind to one’s own 
insensitivities). The strategy that Alcoff proposes, then, is 
to educate with permanent scrutiny on how we learn, know, 
and reason at a meta-level, how to organize our attention 
and perception, and, even better, how we arrive to perceive 
things and produce habits that cross into our conscious 
experience and affect our comprehension of these very 
same sources of information that often are indicative of 
certain structures of inequality and discrimination. 
For some epistemologists of resistance, such as Medina, 
the solution is simply to become acquainted with such 
conditions of perception in order to be aware of the 
“limitations of dominant ways of seeing,” to make 
sure that our perceptual habits are not unfounded or 
unjustified because the whole point is to be considered 
as epistemically responsible agents under conditions 
of oppression. For Alcoff, however, the point must be to 
change the contextual conditions in which institutions form 
and enforce those very same ways of seeing, and change 
existing conditions for many other ways of seeing. 
The problem with Medina’s strategy is that perhaps one 
cannot confront by herself what is called “epistemic 
injustice,” since one can be pushed towards what Luvell 
Anderson has called “hermeneutical impasses.”1 Or, in 
other words, how is one to modify her own epistemic habits 
simply because she witnesses some conflict between her 
beliefs and frameworks of interpretation? It is perfectly 
possible to think of a situation where one may be aware 
of some kind of injustice, but what about someone who 
is not? How should we address this, especially given that 
those who do not see things as unfair dominate institutions 
and institutional narratives? Medina’s strategy seems a little 
bit too simplistic and relativistic. Alcoff provides myriad 
examples of the increased visibility of cases of sexual 
harassment and aggression and the increase of public 
consciousness about it. However, there is a conundrum 
here, since we have seen very little justice for victims and 
only a symbolic punishment of very few notorious cases 
(with a lot of pushback from very prominent people and 
institutions). Alcoff says that this dissatisfaction comes 
from the fact that Medina got things right at a descriptive 
level: Epistemic friction will always exist because there 
will always be different interests and frameworks of 
information. However, Alcoff insists, the prescription does 
not work, since not everything can or must be allowed. So 
the only appeal is to some kind of coherence or consistency 
between the set of views at play. 
According to Alcoff: 
The potential benefits of epistemic friction in 
encouraging more meta-lucidity occur because 
we strive for coherence in our lives, some basic 
consistency. . . . The epistemic pay-off of friction 
occurs when there is communication across 
the silos and a motivation to rethink practices in 
each domain in light of others. . . . The pay-off 
of epistemic friction in enhanced meta-lucidity 
comes about because we are trying to reduce the 
friction. (33) 
To make the claim for coherence, Alcoff states that we 
must put our attention onto the notion of “echoing/ 
echoability” (34). The difficulty and special demands of 
echoing sexual violation seem to isolate the cases of rape. 
However, they do not. They are institutionally embedded 
and permitted, so the echoability of victims’ speech (the 
way that it expands its scope) must work in the same 
ways that other organized protests work. We should work 
together in developing nets of safety and knowledge by 
sharing methods of communication for victims that could 
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generate an understanding of “the limitations of dominant 
ways of seeing” (39).2 That is, we require some kind of 
appropriation for the voice movement, where, first, one can 
report or share experiences in a judgment-free safe space 
and, second, the negative image of the survivor—which 
arises because their credibility is called into question and/ 
or because of hidden institutional agendas—is eliminated. 
In other words, to eliminate the repressive culture against 
the victim and the reporters, we must first create a safe 
space for all where the raped person and her allies are 
neither criminalized nor retaliated against. 
Since what is coherent or consistent may come from 
somewhere or someone else, and that can exclude our 
beliefs, sources, and views, we can’t simply let institutions 
and the people who represent them off the hook. In 
addition, Alcoff explicitly mentions that this is not a solitary 
enterprise, but appeals to individual cases (for example, 
the case of a Muslim activist, fearing repercussions for 
speaking up, who uses anonymity for fighting against 
certain traditions in her community, supposedly in the name 
of everybody who is against such practices) (42). In other 
words, the concerns are these: How can concrete victims’ 
reports have a truth-value if there are no available truth-
conditions that sanction these concrete cases in particular, 
individual terms? How can we believe the reports when we 
still have an immoral institutional culture where the victim 
and their allies are going to be criminalized and punished? 
Because of this, we have much work to do in changing 
the truth-conditions (and the institutional culture) of our 
common ground. Because Alcoff has written an important 
and necessary book, we have some hope for how to shift 
the context of truth-value for survivors. 
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